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    Eurozone inflation rises to 2.9% in December

    Unlock the Editor’s Digest for freeRoula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.Eurozone inflation rose to 2.9 per cent in December, reversing six months of consecutive falls and raising questions over how soon the European Central Bank would start cutting interest rates.The annual rise of consumer prices in the 20 countries that share the euro in December was up from a more than two-year low of 2.4 per cent the previous month, but was slightly lower than the 3 per cent rate forecast by economists in a Reuters poll.The reduction of government subsidies on gas, electricity and food that began last year has triggered a re-acceleration of annual inflation in much of Europe. This has led investors to scale back their bets that the ECB will start rate cuts as early as March, putting a dent in a recent rally in bond markets.But most economists believe eurozone inflation will soon start to fall again. December’s pick-up in price pressures was “just a blip”, said Capital Economics’ Jack Allen-Reynolds, forecasting it would “be reversed in January due to further declines in food and core inflation”.The ECB, which is due to meet to discuss monetary policy on January 25, pushed back against investor expectations of imminent rate cuts last month, saying it wanted to see signs of wage pressures cooling to be sure inflation was on track to hit its 2 per cent target.A mild sell-off in eurozone government bond markets continued in response to Friday’s figures. Germany’s rate-sensitive two-year bond yield was up 0.05 percentage points at 2.59 per cent. Bond yields rise as their prices fall.Diego Iscaro, an economist at S&P Global Market Intelligence, said: “We still believe that market expectations of a first cut coming in March may be too early, as the ECB will want to have more evidence of a moderation in wages before pulling the trigger.” Eurozone energy prices fell 6.7 per cent in the year to December, compared with an annual decline of 11.5 per cent in the previous month, according to the harmonised index of consumer prices published by Eurostat on Friday.Fresh food prices accelerated in December, rising 6.7 per cent compared with 6.3 per cent in the previous month. The pick-up in inflation reflected the comparison with a year earlier when several governments — including those in Germany and France — heavily subsidised gas, electricity and food costs, which drove down the cost of household bills temporarily. Core inflation, which excludes volatile energy and food prices to give a better picture of underlying price pressures, slowed from 3.6 per cent in November to 3.4 per cent in December. Services inflation, which is closely tracked by the ECB to see the impact of rising wages, was flat at 4 per cent. More

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    US jobs market weakened in December, economists predict

    Unlock the Editor’s Digest for freeRoula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.Economists believe the US jobs market weakened in December, bolstering the case for the Federal Reserve to consider cutting interest rates. A poll by Reuters showed economists, on average, predict data published on Friday will show the US economy added 170,000 jobs in December, down from 199,000 in November. The economists also say the number of non-farm payrolls, collated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, will show a small rise in unemployment to 3.8 per cent in December, up from 3.7 per cent a month earlier. The jobs data, due out at 8.30am Eastern time, is a crucial metric for the Fed as its officials assess the health of the US economy — and Friday’s monthly update comes as economists and rate-setters debate how quickly and when the central bank should cut interest rates.Other employment data published by the BLS earlier this week showed the number of new job openings across the US in November fell to its lowest level in two years. Despite the signs of a slowdown in job creation, the December figure would cap a much better than expected year for the US labour market. “We’re likely to have added over 2.7mn jobs over the course of 2023, which would be the strongest performance since 2015 if you exclude the Covid disruptions,” said Gregory Daco, chief economist at EY. “It’s an indication of the robustness of the labour market.” The big question for 2024 is whether a slowdown in the labour market can continue to cool with only minimal impact to the broader economy. The Fed is betting on only a small rise in unemployment to 4.1 per cent by the end of 2024. Officials believe a rise of that magnitude would help lower inflation towards their 2 per cent goal without crashing the economy, paving the way for them to cut rates later this year. The latest projections from US central bank officials, published in December, show they expect the Fed to lower borrowing costs by 75 basis points over the course of 2024.However, some economists are doubtful that such a soft landing for the jobs market can be achieved. “The least likely scenario, in my mind, is that the unemployment rate will gradually drift higher,” said Drew Matus, chief market strategist at MetLife Investment Management. “I am predicting a shallow recession during the first half of this year. And in the past, when we’ve had a recession, we’ve seen the unemployment rate move higher fast.” “The idea underlying the Fed’s message is that the labour market will just slowly weaken over time,” Matus added. “That’s usually not the way it behaves.” Additional reporting by Kate Duguid in New York More

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    Bob Michele: ‘the Fed should start cutting rates’

