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    Draghi calls for joined-up thinking in Europe

    Unlock the Editor’s Digest for freeRoula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.This article is an on-site version of Martin Sandbu’s Free Lunch newsletter. Premium subscribers can sign up here to get the newsletter delivered every Thursday. Standard subscribers can upgrade to Premium here, or explore all FT newslettersFree Lunch readers will be well aware that the Draghi report has landed. In his long-awaited (and delayed) work, Mario Draghi, star-quality former Eurozone central bank chief and ex-prime minister of Italy, set out his analysis of Europe’s productivity challenges and how to address them.There is a short version (well, 69 pages) of the report that I recommend reading in full. For those who want more, there is a much longer in-depth version here. And for those who can’t be bothered to spend much time but want to be able to say they have read something, Draghi offers a readers’ digest version here.There are a lot of excellent ideas in the Draghi report. The analysis is clear-headed: while the task was to look into the EU’s “competitiveness”, Draghi wastes no time in stressing that this should be understood as how to improve productivity — and as a mercantilist zero-sum agenda where export surpluses are better the bigger they are, or “using wage repression to lower relative costs”. (It’s only a decade ago that Eurozone policymakers insisted on “competitiveness” when they meant lowering the labour share of income.) The many very good policy proposals include: more investment and more common funding for common goods; using better the EU’s size to improve terms by procuring raw materials and natural resources jointly; creating a truly single market for company financing (the capital markets union project) and removing barriers for companies to scale up to the level of the continent-sized market; and defining the desired trade-off between promoting domestic clean tech production and making use of Chinese capacity to meet European decarbonisation goals.You can read more about the details in my colleagues’ write-up and the FT’s largely positive editorial. But Brussels is the place good reports come to die. Only months ago, the Letta report on the single market also delivered plenty of good advice, as did many reports before it. So although Draghi’s answers to the question of “what” — what does the EU need to do — are excellent, the biggest question is the “how” — how to actually achieve all these things.That’s why I think the most original and consequential parts of his report, and so far those that have caught the least attention, are on how to change the way the EU makes policy. Draghi’s hundreds of pages of policy proposals amount to one big call for more joined-up decision-making. Here he is on how to make the decarbonisation agenda a success for productivity (my italics):Executing this strategy will require a joint decarbonisation and competitiveness plan where all policies are aligned behind the EU’s objectives.This includes not just domestic policy, but requires what Draghi calls a “foreign economic policy”. And here he is on a particular illustration of a failure to do so (my italics again):The automotive sector is a key example of lack of EU planning, applying a climate policy without an industrial policy . . . The EU has not followed up these ambitions [of phasing out internal combustion engines] with a synchronised push to convert the supply chain.(He says, for example, that the EU should consider extending carbon tariffs to the automotive sector.)This call for joined-up policymaking is more profound than it may seem at first glance. Obvious as it may sound, if it were actually achieved, it would be a game-changer for EU growth and the bloc’s influence on the world. That is because it would involve a greater degree of conscious planning for the EU economy as a whole, and that planning would require policymakers at all levels to take EU objectives more into account and not just narrow national interests. The promise is to make everyone better off on the whole by reducing anyone’s ability to prevent any particular cost to them. How does Draghi propose to do this? Here are the main ways:Common planning for productivityDraghi wants a “competitiveness co-ordination framework”, where all the existing policy co-ordination at present linked to fiscal planning (in the so-called European Semester) is gathered to formulate a common EU-wide productivity strategy and co-ordinate national policies with it. More common regulatory frameworks to escape rather than replace the patchwork of unharmonised national rulesDraghi endorses the idea of “28th regimes” — that is to say, a common regulatory framework in parallel with (not replacing) existing national ones. If a company or project chose to be governed by the 28th regime in question, this would be sufficient to allow it to operate anywhere in the EU. Draghi proposes 28th regimes for renewable energy projects, for interconnectors and for innovative small- and medium-sized enterprises to make it easy for them to scale up to the full EU market.More majority voting and less unanimityDraghi points out that the current treaties allow the EU to move more policy areas from unanimity to qualified majority decision-making, provided that is unanimously decided upfront (the so-called passerelle clauses). “All possibilities offered by the EU Treaties should . . . be exploited to extend QMV,” recommends Draghi.More ‘coalitions of the willing’Of course, many countries will not want to give up their veto rights in some sectors. Indeed, every sector may have some country determined to hold on to its veto. So, Draghi concludes, the EU must pursue the joined-up decision-making he calls for among the countries willing to do it without all 27 member states being on board. Preferably that would include the existing procedure for “enhanced co-operation” whereby nine or more member states can decide to use the EU institutions to do more together without forcing anything on the laggards.More centralised budget capacity for the strategically important sectorsDraghi could not be clearer: “Some joint funding of investment at the EU level is necessary to maximise productivity growth, as well as to finance other European public goods.” But it also works the other way round: “The more that governments implement the strategy laid out in this report, the greater the increase in productivity will be, and the easier it will be for governments to bear the fiscal costs of supporting private investment and of investing themselves.” The next budget, Draghi proposes, should have a dedicated “competitiveness pillar” to be managed under the framework mentioned above in point 1. This would have dedicated funding streams, such as “a centralised EU budgetary allocation dedicated to semiconductors supported by a new ‘fast-track’ IPCEI [Important Project of Common European Interest — the EU’s pre-identified projects with easier subsidy rules]”.These are, to be sure, bold proposals. But what is clear is that good policy proposals will not be realised without a decision-making reform along Draghi’s lines. Nor will the productivity growth acceleration everyone accepts is needed, and which Draghi convincingly argues is possible.What that also means are two things that should be of great interest to sceptical national leaders. One is that limited political time, energy and capital could now be most fruitfully devoted to Draghi’s procedural proposals — because they would greatly lower the cost of pursuing any of the substantive policy ideas by those who would like to. The second is that doing so may (whisper it) more than pay for itself — economically, of course, because of the prospect of faster growth, but therefore also politically, by getting Europe out of its economic funk. Fortune, in short, favours the bold. Other readablesRecommended newsletters for youChris Giles on Central Banks — Your essential guide to money, interest rates, inflation and what central banks are thinking. Sign up hereUnhedged — Robert Armstrong dissects the most important market trends and discusses how Wall Street’s best minds respond to them. Sign up here More

