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    COP28: What to expect at UN climate talks

    Unlock the Editor’s Digest for freeRoula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.Tens of thousands of people are expected to descend on Dubai in the United Arab Emirates in the next few days for the UN’s COP28 climate summit where, during the next two weeks, negotiators will spend long hours haggling over how to limit global warming.COP talks are often fractious. This year, diplomats are expected to argue over whether to phase out fossil fuels and who should help poorer nations pay for climate damages.This article is part of an FT special report into Managing Climate Change, publishing on Thursday November 30, at the start of the COP28 summit. • Visit the FT’s climate hub • Follow our COP28 coverageScientists are increasingly concerned about rapid warming and the frequent extreme weather events propelled by it. For the world to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement — struck at COP21 in 2015, to limit global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels — scientists from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change now say greenhouse gas emissions need to fall by 43 per cent by 2030 compared with 2019.As a result, an important part of the COP28 agenda is the “global stocktake” to assess progress countries have made towards cutting emissions. This year’s summit is expected to make clear that the world is not on track to limit global warming by the amount agreed in Paris and that more needs to be done. But by whom, and how, will be among the key questions up for debate. The global stocktakeParties at COP28 will be expected to sign off on a document measuring how the world is progressing in reducing emissions in line with the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5C.Countries will then need to agree on pathways to bring emissions under control. According to a UN report released this month, the world is heading for a temperature rise of between 2.5C and 2.9C and must take urgent action.COP28 starts on November 30 and lasts for two weeks More

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    The US retains the economic advantage in its rivalry with China

    Unlock the Editor’s Digest for freeRoula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.Not long ago, “most governments had believed that closer economic integration would promote long-term prosperity. Now, integration is seen as a source of risk and insecurity.” This is how London-based Capital Economics introduces an intriguing analysis of “the shape of the fractured world economy in 2024”. Economics and politics always interact. Today, however, politics has become more important. Its concept then is of a global economy being reshaped by fraught relations between the US and China.Capital Economics argues that countries can be divided into five groups: the US and its close allies; countries that lean towards the US; the unaligned; those that lean towards China; and China and its close allies. The first group consists of the US and Canada, Europe (except Hungary), Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The second group includes, above all, India, but also Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, Turkey and South Korea. The unaligned group includes, significantly, Brazil, Indonesia and Nigeria. The group of countries leaning towards China includes Argentina (true, until a few days ago!), much of Africa (including South Africa), Iraq, Kazakhstan and, suggests Capital Economics, Saudi Arabia. Finally, China’s strong allies include Russia, Iran and Pakistan.A fundamental distinction exists between the first group and all others. The high-income democracies share core values (although whether they continue to do so will depend on the results of the 2024 US presidential election). The other groupings are defined far more by what they are against than what they are for. Russia and Iran are allies of convenience for China, and vice versa. They share an enemy. But they are still very different from one another. Yet such alliances of convenience can shape both economic and political relationships. The enemy of my enemy may, for a while, indeed be a good friend.Here then are some relevant data.The China bloc accounts for half of the world’s (non-Antarctic) land mass, compared with 35 per cent for the US bloc. It is also home to slightly more of the world’s people (46 per cent, against 43 per cent). But it still generates only 27 per cent of the world’s GDP, nearly all of that in China itself, compared with 67 per cent in the US bloc. This is because, crucially, most of the world’s high-income countries are in the latter.The ways that balance might change is for the US bloc to disintegrate, probably under Donald Trump, or for the Chinese economy to grow faster than Capital Economics now expects. The latter’s pessimism on China’s prospects may be excessive, but it is far from absurd. China does, indeed, face strong headwinds against high growth over the next quarter of a century. Unsurprisingly, the China bloc is more important in industry than in GDP. Thus, its share of world industrial output was 38 per cent in 2022, against 55 per cent for the US bloc. Whether China’s bloc reaches equality in industry over the next quarter century depends mainly on the performance of Indian manufacturing relative to China’s. In agriculture, the China bloc generates 49 per cent of output, compared with 38 per cent for the US bloc, because it contains many commodity producers.In 2022, 144 countries traded more goods with China than with the US. The US was the bigger trading partner for only 60 countries. But half of global goods trade was among countries classed as in the US bloc. This wider perspective is really useful. Germany, for example, is widely thought to be the US ally with the tightest trade links with China. But only 11 per cent of its goods trade was with the China bloc in the second quarter of 2023, while 86 per cent was with others in the US bloc, principally its European partners.You are seeing a snapshot of an interactive graphic. This is most likely due to being offline or JavaScript being disabled in your browser.In financial activities and capital flows, the US bloc remains dominant. While its place in foreign direct investment has shrunk over the last quarter of a century, it still accounted for 84 per cent of the total FDI stock by investor country and 87 per cent by recipient in 2022. This is because the world’s dominant corporations and the most attractive destinations remain within it. This gap will not close under Xi Jinping.Some 86 per cent of global portfolio investment also lies within the US bloc and only 2 per cent within the China bloc. FDI between the US and China blocs is three times FDI within the China bloc: Russia and Iran may be China’s allies of convenience, but only fools would put much of their capital in such economically benighted petrostates. Chinese investors are not such fools.You are seeing a snapshot of an interactive graphic. This is most likely due to being offline or JavaScript being disabled in your browser.Foreign exchange reserves still predominantly consist of assets denominated in the US currency and those of its allies. In the second half of 2023, these accounted for 87 per cent of foreign currency reserves, only a little down from 89 per cent three years earlier. This is because only these countries supply liquid long-term financial assets. They may not be as safe as they used to be, given the use of sanctions. But no good alternatives exist. China is most unlikely to wish to supply them, since that would require liberalisation and opening of its financial markets, including markets in Chinese public debt.Many countries wish to see the US and its allies, the dominant powers of the last two centuries, taken down more than just a peg or two. But they are more united and economically powerful than China’s group of malcontents. The event likely to change this balance quickly would be a US decision to tear its alliances to pieces. That would be one of the most dramatically self-harming acts in global history. It would take far longer for the China bloc to surpass the US bloc on all relevant aspects of economic weight. It may never do [email protected] Martin Wolf with myFT and on Twitter More