    This article is an on-site version of our Unhedged newsletter. Sign up here to get the newsletter sent straight to your inbox every weekdayGood morning. Forecasters see the US economy adding 170,000 jobs in December with the unemployment rate nudging up to 3.8 per cent. Just yesterday, though, two labour market measures (ADP payrolls and jobless claims) showed surprising strength. A blowout jobs day wouldn’t be entirely shocking. Email us: [email protected] and [email protected] Interview: Bob MicheleWhen trying to solve bond market mysteries, Unhedged has long depended on the wisdom of Bob Michele. He is co-chief investment officer of JPMorgan Asset Management and leads JPAM’s fixed-income business, with final responsibility for both operations and investment performance. He talks below about where yields are headed, why concerns about fiscal deficits might be overdone — and why the Bank Term Funding Program may have been the Fed’s most important intervention. The interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.Unhedged: You have written that there is a meaningful chance the Fed completes 10, 25 basis-point rate cuts in 2024. The market consensus is for about six. Can you walk us through your thinking? Bob Michele: They’ve only got eight meetings, so you’ve got to do a bunch of 50bp increases in there. But I think they’ve opened the door to that. The pivot at the last meeting was a way for them to say that inflation is pretty much at their target, and if the labour market continues to cool, why not bring down real yields? I agree with them. The fed funds rate at 5.5 per cent, plus quantitative tightening — those policies were designed to bring inflation down from high single digit/low double digit levels, and for unemployment, which was closer to 3 per cent. But inflation has come down a lot. One of the things we like to look at is the six-month annualised rate of core personal consumption expenditure inflation. On that measure, we’re at 1.9 per cent, below the Fed’s 2 per cent target. Two or three years ago, it was at 6.6 per cent. And as inflation has come down, the real fed funds rate has gone up. So even though the Fed hasn’t hiked rates since July, policy has become tighter. The Fed has a lot of capacity to bring rates down here. If they cut by 250bp, that brings the fed funds rate down to 2.75-3 per cent. They have told us that the neutral rate is about 2.5 per cent. If so, that means a real fed funds rate of about half a per cent. So even that is just getting down towards what they consider to be neutral today.Unhedged: At the same time, though, you have flagged that the biggest risk is a hotter than expected economy and a resurgence in inflation.Michele: I tip my hat to the Fed. They have engineered a soft landing. You’re pretty much bang on the 2 per cent inflation target. You’ve got unemployment at 4 per cent or below for 24 consecutive months. They’ve met their dual mandate of full employment and price stability. I just think soft landings are notoriously difficult to maintain, and their best hope of ensuring that we stay in a soft landing is if they gradually start bringing down the fed funds rate; otherwise real rates will be too powerful a headwind. And if they bring rates down too rapidly or end QT too quickly, you run the risk that things accelerate again. To us, those look like roughly equal probabilities. Looking at these tail risks, higher inflation is the one that is more problematic for markets. Businesses and households just absorb the high- rate environment, and suddenly you see home sales start to pick up again, auto sales pick up and businesses invest, and that creates a higher level of inflation. Then the Fed not only has to stop cutting rates, they have to consider hiking rates again, the discount rate on every class has to go back up again, and prices fall. Unhedged: Does a 250bp-cut scenario require changes in the data, such as a clearly rising unemployment rate? Or is more of the same enough?Michele: For us, a soft landing looks like inflation stable around 2 per cent on a three and six month run rate and unemployment at around 4 per cent. That kind of stable environment is when the Fed has scope to continuously bring rates down. Unhedged: Turning to the long end of the curve, with the 10-year Treasury yield at 4 per cent, do you think there is anything left in the duration trade? Michele: There is room for the two-year to come down the most, towards where you would see the terminal fed funds rate, about 2.75 per cent. And then you’d expect the 10-year part of the curve to be somewhere around 3.5 per cent, maybe a little bit lower. [In that scenario] there is a positive term premium and the front end approximates the fed funds rate. It just feels to me if we’re wrong on that, it’s not that rates will be higher, but that rates will be lower.It’s funny, you started this conversation saying this looks like the year for fixed income. But we could have had this conversation in January of last year, when “bonds were back”. What happened to that? We ended the year at exactly the same level on the 10 -ear and with the two-year just a bit higher. What happened is the Fed kept hiking rates into July and investors realised if they just put money in money market funds, they could get a 5 per cent or 6 per cent yield pretty easily. Despite that, money still came into bond funds and bonds did reasonably well. What happens now? If you’re in a year where the Fed starts cutting rates, yields on money market funds come down and cash starts pouring into things like fixed income because this year it’s real. I think we have just below $6tn in money market funds; it’s up $1tn in 2023. And you go back another few years, it has almost doubled. That money could come into the market and chase yields lower than even where theory tells you it could.Unhedged: What is their logical next step for investors? Moving to the middle of the yield curve?  