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    Can Reed Hastings preserve Netflix’s culture of innovation as it grows?

    THE BEST way to stay innovative, many bosses will tell you, is to hire the best people and let them get on with it. Few take this as literally as Reed Hastings of Netflix. The video-streamer’s employees can take as much holiday as they fancy and put anything on the company’s tab so long as, to cite the entirety of its corporate expense policy, they “act in Netflix’s best interest”. Anyone may access sensitive information like a running tally of subscribers, which Wall Street would kill for. Executives seal multimillion-dollar deals without sign-off from top brass. High-achievers are rewarded with the plushest salaries in the business—whether their business is writing computer code or film scripts. Underperformers are unceremoniously cut loose.
    It sounds like a recipe for expensive anarchy. But managing “on the edge of chaos”, as Mr Hastings mischievously puts it, has served Netflix well. Most of its 7,900 full-time workers seem happy being treated like professional athletes, paid handsomely as long as no one can do their job better. Each generates $2.6m in annual revenue on average, nine times more than Disney employees, and $26.5m in shareholder value, three times more than a Googler does.

    Investors lap it up as hungrily as Netflix binge-watchers, who now number 193m worldwide. Since going public in 2002 the firm’s share price has risen 500-fold (see chart 1), in the top ten 18-year runs in America Inc’s history, as Mr Hastings points out with a hint of pride in his voice. This year it briefly overtook Disney to become the world’s most valuable entertainment company.
    125 reasons why
    This track-record has earned Mr Hastings kudos. A PowerPoint “culture deck” outlining his management philosophy has been viewed 20m times since he posted it online 11 years ago. Sheryl Sandberg, Mark Zuckerberg’s right-hand woman at Facebook, has called it the most important document ever to emerge from Silicon Valley. A new book in which Mr Hastings fleshes out those 125 slides is destined for the bestseller list. But it raises a question: are the “No Rules Rules” of the title the right set as Netflix metamorphoses from California startup into global show-business colossus?

    It is easy to put too much stock in corporate culture, which can be a story triumphant companies tell themselves after the fact. GE’s rise in the 1990s had more to do with financial engineering than with the much-aped habit introduced by Jack Welch, the conglomerate’s CEO at the time, of ranking employees and “yanking” the bottom 10%. Netflix would not be where it is without its boss’s uncanny foresight to bet on streaming in the late 2000s, or the uncannily flat-footed response from Hollywood incumbents, which took a decade to grasp the threat. Investors have displayed deep reserves of cheap capital, and deeper ones of patience. Over the past year the firm’s prodigious revenue-generators each burned through $123,000 of cash (see chart 2); this year quarterly cashflow turned positive for only the first time since 2014. Luck played a role, as when cut-price DVD players debuted just in time for Christmas in 2001, months after the dotcom crash forced Mr Hastings to lay off a third of his 120-odd workers, from what was then a DVD-by-mail rental service.