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    Do we still need to talk about inflation?

    This article is an on-site version of our Chris Giles on Central Banks newsletter. Sign up here to get the newsletter sent straight to your inbox every TuesdayWith US readers back at work after their Thanksgiving weekend, the indications suggest shoppers were out in force, boosting the already strong US economy. In other developments, I am recovering from being quoted in a House of Lords report saying that quite a lot of the text in the Bank of England’s remit was “simply flab” which required “a good editor”. More on that below. Email me: [email protected] D King on inflationEarlier this year, Stephen D King published an acclaimed book, We Need to Talk About Inflation, outlining lessons he thought we needed to learn from the surge in prices over recent years. Last week, the HSBC senior economic adviser gave the annual Wincott lecture in London.In summary, he said inflation was not about to crawl obediently into a box marked “no need to open until 2060”. I caught up with him for lunch earlier this week. The interview below has been edited for clarity and concision.Chris Giles: Your book asked us to talk about inflation. Now most people say the devil has been slain. Why is that wrong? Stephen King: Even now inflation is persistently overshooting targets. The majority of central banks have struggled to get inflation down to 2 per cent and the costs have been very visible in terms of much higher interest rates than anyone could have possibly imagined two or three years ago. Even in the US, which has been one of the most successful in reducing inflation, core inflation there is still higher than it was when Jay Powell talked about inflation being transitory. That was back in August 2021. So, I would say that central banks still have a fight on their hands. Chris Giles: What’s causing the stickiness in inflation?Stephen King: The first thing is very simple — a repeat of the 1970s — which is to say that there was a refusal to admit that inflation was not just being caused by external shocks. Second, it’s also how you’re perceived to react to those external shocks as a policymaker. If you simply claim that the shocks will come today and be gone tomorrow and you’re quite relaxed about it, there’s a significant risk that inflation will gain a domestic foothold, which is then difficult to get rid of. The Fed rejected the transitory language quite early on when, in late 2021, Jay Powell said essentially, “OK, we’re going to retire the word transitory”. And ever since then the Fed has given a pretty clear indication of the fight on its hands. But it strikes me that the Bank of England was still using what amounted to transitory language all the way through until the early months of 2023. And with UK wage growth running at almost 8 per cent a year with zero productivity growth, there’s no way that can be possibly consistent with an easy return to the inflation target. Chris Giles: Why do central banks need to get inflation sustainably back to their previous 2 per cent targets? Stephen King: The risk of slippage is quite high. Institutionally this raises the possibility that central banks either raise their own inflation targets or have them raised for them. By all means have a debate about raising inflation targets, but it’s probably best not to talk about it when inflation has been persistently above target for quite a long time. It just looks like you’re trying to accommodate something and then you begin to embed inflation into society. The problem with inflation ultimately is that it’s a deeply unfair, undemocratic process. I think that over the past 30 years when inflation has been low, people have forgotten about that aspect of inflation. They think of it perhaps as a sort of technocratic difficulty that central banks are there to solve. But actually it’s a political and social evil that redistributes income in an entirely arbitrary fashion. Chris Giles: We’ve seen some welcome supply shocks with rising labour participation in the US and lower natural gas prices in Europe. Does this mean that interest rates have now risen too far and will squeeze the economy too much?Stephen King: Some of the inflationary headwinds were always going to reverse. I’m not going to complain about that. But I think that the broader story of what was known as the Great Moderation is something which has been in trouble for longer than just the energy price shocks during Covid and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We had a deflationary tailwind for many decades associated with hyper globalisation, borders and barriers collapsing around the world leading to tremendous efficiency gains. For any given growth rate, you could have lower inflation than previously. It was all easy. The deteriorating relationship between Beijing and Washington, Brexit, friendshoring, reshoring, the rise of nationalism and populism are all signs of a shift long term away from that