Michele: Money is certainly going to go into general bond funds. So investment-grade securities will do well. And high taxpayers will put it into general municipal bond funds. Professional investors will look at everything and weigh credit versus government bonds and agency mortgages versus high yield and emerging markets. Right now, those look pretty cheap in a soft landing environment. Not perfectly cheap, but if we’re in a soft landing and default rates remain low, then credit spreads on high yield could go through 300bp [down from 370bp today]. Unhedged: Does the logic you just laid out hold for the riskier ends of the credit spectrum, such as in triple-C high-yield bonds or leveraged loans? Do you get paid enough at current spreads to take on that much credit risk? Michele: That’s a really good question because it’s been bifurcated. Nine months ago, we had a regional banking crisis and it looked as though central bank tightening was starting to bite hard. Everyone, including us, assumed at some point in 2023 we would tip into recession. The debate was how deep a recession it would be. So money that did go into high yield went into higher quality, including double-B bonds. Although default rates have gone up a bit in triple-C bonds, in bank loans and in private credit, the reality is they’re still low in historical terms, and there’s still a tremendous amount of dry powder available, particularly in private credit, looking to go in and provide support and restructuring. So if we do stay in this soft landing environment, yes, triple-C credit spreads and bank loans will do well. And I will tell you that just recently we added to both of those in our portfolios. Unhedged: Do worries about the US fiscal situation have a place in constructing a portfolio? Michele: I started in the business in 1981, in the era of twin deficits [a fiscal shortfall combined with a trade deficit, ie, imports exceeding exports]. I was told the US would never be able to balance its budget again, and that the US should never be allowed to fund itself below 10 per cent yields again. And of course yields promptly went from close to 16 per cent down to 1.5 per cent over the next 27-odd years. And during the Clinton administration, we more or less got a balanced budget. So I caution against thinking too much in the near term. We have to step back. We had a pandemic and got the policy response we wanted and needed, which was unlimited fiscal and monetary support. We’re still in the Covid shadow. The Fed is trying to drain some of that liquidity away, and you are seeing more discussions on the fiscal side about how we bring down the deficit with debt-to-GDP looking too high. The next phase I think we go through is, once we fully emerge from the Covid shadow, a period of sustained growth. It could look like it did pre-financial crisis, because of demographics. The 1991 births are the largest population cohort for any single year; they will all earn, spend and save. Just like we saw during the Clinton administration, there will be plenty of growth to generate tax revenue and stabilise the federal deficit and government spending. Importantly, too, we can look at Japan over the last 30 years and ask, at what point does debt-to-GDP not matter? They’ve had debt-to-GDP in the hundreds of per cents for a long period of time, yet have managed to keep things ticking along. Of course, you would like the government to apply more fiscal discipline going forward. But you are seeing a lot more conversation on fiscal discipline coming from Washington. So I’m not that concerned. And I don’t want that to muddy the message that we’re about to see the Fed cut rates. That’s always good for buyers. You always get a bond bull market; don’t miss out on yields here. I think more bad decisions get made in the bond market on supply-demand [dynamics] than anything else I’ve seen. People always, always worry too much about supply, and where demand will come from. Unhedged: Speaking of Japan, should we own yen? JGBs? The Japanese stock market and economy surprised people positively last year. What’s your view?Michele: We did put yen as one of our five surprise projections for 2024, and we do own yen versus dollars in our portfolios. Many clients think we’re crazy. But all we’re doing is taking [the yen-to-dollar exchange rate] back to where it was before the Fed started hiking rates. If you go back to the period between 2019 and 2021, yen traded around 105 to 110 [yen per dollar] for a long period of time. It only knifed higher when the Fed started hiking rates in 2022, when you went from 110 to 152 by October 2022. That’s pretty much the teeth of Fed rate hikes. So if we’re right that just the Fed starts to bring down rates 250bp, you should see a lot of that reverse. And if the once-unthinkable happens that the Bank of Japan starts hiking rates, which appears to us they’re setting the market up to do, likely after their fiscal year changes in March, now you’ve got two powerful tailwinds for yen. Unhedged: Looking back over the period between when inflation first picked up in 2021 through the end of 2023, what calls did you get right and what did you get wrong?Michele: We’ve generally been pretty good. We were calling for the Fed to hike rates meaningfully at the end of 2021 going into 2022 and a meaningful bond bear market. We got a lot of that. Then coming into 2023, we said growth and inflation are just too high; given how far all central banks have hiked rates and the amount of quantitative tightening that’s going on, growth and inflation are going to come down continuously through 2023 and we should be concerned about recession. We did get the decline in growth and inflation. Ultimately, it was good for bond prices. We thought it would be good for high-quality credit. So we got all of that. I would say our biggest miss is we thought that the US economy would be in recession and high-yield credit spreads would reprice wider for that. And neither of those things happened. We went back and tried to figure out how did we miss that, what happened? We go back to the policy response to the regional banking crisis. And it appears to us that through the end of March, we were right. The amount of rate hikes and quantitative tightening were creating fractures in the system, specifically in the regional banking system, and we were headed to a fairly meaningful recession. But then you look at the policy response from the Fed and the Treasury, and it now, in retrospect, looks to us that the Bank Term Funding Program was the equivalent of a 200bp rate cut targeted to the banking system. The problem back in March was that a lot of the regional banks were seeing deposit outflows as customers took cash out to pay for things [amid rising prices] or they were moving cash into money market funds. As their deposit balances went down, they had to start liquidating their securities portfolios