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Britain’s Brexiters still do not understand Europe

Why are the Europeans being so beastly? Why won’t they agree to the post-Brexit trade deal Britain wants? Worse, why doesn’t Brussels understand that it is in the EU’s own interest to sign up to Boris Johnson’s proposals? As the UK prime minister never tires of saying, Britain buys lots of German cars, Italian prosecco and French cheese.

Britain’s government is under siege. Its handling of Covid-19 has been pretty much a shambles, with death rates among the highest of rich nations. The economy is in deep recession. Breaches of lockdown rules by Dominic Cummings, a close prime ministerial aide, have scorched public trust in the government. Mr Johnson has faced a Tory rebellion. He looks lost. Never mind, whatever the fires at home he will “take back control” from Brussels. 

There is a snag. After jilting its long-term partners, Mr Johnson’s government still struggles to understand why it cannot hold on to its matrimonial privileges. The letter sent by Britain’s Brexit negotiator, David Frost, to his EU opposite number, Michel Barnier, in advance of a new round of talks next week was intended to sound tough. In truth, it was rather plaintive. Why, Mr Frost pleaded, does Mr Barnier keep saying “No”? 

There was an element, of course, of domestic politics. With only seven months of the Brexit transition period still to run, and with the July 1 deadline to request an extension looming, the prospect of a breakdown is rising. The economic costs for Britain would be severe at the best of times. In the wake of the shock of the pandemic they will be ruinous. The government wants to be sure Mr Barnier gets the blame.

Beyond the political tactics, however, the letter was a depressing example of how little the Brexiters have learnt about the EU after more than four decades of membership. Mr Johnson has found it politically convenient to close his eyes to the realities. Most around his cabinet table have never paid them any attention.

The present deadlock is easily summarised. The EU wants a broad economic and trade agreement that will preserve close ties; Britain insists on a basic zero-tariff, zero-quota trade pact, plus a string of à la carte arrangements in industries including transport, energy, pharmaceuticals and financial and other services. The EU wants long-term access to Britain’s fishing grounds; Mr Johnson is offering only an annual deal.

There is nothing eccentric about the EU’s pitch. To the contrary, it matches precisely the joint political statement to which both sides signed up last autumn. This solemn declaration of intent presupposed an “ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership”, which would cover economic as well as trade co-operation. To make this work it would include provisions to underpin “a level playing field for open and fair competition”.

The impasse has arisen because Mr Johnson has changed his mind. Invoking a novel theory of international relations, he says that winning a British election bestows the right to tear up agreements he has made with foreign partners. The level playing-field provisions — implying shared employment and environmental standards, norms and common rules for state aid, and anything implying a say for the European Court of Justice — must be jettisoned.

Never mind that this goes back on Britain’s word. Without a hint of irony, Mr Frost is now telling Mr Barnier that the EU can take Mr Johnson on trust. This, as the prime minister also obfuscates about the fate of a separate, legally-binding commitment on the operation of the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

Unsurprisingly, the EU27 considers it has a better sense of its own interests than does Britain. From its perspective, Mr Frost is proposing a deal that would collect together all the bits Britain likes from EU agreements with, or offers to, nations as diverse as Canada, Norway, South Korea and Mexico. This unique package would sit alongside a series of arrangements specifically tailored to Britain’s interests in the services sector. 

The underlying assumption is that Britain is somehow “owed” privileged access. In the eyes of Brussels, Berlin and Paris, it is now a “third country” — an important ally, but, potentially, also a threat to the integrity of the single market. Forget the cars and prosecco, the union’s overriding interest — against which all else is trivial — is to maintain its system of rules and legal oversight.

The Brexiters have never properly grasped that, for its erstwhile partners, the EU is as much a political as an economic enterprise. European integration is an investment in shared security, stability and democratic values, as well as a source of prosperity. These are not things they can give away in a trade deal with Britain.

The upshot is that the EU simply cannot offer the deal Mr Johnson wants. Sure, it can dress up its offer on trade access and reduce its demands on fisheries. But it cannot bend its rules out of shape. 

Mr Johnson is left with two choices. He can accept an improved version of Mr Barnier’s deal and, as he did with the withdrawal agreement, try to reframe defeat as victory. Or he can allow Britain to slide over the cliff edge without any agreement. 

The government’s dismal performance over recent months scarcely gives cause for optimism.

philip.stephens@ft.com

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Source: Economy - ft.com

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