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    Global jobs market shaken by green transition

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    FirstFT: Trump camp reels after debate

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    Why Low Layoff Numbers Don’t Mean the Labor Market Is Strong

    Past economic cycles show that unemployment starts to tick up ahead of a recession, with wide-scale layoffs coming only later.As job growth has slowed and unemployment has crept up, some economists have pointed to a sign of confidence among employers: They are, for the most part, holding on to their existing workers.Despite headline-grabbing job cuts at a few big companies, overall layoffs remain below their levels during the strong economy before the pandemic. Applications for unemployment benefits, which drifted up in the spring and summer, have recently been falling.But past recessions suggest that layoff data alone should not offer much comfort about the labor market. Historically, job cuts have come only once an economic downturn was well underway.

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    Layoffs per month
    Data is seasonally adjusted.Source: Bureau of Labor StatisticsBy The New York TimesThe Great Recession, for example, officially began at the end of 2007, after the bursting of the housing bubble and the ensuing mortgage crisis. The unemployment rate began rising in early 2008. But it was not until late 2008 — after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the onset of a global financial crisis — that employers began cutting jobs in earnest.The milder recession in 2001 offers an even clearer example. The unemployment rate rose steadily from 4.3 percent in May to 5.7 percent at the end of the year. But apart from a brief spike in the fall, layoffs hardly rose.We are having trouble retrieving the article content.Please enable JavaScript in your browser settings.Thank you for your patience while we verify access. If you are in Reader mode please exit and log into your Times account, or subscribe for all of The Times.Thank you for your patience while we verify access.Already a subscriber? Log in.Want all of The Times? Subscribe. More

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    Inflation is still dead

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    Dollar firm as inflation data douse bets for big Fed rate cut

    TOKYO (Reuters) – The dollar traded near a four-week high versus the euro on Thursday after signs of some stickiness in U.S. inflation reinforced expectations that the Federal Reserve would avoid a super-sized interest rate cut next week.Meanwhile, a quarter-point rate reduction from the European Central Bank (ECB) is widely expected later on Thursday, with investors anxious for hints on how soon the monetary authority will cut again.The dollar gained against the yen, following a turbulent session on Wednesday that saw the U.S. currency plunge as much as 1.24% to the lowest this year before recovering all its losses after the consumer price data.Early on Wednesday, Bank of Japan board member Junko Nakagawa reinforced the central bank’s tightening bias by saying low real rates leave room for further rate hikes. Another BOJ board member, Naoki Tamura, takes to the podium on Thursday.The U.S. consumer price index (CPI) rose 0.2% last month, matching the advance in July. But excluding the volatile food and energy components, the gauge climbed 0.3%, accelerating from the previous month’s 0.2% increase.As a result, traders essentially priced out the chances of a 50-basis point (bp) rate cut on Sept. 18, paring the odds to 15% versus 85% probability for a 25-bp reduction. However, there are still 104 bps of cuts priced by year-end, meaning markets still expect a 50-bp cut at either the November or December meeting.The dollar rose 0.38% to 142.905 yen as of 0031 GMT, after dipping as low as 140.71 on Wednesday for the first time since Dec. 28 following Nakagawa’s comments. However, the failure of the yen to sustain its gains “has left signs of downside capitulation at the 140.71 low, … opening the way for a recovery back towards 145.50,” said Tony Sycamore, an analyst at IG.The dollar-yen pair tends to track U.S. long-term Treasury yields, which bounced back forcefully after dipping to a 15-month low of 3.605% on Wednesday, and were ticking up in Asian time on Thursday to last stand at 3.6609%.The euro eased to $1.1007, sticking close to Wednesday’s low of $1.1002, the weakest since Aug. 16.The ECB lowered its deposit rate to 3.75% in June and an array of policymakers have already backed another cut, suggesting their debate is likely to focus on how quickly borrowing costs need to fall in subsequent meetings.Sterling edged lower to $1.30360, after dipping as far as $1.30025 in the previous session for the first time since Aug. 20.The Swiss franc was also on the back foot, with the dollar gaining 0.08% to 0.8529 franc, after touching the highest since Aug. 21 at 0.8544 franc on Wednesday. More