to meet deposit outflows, and their securities portfolios were at about $0.90 on the dollar. So of course when you start liquidating securities at $0.90 on the dollar, you become insolvent. That’s why the Fed and the Treasury stepped in with the BTFP, taking securities at $0.90 on the dollar and exchanging them for 100 cents on the dollar to meet deposit outflows. If the average duration of the securities portfolio is about five years, that’s the equivalent of a 200bp rate cut. That’s what we missed: how the policy response to the regional banking crisis stabilised the banking system, which allowed a pretty sharp V-shaped recovery. Unhedged: That suggests that if you can avoid the crisis, you can avoid the recession. In a tightening cycle, something usually breaks. If you can stop that, you have a much better chance of steering around recession.Michele: You’re exactly right. Much higher interest rates create a higher cost of funding everything. While slowing things down, it also creates a frailty throughout the system, which exposes you to a shock. We got that shock in the regional banking system, but the policy response came very quickly. The one soft landing I’ve lived through is 1995. Remember, the Fed hiked rates over a 12-month period from January 1994 to January 1995, going from 3 per cent to 6 per cent. But then they started cutting rates very quickly thereafter because they saw things slowing down. And I feel that given where rates and quantitative tightening are, we’re in a similar position where we know the broader economy is vulnerable to a shock. We already saw that in the regional banking system. Now that inflation has come down, before the next shock materialises, the Fed should start cutting rates and take away some of that vulnerability.One good readAre retail-focused “alts” funds any good?FT Unhedged podcastCan’t get enough of Unhedged? Listen to our new podcast, hosted by Ethan Wu and Katie Martin, for a 15-minute dive into the latest markets news and financial headlines, twice a week. Catch up on past editions of the newsletter here.Recommended newsletters for youSwamp Notes — Expert insight on the intersection of money and power in US politics. Sign up hereChris Giles on Central Banks — Your essential guide to money, interest rates, inflation and what central banks are thinking. Sign up here More

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    What can investors expect from 2024?

    Forecasting the economic and financial outlook for the coming year is always difficult. In 2020, the surprise came in the form of a global pandemic; in 2022, it was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For 2024, the known unknowns come in two categories: economics and politics.The likely good news comes in the form of falling inflation and the widespread expectation that the Federal Reserve, and other central banks, will start to cut interest rates during the year. Anticipation of this policy shift sparked a strong rally in US equities in November and December, making 2023 the best year for global equities since 2019. The potential downside, however, is that monetary policy has a lagged effect. Some economists worry that the monetary tightening in 2022 and 2023 will have an adverse economic impact in 2024. So the big issue for 2024 is whether the central banks have got it right. Have they done enough to slow inflation without sending the economy into recession? Alternatively, are inflationary impulses so ingrained that central banks may have to tighten once more over the coming year?For UK investors and savers, the answers to these questions will be vital in determining the best way of allocating their portfolios and the returns they are likely to make. Should they opt for equities as the best long-term bet or take advantage of the better returns now available on savings accounts?Cross-currents aheadA broader concern is whether China is starting to lose its role as the driving force of the world economy; it provided almost half of global GDP growth over the past 10 years. Dhaval Joshi of BCA Research argues that Chinese residential property is massively overvalued. The Chinese government cannot risk letting house prices fall, given the potential impact on the wealth of ordinary citizens. Instead he says that the Chinese will engineer “a reduction in housing development and construction activity to equilibrate supply with collapsing demand.” He says: “This has huge implications for the world economy because China’s construction and infrastructure boom has been the world’s main growth engine, and that engine is about to die.”Such concerns explain why economists are generally quite cautious about the outlook for 2024. Citibank, for example, expects global GDP growth to be just 1.9 per cent and Deutsche Bank 2.4 per cent. Such figures are very weak by the standards of the past three decades. Meanwhile, expectations for US growth are in the 1-2 per cent range — respectable, but hardly dazzling. In the UK, the Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts a sluggish 0.7 per cent GDP rise for the year.Forecasters are often wrong, of course. US growth in 2023 was better than expected. The strength of the labour market has been a constant surprise in many parts of the world. Despite slow growth, UK unemployment is still just 4.2 per cent, while in the US it is even lower at 3.7 per cent.However, even if growth turns out to be better than expected, the US equity market has priced in quite a lot of good news. The price/earnings ratio on the S&P 500 is more than 25, based on the last year’s earnings; on the longer-term cyclically-adjusted ratio, it is 31.That valuation strength owes much to the technology sector, which remains the darling of investors. The top 10 stocks in the S&P 500 make up about one-third of the index, the highest proportion since the dotcom bubble of 2000. Of that top 10, the largest six (Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Nvidia and Meta) are in the tech sector, while the seventh biggest, Tesla, the car company, owes much to its technological expertise.The big tech companies have attracted ire from regulators and politicians, based on their monopolistic