    Still, as Michael Nathanson of MoffattNathanson, a consultancy, observes, “Every time that Netflix faced a roadblock it found a clever way to work around it and emerge stronger.” Most notably, when TV networks and studios at last woke up to the reality of streaming and began to hog content licences, Netflix started producing its own shows, and later feature films. The swivel might have taken longer with employees bogged down in chains of approvals. “Radical candour”, whereby everyone’s ideas, from Mr Hastings down, can be challenged by all-comers, helps weed out bad ones. “Sunshining”, the stomach-churning spectacle of publicly explaining choices, helps not to repeat mistakes. Senior Netflixers’ “ability to swallow their pride is truly exceptional”, says Willy Shih of Harvard Business School, who has written two case studies on the firm.
    Now this innovation-friendly culture is under fire on three fronts. The first two—the firm’s growing size and scope—are internal to Netflix. The third source of pressure comes from the outside.
    Start with size. The flat hierarchy and frankness that works in Silicon Valley, with its narrow range of temperaments and socioeconomic backgrounds, is harder to sustain in a global workforce that has swelled nearly fourfold in five years (more if you include temporary contractors, who now number over 2,200, up from fewer than 400 in 2015). Asians, Europeans and Latin Americans can find visitors from headquarters “exotic”, in Mr Hastings’s words. Negotiating “context”, as Netflix managers and their subordinates do constantly in the absence of explicit rules, offers useful flexibility. But it takes time that could be spent perfecting a product—ever more of it as tacit cultural understanding is diluted by international expansion. Revenue per worker is down by 7% from 2015.
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    Many countries grant workers more protections than America does. This is a problem for the “keeper test”, which requires managers constantly to question if they would fight to stop their underlings from leaving—and, if the answer is “no”, immediately send the individual on their way with generous severance. These golden handshakes, which range from four months’ salary in America to more than six months in the Netherlands, are “too generous” to reject, says Mr Hastings. Netflix has not been sued even in Brazil, where employee lawsuits are a national sport to rival football. The bonhomie may not last.
    A larger workforce poses a separate risk to internal transparency. Even while the attrition rate hovers at around 10%, the number of ex-Netflixers with knowledge of the firm’s finances and strategic bets is now growing by hundreds each year. Unwanted disclosures have been rare and, says Mr Hastings, immaterial. But, he concedes, serious leaks may be “a matter of time”.
    The second challenge has to do with Netflix’s sectoral girth. In its first decade it was primarily a firm of technologists like Mr Hastings, whom his co-founder, Marc Randolph (who left the firm in 2003), likened to the hyper-rational, emotionless Mr Spock in “Star Trek”. That was never entirely fair—Netflix products are data-driven but Mr Hastings attaches as much weight to judgment in managing people as Captain Kirk ever did. Still, by the standards of Tinseltown, where he now spends a couple of days most weeks amid studio intrigues and moody showrunners, he and his firm can come across as robotic.
    One producer who has worked with Netflix detects hints of its horizontal hierarchy permeating Hollywood “by osmosis”. This can speed things along. But, she grouses, “sometimes you need a production assistant to assist, not commission scripts.” At the same time, Netflix missed a chance to revolutionise other old studio ways. The $150m five-year deal it signed in 2018 with Shonda Rhimes, a star TV producer, may be more generous than most networks could afford. But it is Hollywoodian in its structure, says a former executive—and antithetical to the keeper test.
    Moreover, Netflix may have no choice but to expand into new industries. This would be a departure from its laser focus on its core product: quality streamed entertainment. But show business is increasingly the preserve of conglomerates. Disney has theme parks, merchandising and TV networks. Comcast (the cable giant that owns NBCUniversal) and AT&T (the telecoms group which controls HBO and WarnerMedia) possess the pipes along which content flows. Apple’s and Amazon’s Hollywood ambitions are tethered to their powerful technology platforms.
    Disrupting sluggish behemoths is one thing. Competing with them head-on may require a different trade-off between flexibility and efficiency. It may also mean takeovers. Mr Hastings has no shopping plans. But a strong culture, he admits, “is a material weakness if you are going to make big acquisitions”. Cultural sparks could fly when you integrate more than a few dozen people, as they flew when his first firm, Pure Software, bought rivals in the 1990s.
    The third set of challenges is external. Covid-19 has muted the exchange of ideas. It is also harder to evaluate—and dismiss—people by Zoom; Netflix’s 12-month rolling attrition rate has declined by a third, to 7%. This week Mr Hastings said he does not see “any positives” to home-working.

    Dear White People
    Then there is public pressure for corporate America to care more about diversity. Mr Hastings added inclusion to Netflix values in 2016 but it barely features in his investor letters or annual reports. He acknowledges a tension between the desire for diversity and Netflix’s arch-meritocratic ideals (the firm eschews quotas, as it does all management metrics, in favour of that Kirkian judgment). Its corporate temperament screams “hypermasculine”, as Erin Meyer, Mr Hastings’s co-author and professor at INSEAD business school in France, has herself noted. And one person’s radical candour is another’s microaggression.
    Netflix shareholders and their representatives on the board have confidence that Mr Hastings can reconcile these strains. He has given them plenty of reasons to trust his own judgment. But he is fully aware that his position is safe only as long as he can keep the magic going. The keeper test applies to him, as well.■
    This article appeared in the Business section of the print edition under the headline “The Hastings doctrine” More

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    Could you build a better TikTok?