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    Does central bank independence really exist?: McGeever

    ORLANDO, Florida (Reuters) -Debate over the Federal Reserve’s independence is bubbling up again and could become a red-hot issue for market watchers if Donald Trump wins the Nov. 5 U.S. presidential election.     The former president and Republican candidate said in July that he would allow current Fed Chair Jerome Powell to serve out his term through 2026, though he added “especially if I thought he was doing the right thing.” And last month Trump said the sitting president should have “at least (a) say” in Fed decisions.    While the Fed and other central banks have attained greater operational independence in recent decades as they have adopted inflation-targeting, their political and legal independence is a lot less clear-cut.     In theory, central banks set policy purely on cold, hard economic numbers, impervious to the government of the day’s political whims, influence, or pressure. This is wishful thinking, but that’s not necessarily a bad thing. Consider the developed world’s responses to the Global Financial Crisis and COVID-19 pandemic. They featured interdependent – and often coordinated – fiscal and monetary policy that helped countries avoid economic, financial, and, potentially, social catastrophe.    Of course, this resulted in skyrocketing government debt, much of which is now held by the central banks themselves. While the debt was purchased on the secondary market, rather than via direct debt monetization, it’s still effectively one arm of government lending to another.      Doesn’t this politically-led largesse risk a hyper-inflationary disaster, violating the fundamental pillar of nearly every central bank’s mandate: controlling inflation?True, inflation spiked following the Fed’s massive stimulus efforts. But inflation was well below the U.S. central bank’s target for more than a decade after the GFC – despite the Fed’s bloated balance sheet – and prices only soared in 2022 when vast money creation and trillions of dollars in direct cash transfers were combined with global supply-chain snarls and an energy crisis sparked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.So, yes, coordinated fiscal and monetary efforts are likely responsible for some of the inflation surge. But two years later, the U.S. economy is still humming along and inflation is heading back toward the Fed’s 2% target. Was this outcome really so bad then, especially considering what could have happened if officials hadn’t acted aggressively?Robert Skidelsky, a professor and UK lawmaker, is of a very different political hue than Trump. But in “The Myth of Central-Bank Independence,” an article published in May, he asks why government shouldn’t have more of a say in monetary policy.      “Interest rates affect not just the value of money but also unemployment, growth, and distribution, it could be argued that monetary policy, like fiscal policy, should be managed by governments accountable to voters,” he wrote. RANKING SURPRISESIn “The Limits of Central-Bank Independence,” an article published last month, Stefan Gerlach, a former deputy governor of Ireland’s central bank, argues that central bank independence isn’t an all-or-nothing proposition.     “Firm political support for the objective of maintaining low inflation is essential; but complete legal independence does not seem to be a necessary condition for achieving it,” he writes, citing the case of Singapore.    The Monetary Authority of Singapore has achieved average inflation of almost 2% since its monetary policy framework was introduced in 1981, although it uses the exchange rate rather than domestic interest rates as its main policy lever.    Yet four government ministers sit on the MAS board and nobody doubts that Singapore’s government could – if it wanted to – exert full control over monetary policy. In short, Singapore has achieved consistently low, stable inflation without genuine central bank independence.    Indeed, Singapore scores poorly in countries ranked according to central bank independence in a new paper published last month by Barry Eichengreen and Joan J. Martinez of the University of California, Berkeley and Nergiz Dincer of TED University.     The rankings are based on 16 criteria, including the length of the governor’s term of office and provisions for dismissal, the means for resolution of conflict between the central bank and government, limitations on lending to the government, and the role of the central bank in fiscal matters. Singapore’s ranking is 114 out of 120 countries based on one methodology and 113 out of 119 countries on another. For comparison, the Fed is ranked at 29 in the first table and 43 in the second.  As the global response to the GFC and pandemic have shown, central banks are working more closely with governments today than they have for decades, while still maintaining the veneer of independence, and this arrangement has been fairly effective.Central bank independence might be a fiction, but perhaps it’s a useful one. (The opinions expressed here are those of the author, a columnist for Reuters.)(By Jamie McGeever; Editing by Paul Simao) More