positions, intrusions into privacy and their control (or failure to control) free speech on their networks. If regulators or political leaders take significant action, tech shares could be vulnerable to a derating. Even without regulatory action, tech shares could lose momentum; Apple’s sales have fallen for four consecutive quarters, for example.There is also something of a soft underbelly about the US corporate sector. Torsten Slok of Apollo Global Management points out that 40 per cent of companies in the Russell 2000 index have negative earnings. That is around the level seen during the 2007-08 financial crisis. In addition, both Chapter 11 bankruptcies and default rates on corporate bonds are trending higher, doubtless a response to rising interest rates.A year for equities? Furthermore, there are worrying signs at the global level. The profits for companies in the MSCI World index were flat in 2023, according to Ed Yardeni of Yardeni Research. Revenues were also sluggish, showing just a 1 per cent increase. Investors are more hopeful about 2024, with analysts pencilling in a 10 per cent earnings increase at the global level. However, analysts usually start the year in an optimistic mood, revising down forecasts only when faced with grim reality.Despite these concerns, it is certainly possible that equities will have a good 2024; stock markets are often described as climbing a “wall of worry”. Falling interest rates are generally good for shares, as long as they are not accompanied by a very deep recession. The oil price is well down on its levels in 2022, when investors were spooked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Lower oil prices should bring some relief to both consumers and businesses. If, as many suspect, China’s growth rate slows, commodity prices in general will come under pressure and that should help to bring inflation down further.Falling commodity prices and a sluggish Chinese economy are not a great combination for emerging markets. But the prospect of lower US interest rates in 2024 should allow central banks in developing countries to cut interest rates. In short, as with other equity markets, the outlook is distinctly mixed.On the surface, the prospects for the government bond market in the US and UK seem more clear than for the equity market. If inflation has peaked, and central banks are able to cut interest rates, then government bonds should do reasonably well. Some of the good news is already reflected in the price; the 10-year US Treasury bond yield has dropped from 5 per cent in October to around 3.9 per cent today. If investors believe the Fed can maintain inflation at around 2 per cent over the next decade, that represents a reasonably positive real return. In the UK, 10-year gilt yields are about 3.7 per cent. Again, if the Bank of England meets its 2 per cent inflation target, gilts should generate a positive real return.Election seasonSometimes, of course, the market can be derailed by events (like the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) that do not have their underlying drivers in economics. In 2024, these events could stem from politics. The primary concern is elections in the UK and the US. At the moment, the Labour party seems likely to win a majority in a UK election that is likely to occur in May or October. As Labour is now led by the moderate Sir Keir Starmer, following the more leftwing Jeremy Corbyn, a change of government is unlikely to startle investors. But if a hung Parliament were to seem likely, in which Labour was dependent on support from the Scottish National party, uncertainty would increase.In the US, November’s election seems likely to be a repeat of the 2020 contest between Joe Biden and Donald Trump, candidates with a combined age on election day of 159. The markets did pretty well under the first Trump administration so it might seem as if investors have little to worry about. But the circumstances of the 2020 election should be very concerning to all those who worry about the long-term stability of the US. Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator, wrote that a Trump win would mean the US was “no longer committed to democratic norms”.If Trump loses, he is likely, once again, to refuse to accept the result, leading to unrest by his supporters. And there is also a chance that he might try to use the tactics he suggested in 2020 in an effort to win — for example, using his supporters in state governments to alter the slate of electors in contravention of the recorded vote. That might lead to widespread protest by opponents of his rule and prolonged legal action that would keep the outcome in doubt. So there could be plenty of turmoil at the end of 2024.More broadly, geopolitical risks that might emerge this year include further aggression from Vladimir Putin’s Russia. This might occur if he is emboldened by success in Ukraine (due to a loss of support for the invaded nation from the US) or if he is frustrated by the failure of his invasion. There is the obvious risk that Israel’s attempt to eliminate Hamas from Gaza will lead to a wider Middle East conflict. And there is also a danger that China might decide to strike against Taiwan, particularly if it feels that the US is weakened by its internal divisions.There are always political worries, of course, and in most years, the world manages to muddle through. If, as expected, the Fed cuts interest rates several times next year, consumers should feel more prosperous and the turbulence of a Trump victory can be avoided. All this should support both stock and bond markets. But it would be unwise to be too confident. The past few years have shown that negative surprises can come in many forms and, after the recent rally, the US stock market is priced on the assumption that good news will persist.Forty years of the FTSE 100© Victor Blackman/Express/Getty ImagesThis year marks the 40th anniversary of the FTSE 100 index, which was created in 1984 to replace the rather old-fashioned FT-30 as the main benchmark of the UK stock market. The index’s history can be divided into halves. In the first, between the start of 1984 and the end of 1999, the benchmark had lots of momentum, advancing