    “A MAINSTREAM GIANT goes countercultural.” That is how the technology press described the decision in the early 2000s by IBM, then a paragon of corporate IT, to back Linux, an obscure operating system written by a ragtag collection of activist coders. In the event, the unnatural combination wound up being a match made in computing heaven. It turned Linux into a serious rival to Microsoft’s Windows, then the dominant operating system, and justified the decentralised way that Linux had been developed. This benefited IBM and fuelled the rise of cloud computing, which is mostly powered by Linux and similar “open source” software.
    The tech industry may soon witness a similarly curious pairing. Microsoft and Oracle, a big software firm, are—along with other, less serious suitors—fighting over TikTok, a Chinese-owned short-video app. Its sale is far from assured (see article). But if a deal were struck it too could prove momentous, this time as a chance to redefine how big online platforms are run. TikTok could become the Linux of social media—and a model for others.

    The current debate over platform governance centres on two options, neither of them appealing. Governments tell firms what to do (in part already the case in Germany). Or firms can regulate themselves (as happens in most other places, including America). In a recent paper Dipayan Ghosh and Josh Simons of Harvard University propose a third way, more fitting for what the authors call “algorithmic infrastructure”—utilities for the digital public square. Governments should set a broad framework and let platforms experiment within it, the authors suggest.
    TikTok could become just such an experiment. It is a young service unburdened by an ingrained business model or governance structure. ByteDance, its Chinese owner, has barely begun building these for the American market. None of TikTok’s wooers, including Oracle and Microsoft, has much experience running a social-media platform. So each could try something new as TikTok takes on social media’s incumbents, notably Facebook and Google.
    Start with the business model. Social-media firms make almost all their money from advertising. This pushes them to collect as much user data as possible, the better to target ads. Critics call this “surveillance capitalism”. It also gives them every reason to make their services as addictive as possible, so users watch more ads.
    The new owner is unlikely to do away with advertising in favour of subscriptions; teenagers are notoriously unwilling to pay for online content. But the new TikTok could offer an ad-free version for those who prefer to pay with cash rather than attention. It could also consider other revenue sources, for example taking a cut from enabling seamless sales of something users see in a clip or charging professional influencers once they have reached a certain prominence (1m followers should be worth at least $100 a month to TikTok stars). As for ads, TikTok could target only broad categories of users instead of individuals, much as firms once bought ads in newspapers. Advertisers, who love microtargeting, need not necessarily object, so long as TikTok remains popular with its coveted young demographic group.

    Respectful management of data offers another business opportunity. TikTok could give users more control, telling them how much their data are worth and managing information on their behalf, as a data trust of sorts. Other firms could tap your TikTok “data account” if you agree and they pay—a model pioneered by startups like digi.me and CitizenMe, which pocket a share of the proceeds from the data deals.
    Perhaps most important, the new owner could turn TikTok from a social-media service to a digital commonwealth, governed by a set of rules akin to a constitution with its own checks and balances. User councils (a legislature, if you will) could have a say in writing guidelines for content moderation. Management (the executive branch) would be obliged to follow due process. And people who felt their posts had been wrongfully taken down could appeal to an independent arbiter (the judiciary). Facebook has toyed with platform constitutionalism: it once let users vote on privacy changes (mostly as a PR stunt) and now has an “oversight board” to hear user appeals (a more serious effort). But the social network introduced these only in response to mounting criticisms. Drafting rules at the outset might make them more credible.
    Linux lessons
    Why would any company limit itself this way? For one thing, it is what some firms say they want. Microsoft in particular claims to be a responsible tech giant. In January its chief executive, Satya Nadella, told fellow plutocrats in Davos about the need for “data dignity”—ie, granting users more control over their data and a bigger share of the value these data create. Brad Smith, Microsoft’s president, last year wrote a book in which he argued that technology firms “must accept greater responsibility for the future”.
    Governments increasingly concur. In its Digital Services Act, to be unveiled later this year, the European Union is likely to demand transparency and due process from social-media platforms. In America, ideas for making them more accountable appear on both sides of the partisan divide. “Citizens who are using these platforms every day should have a say in what content is acceptable,” says Johnnie Moore, an evangelical leader who has the ear of President Donald Trump. Andrew Yang, a former Democratic presidential candidate, has launched a campaign to get online firms to pay users a “digital dividend”. Getting ahead of such ideas makes more sense than re-engineering platforms later to comply.
    Today’s social-media titans will resist change. But they may reconsider, as Microsoft did with Linux. Mr Nadella’s predecessor, Steve Ballmer, once called open-source software “a cancer”. Today, Microsoft is one of the biggest users of and contributors to such projects. Surreal as it sounds, 20 years from now Facebook and Google may have reconstituted themselves for the better, too.■
    This article appeared in the Business section of the print edition under the headline “Reconstituted” More