deflationary tailwind towards an inflationary headwind. So, yes, we’ve had some very good news in certain specific areas over the course of the last year or so. But the idea that we’re going to return easily to conditions before the global financial crisis doesn’t hold water.Chris Giles: Higher interest rates are now making governments’ budgets less sustainable. How do you think that’s going to play out?Stephen King: At the moment it’s like, no one cares, but they will care soon because the extra money being paid out in interest will begin to look quite frightening. If the bond market begins to penalise you, you’re limited in terms of the options that are available to you. Obviously, you can raise taxes, but that is tricky. You can cut government spending, but you’ve got tremendous upward pressure from ageing, from additional defence spending and from the green transition to be coming through in the years to come. So if you can’t do much in terms of your standard fiscal policy, you’re left with a variety of what we might describe as non-conventional approaches to fiscal stabilisation — default, regulatory change that allows governments to jump to the front of the credit queue or financial repression of one kind or another. All would be damaging in terms of long-term growth. The final option is inflation. And the truth is that inflation has been the preferred course of action for governments over centuries and centuries, when ultimately the fiscal numbers just don’t add up. So, I think it’s fine to pretend that fiscal and monetary linkages don’t exist anymore, central banks are independent etc. But if you have these rapidly deteriorating fiscal positions, you’d have to think that inflation is an option that is back on the table.Remits, accountability and challengeOn Monday the august House of Lords economics affairs committee published a review of the Bank of England, 26 years after the government announced it would become independent. It said the UK’s central bank, along with most others, had made “errors” in dealing with inflation, but when I spoke to the committee chair, Lord Bridges, he said that the report’s recommendations could be summarised in three words: “remits, accountability and challenge”. Bridges reminded me I had given evidence to the committee. At the hearing, I riffed that the additional text added to the BoE’s remit since 1997 was mostly flab, needed a good editor and many of the secondary objectives added to the BoE’s duties were really functions of government rather than the central bank (helping first-time homebuyers, for example). Sir John Vickers, former BoE chief economist, said any remit should pass a “Crick and Watson test” with fewer than 900 words, the length of the academic paper explaining the structure of DNA. Journalists are often all mouth and no trousers, so I feel I need to put my words into action. In this article on my LinkedIn page, I have slashed the Monetary Policy Committee remit from its current 1,449 words to 766 words, trying to retain all relevant points. I am only an adequate editor, but this took just 15 minutes. One example is to cut this paragraph:The inflation target is forward-looking to ensure inflation expectations are firmly anchored in the medium term. The government believes that low and stable medium-term inflation is an essential pre-requisite for economic prosperity.To this. The second sentence adds nothing apart from redundant words to a remit, since it duplicates an earlier passage.The inflation target is forward-looking to ensure inflation expectations are firmly anchored in the medium term. I’d love to know whether I’ve cut something crucial. [email protected] I’ve been reading and watchingThe Fed and the ECB released minutes of their most recent meetings, with both seeing it as an opportunity to persuade financial markets they really are not thinking about cutting interest rates. The BoE joined the party with an FT interview of Huw Pill, the chief economist. The ECB has also warned that it can see the first signs of commercial bank stresses arising in rising loan losses in commercial banks. For now, though, they are making record profits. In Argentina, the planned dollarisation (without dollars) looks troubled within a week. Talking of remits, UK chancellor Jeremy Hunt appeared to have seen a draft of the House of Lords report and cut environmental objectives from the BoE’s financial policy committee remit. That was welcome, but provoked quite a lot of manufactured outrage. I can’t resist a plug for my column highlighting research that finds no increase in US income inequality over 60 years. To the extent that the Auten Splinter paper is true (and it has just been accepted in a top academic journal), it upends everything we thought we knew. Recommended newsletters for you Free lunch — Your guide to the global economic policy debate. Sign up hereUnhedged — Robert Armstrong dissects the most important market trends and discusses how Wall Street’s best minds respond to them. Sign up here More