from its original level of 1,000 to almost 7,000 at the end of the last millennium. Since then, it has been very slow progress. The 7,000 mark was not properly breached until 2015 and while the 8,000 mark was passed early in 2023, the index is still stuck in the 7,000-8,000 range.To put that performance in perspective, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was only just above 1,000 at the start of 1984 but trades in the mid-30,000s today. The broader S&P 500 was 164 at the start of 1984 and is in the mid-4,000s now. Instead of mimicking the entrepreneurial US, the UK market has behaved rather more like corporatist France; Paris’s CAC 40 index started in 1987 with a level of 1,000 and is in the mid-7000s today.Part of the reason for Footsie’s sluggish performance relative to the Dow or the S&P 500 is the lack of a thriving technology sector. In 1984, when the internet was a twinkle in the eye of Tim Berners-Lee, the UK’s leading index had two technology stocks. Forty years later, it still does. It was a sign of the times when Arm, the chip designer, decided to list in the US rather than the UK when it returned to the market in September. In some ways, the UK market is frozen in aspic; almost a quarter of the index in 1984 was composed of financials and real estate; they make up the same proportion of the index today.However, at the individual stock level, there has been plenty of change. Just 26 of the original 100 constituents have survived, although not all in the same form. The best performer over the 40 years is RELX, an analytics and information company. Back in 1984, when it was Reed International, a book and magazine publisher, it would probably not have been many people’s pick as the stock that would rise more than sixtyfold over the next 40 years. But a merger with Elsevier, a Dutch scientific publisher, in 1993 transformed the group’s prospects.The other four of the top five performers over the past 40 years are all in the consumer staples sector, which is not often tipped by pundits selecting the next hot stock. But Unilever, Associated British Foods and Reckitt Benckiser all sell goods that consumers demand, year after year, while British American Tobacco produces goods that some people simply cannot do without.That said, selling to consumers has not been a sure-fire route to success; two of the five worst-performing stocks have been J Sainsbury and Marks and Spencer, which have each seen their positions eroded by competition. But the two worst performers of all are Lloyds Bank and NatWest. The latter has a complicated history. The original NatWest was taken over in 2000 by the Royal Bank of Scotland, as part of an acquisition spree that turned RBS into the world’s biggest bank. After RBS collapsed in the 2008 financial crisis, it reverted to the NatWest name. If the FTSE 100 index is to do better in the next 40 years than the past four decades, it is going to need to depend less on financials and more on some dynamic sectors. More

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    Is the west talking itself into decline?

    Unlock the Editor’s Digest for freeRoula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.The industrial revolution was one of the most important events in human history. Over a handful of decades, technological breakthroughs kicked economic output off its centuries-long low plateau and sent populations, living standards and life expectancy soaring.Yet for all its vital importance, there is still disagreement over why all this took off when and where it did.One of the most compelling arguments comes from US economic historian Robert Allen, who argues that Britain’s successes in commerce in the 16th and 17th centuries pushed wages up and energy costs down, creating strong incentives to substitute energy and capital for labour and to mechanise manufacturing processes. Others place greater emphasis on the role of UK institutions, while some argue that innovative ideas emerged as a result of increasing interactions among growing and densifying populations.Another interesting theory is that of economic historian Joel Mokyr, who argues in his 2016 book A Culture of Growth that it was broader cultural change that laid the groundwork for the industrial revolution. Prominent British thinkers including Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton championed a progress-oriented view of the world, centred on the idea that science and experimentation were key to increasing human wellbeing.While persuasive, Mokyr’s theory has until recently been only that: a theory. But a fascinating paper published last month by a quartet of economists puts some evidence behind the argument. The researchers analysed the contents of 173,031 books printed in England between 1500 and 1900, tracking how the frequency of different terms changed over time, which they use as a proxy for the cultural themes of the day.They found a marked increase in the use of terms related to progress and innovation starting in the early 17th century. This supports the idea that “a cultural evolution in the attitudes towards the potential of science accounts in some part for the British industrial revolution and its economic take-off”.To explore whether this holds for other countries, I have adapted and extended their analysis to include Spain, which was economically competitive with Britain well into the 17th century, but then fell behind. Using data from millions of books digitised as part of the Google Ngram project, I have found that the upsurge in discussions of progress in British books occurs about two centuries before the same uptick in Spain, mirroring trends in the countries’ economic development.And it’s not just that people talk more about progress when their country is moving forward. In both, culture evolved before growth accelerated.The finding that language and culture can play important roles in triggering economic development has major implications for the west today.Extending the same analysis to the present, a striking picture emerges: over the past 60 years the west has begun to shift away from the culture of progress, and towards one of caution, worry and risk-aversion, with economic growth slowing over the same period. The frequency of terms related to progress, improvement and the future has dropped by about 25 per cent since the 1960s, while those related to threats, risks and worries have become several times more common.That simultaneous rise in language associated with caution could well be not a coincidence but an equal and opposite force acting against growth and progress.Ruxandra Teslo, one of a growing community of progress-focused writers at the nexus of science, economics and policy, argues that the growing scepticism around technology and the rise in zero-sum thinking in modern society is one of the defining ideological challenges of our time.Some may counter that a rebalancing of priorities from perpetual advancement to caution is a good thing, but this could be a catastrophic mistake. As well as economic growth, the drive for progress brought us modern medicine, significantly longer and healthier lives, plentiful food supplies, dramatic reductions in poverty, and ever more and ever cheaper renewable energy. The challenges facing the modern world will be solved by more focus on progress, not less.The pre-industrial world was one of mass conflict, exploitation and suffering. If we are to avoid backsliding, advocates for innovation, growth and abundance must defeat the [email protected], @jburnmurdoch More

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    Shipping blues get a hand from Red Sea disruption

    Unlock the Editor’s Digest for freeRoula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.Few industries are more sensitive to geopolitics than the one that moves goods from factories in the east to consumers in the west. Open seas and giant container ships have made globalisation and the wealth it creates possible. But supply chains are a tightly run ship and when blown off course, as the pandemic showed, large swings in prices and sentiment occur.Dominated by a few huge companies like Switzerland’s MSC and Denmark’s Maersk, container lines operate like a regular conveyor belt across the oceans. Many customers buy space as and when availability and prices suit them. This leaves the industry with a high reliance on short-term or spot prices that are attuned to supply and demand. This is efficient when things are working properly but also susceptible to volatility. That means earnings for shipping companies and their shareholders also have a tendency for exaggerated cyclicality.Yemeni rebels are the latest ill wind to hit, causing disruption in the Red Sea with attacks on ships. The route is a critical choke point that leads to the Suez Canal, through which about 12 per cent of global trade passes. Maersk said this week it would pause transits along the route due to the rising risk. It will instead route ships around South Africa, a journey that can add up to two weeks to a voyage. Transits along the route are almost 70 per cent higher so far this year, according to the IMF’s Portwatch service. This is sparking fears of a supply crunch of ship capacity.The disruption comes at a particularly sensitive time, notes Philip Damas of Drewry Shipping Consultants, with China’s producers rushing to get goods to Europe before they shut for Chinese new year. Rates for 40ft containers to Northern Europe from China have risen from $1,148 at the end of November last year to about $4,000 today. Damas expects rates to remain elevated for at least the next month. That is also boosting share prices for shipping lines. Maersk and Germany’s Hapag-Lloyd are up about 20 per cent over the same period.You are seeing a snapshot of an interactive graphic. This is most likely due to being offline or JavaScript being disabled in your browser.This is good for investors at first glance, but the industry continues to battle the hangover of previous price volatility. Before the recent conflict, share prices for the groups were close to three-year lows. This was due to fears of an oversupply of capacity as a result of record ship orders placed during the pandemic. Freight rates soared in the Covid period on global disruption and new ship deliveries are expected to peak this year. That could push global overcapacity to a record 25 per cent this year, according to Drewry. That explains why freight rates and share prices were in the doldrums. That could, however, tighten by as much as 9 percentage points if the Red Sea route remains fully closed for the rest of the year, adds Damas. That would still leave the industry oversupplied by levels experienced during a previous industry slump prior to 2019. The industry response has been to consolidate. The five largest companies now control 65 per cent of the market, up from 45 per cent in 2016. Still the industry is expected to make an operating loss as a whole this year. Even with sharp lay-offs to come, Maersk might lose $500mn this year, according to Visible Alpha consensus. A rebel-provoked rally in freight rates might help soften that. But the fundamentals of too many container ships on the seas will be a more powerful force dictating earnings in the coming years.Footsie to its friendsLex features the FTSE 100 index, or at least its constituents, on an almost daily basis. Awkwardly, it was not always that way. When it was born 40 years ago this week, the index that would help revolutionise markets was initially named the “SE 100”. It was not until a rebrand over a month later to include “FT” that Lex initiated coverage, dubbing the index “footsie to its friends”.The FTSE 100 was originally conceived to help the London futures market offer more products. Lex noted it “should gain a following in the equity cash market as well”.Its anniversary offers an opportunity for amusement at past understatements. But it also comes at a time of serious soul-searching for UK equity markets. The FTSE 100 and its sister indices will require fresh impetus to gee them up for the next 40 years. Membership of the FTSE 100 no longer holds the prestige it once did, even with the index money that now tracks its constituents. It trades at a 45 per cent discount to the S&P 500 on forward earnings, partly because of its lack of large tech companies. The discount to the MSCI world