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    Italy’s Salvini says would consider a sound plan to sell railway stake

    On Monday Salvini, who is also deputy prime minister, was quoted as saying that he was against selling a stake in the company.But in comments at the Foreign Press Association in Rome, he said his ‘no’ had referred to the absence of any current sale plans for Ferrovie dello Stato (FS). “I am not a priori against”, he said.”If you ask me if this morning, this Tuesday morning, if I have on my desk a plan to privatise FS, parts of FS, the high-speed services, the network, (the answer is) no,” Salvini said. “If there were an (asset sale) plan that could bring me added value, investments, money … I would gladly read it,” he added.The Italian government has set itself the goal of raising some 20 billion euros ($21.91 billion) between 2024 and 2026 through privatisations to help trim public debt, the euro area’s second-highest in proportion to gross domestic product (GDP).Economy Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti, who belongs to Salvini’s League party, said in October that state-owned railways and motorway networks were among the state assets that could be partly sold.($1 = 0.9128 euros) More

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    European Central Bank reports AI boosts high-skilled employment during recession

    The ECB’s Research Bulletin, released today, emphasizes that sectors influenced by AI have experienced a surge in job opportunities, mainly for individuals with advanced skill sets. This development marks a departure from previous technological revolutions, which often led to a reduction in medium-skilled roles. In contrast, the current AI-driven growth has not negatively affected employment levels for those with low to medium skills.However, this technological progress has not come without its concerns. While earnings have not been significantly impacted, with only a slight negative effect observed, there is growing apprehension about the potential future consequences of AI’s continued advancement. Experts worry about the implications for wage disparities and economic inequality, particularly as AI’s influence becomes more pervasive.The ECB’s findings are based on data from 16 European countries and come at a time when public anxiety over job security is high, and the labor market is experiencing a shortage of qualified workers. Despite these challenges, the ECB’s report provides a nuanced view of the labor market, acknowledging the complexities introduced by AI and the need to monitor its long-term effects on economic growth and social equality.This article was generated with the support of AI and reviewed by an editor. For more information see our T&C. More