index, ex-the US, is smaller but still not inconsiderable at 19 per cent. Companies such as Smurfit Kappa have highlighted that valuation gap in seeking to move their primary listings to New York. Weaker liquidity is also blamed for London missing out on big listings, such as that of UK chipmaker Arm last year. Once upon a time the cachet, and cash, attached to FTSE inclusion was seen as easily outweighing the governance strictures of joining the club of “premium” stocks on the London market. No longer. Changes to listing rules are undeniably chipping away at the shareholder protection the UK market once wore as a badge of pride.The index itself, with its own rules set by FTSE Russell, will need to keep pace with modernisation efforts. But that won’t address underlying challenges. Efforts to boost the flow of pension fund money into the market, while welcome, will not bear fruit quickly — with calls for more immediate action, including a “British Isa”, growing. The truth is that no proposal in isolation can bring the quick fix that City reformers desire. But birthdays are a time to take stock — and the FTSE 100, born out of London’s desire to grow and succeed, needs that if it is to repeat the feat in the decades to come. More

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    Don’t take closing the gap between rich and poor countries for granted

    Unlock the Editor’s Digest for freeRoula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.If you are reading this, congratulations, you have won a sort of lottery. About 700mn people around the world survive on less than $2.15 a day, the World Bank’s poverty line. That is less than half the price of one turmeric latte in Washington DC. How to close the gap between poor and rich countries? The question has occupied generations of great economists, including the late Robert Solow, a Nobel laureate who died on December 21 2023. His model of growth “continues to be extremely prescient and relevant”, says Michael Kremer of the University of Chicago, another laureate. If only the convergence it predicted was easier to pin down. Solow had a fascinating life, growing up in the Depression and temporarily dropping his studies to intercept Nazi communications. In the decade after the second world war, he saw European economies rebounding quickly. As he put it, the question of why some countries grow faster than others was “in the air”.The model he wrote became foundational; iterations are still taught today. Its predictions were striking. Start with two countries with identical savings rates, population growth rates and access to technology. Then assume that the returns on investment fall as you get more of it. With a smattering of algebra, one can show that countries starting off poorer should grow faster than richer peers.This “unconditional convergence” was a neat — and optimistic — idea. But it was also a statistical minefield. One 1986 study seemed to find evidence among a group of sixteen rich countries. But as the economist Debraj Ray describes, it would be easy to spot convergence to superstardom among a top basketball team. Inferring that a random group of wannabes will tend towards the top tier would be a leap too far.Broader number crunching led economists to give up on unconditional convergence. Depressingly, for centuries poorer countries had been no more likely to grow quickly than richer ones. Only when one accounted for differences between countries, in factors like population growth or investment rates, did (conditional) convergence hold.Then something extraordinary happened. Around the mid-1990s, poorer countries started to experience growth that was higher relative to richer ones, less volatile and more persistent. The trend was broad, and not driven by any single country such as China. One study published in 2021 triumphantly called it “The new era of unconditional convergence.”A different study published in 2021 by Kremer, Jack Willis of Columbia University and Yang You of the University of Hong Kong found that the change coincided with countries becoming increasingly similar in lots of other ways too, including their rates of population growth, investment and government spending. Although the authors were careful to point out that it was unclear what was causing what, it is possible that increasingly similar policies helped poorer countries converge with richer ones. If you buy that idea, it’s grounds for optimism, says Willis. It suggests that history is not destiny and that deep disadvantages can be overcome.Unfortunately, this new golden era may already have ended. The latest data from the World Bank confirms that over the 2000s the dispersion in income per person across a consistent set of 204 countries did fall. But starting around the mid-2010s, it plateaued, a trend that the pandemic only temporarily disrupted.Measuring convergence differently, in the 2000s and 2010s poorer countries grew faster than richer ones. But starting in 2015, income per person was essentially uncorrelated with growth up to 2022. Between 2019 and 2022 poorer countries grew more slowly than richer peers.You are seeing a snapshot of an interactive graphic. This is most likely due to being offline or JavaScript being disabled in your browser.It would be comforting to cling on to the hope of unconditional convergence. Perhaps very recent trends say more about the strangeness of Covid-19 than they do about a new era. Maybe richer countries’ strong fiscal responses enabled a quicker recovery, an effect that will fade over time. Jared Rubin of Chapman University suggests a gloomier take, that the convergence of the early 2000s was just a one-off shift of workers into the global labour market. In other words, the low-hanging fruit of globalisation. Meanwhile institutions like the World Bank seem pessimistic about development, given climate change, higher interest rates and frail democratic institutions.When discussing growth theory, Solow once said that “many more questions have been asked than answered”. That is still true. We don’t know exactly how to make sure poorer countries catch up with richer ones. But we do know that there is nothing automatic about it. [email protected] More