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    What is Prosus, Europe’s consumer-internet star, for?

    FEW FIRMS struggle with too much success. One is Naspers, a South African media group founded in 1915. In a prescient bid to diversify away from newspapers in 2001 it paid $32m for a large stake in a piddly Chinese startup. Tencent, the startup in question, has since morphed into a gaming and messaging behemoth worth over $670bn. Dealing with the windfall presents unique management headaches.
    The unexpected upshot of a South African investment in China is a European consumer-internet giant. A year ago Naspers listed Prosus, a vehicle for its online bets, in Amsterdam. By dint of owning 31% of Tencent, worth about $208bn, as well as other investments made since, Prosus is the EU’s fourth-most-valuable firm. It is also the closest that Europe has to the global tech stars that dominate the world’s stockmarkets. Its boss, Bob van Dijk, acknowledges the firm’s model may be unusual in the tech world. But, he argues, it can still deliver value.

    Prosus has invested billions—and has ever more billions to invest, thanks to Tencent’s continued success—into all manner of online ventures, from e-commerce to food delivery, distance learning and classified ads. Though run from the Netherlands, much of its empire lies in emerging markets, a nod to its African heritage. Deep pockets let it build online businesses or aggregate local players into global platforms.
    As exciting as that sounds, Mr van Dijk has a more prosaic problem: proving to the outside world the firm needs to exist. He insists Prosus has found a distinctive approach. Unlike venture capitalists, it does not need to return money to investors. It can back businesses for the very long term and, because it runs some of them, has “an operator’s DNA”. Few of its investments have been busts.
    Investors are sending mixed signals. Its market capitalisation of $167bn is about a fifth less than the value of its Tencent shares. Add the other firms it has stakes in, some of which are listed, as well as $4.5bn of net cash on its balance-sheet, and the discount rises to 33%—a gap of $80bn or so (see chart). Its share price has risen of late, but not as fast as those of its holdings. Markets seem to be valuing the portfolio of companies which Prosus has spent over $12bn building at less than nothing.

    That looks unduly harsh. The management of what is now Prosus has made bets which, though less spectacular than Tencent, would not shame most venture capitalists. The classifieds business it built up, OLX, has 300m monthly users in 22 markets. PayU, a payments arm, has grown rapidly, notably in India. An Indian e-commerce investment, Flipkart, generated a return of $1.6bn when it was sold to Walmart in 2018. Prosus’s minority stakes in Delivery Hero, a food-delivery service active in 40 countries, and Mail.ru, a Russian social-media firm, are worth much more than what it paid.
    But challenges abound. Many Prosus bets have tricky economics, promising jam tomorrow with fruit and sugar nowhere to be seen today. Adjusted for its stakes, its food operations lost $624m in the year to March, on revenues of $751m. Of the businesses it runs, only the classifieds turn a (small) operating profit. Some of its investments are in industries likely to be profitable only if mergers create winners that could attract the gaze of trustbusters.
    Continuing to grow fast will require buying rivals with heady valuations. In the past year Prosus has narrowly lost out on Just Eat, an $8bn food-delivery business, and eBay’s classified-ads business, which fetched $9bn. “On the one hand, you do want to be disciplined and not overspend on acquisitions,” says Ken Rumph of Jefferies, an investment bank. “On the other, if you keep on finishing second you don’t get to execute your strategy.”
    Of 2020’s vagaries, covid-19 should help lure new customers online. But the ongoing trade skirmishes between America and China pose a risk for owners of Chinese assets. Last month President Donald Trump gave Americans 45 days to stop doing business with WeChat, Tencent’s messaging app (as well as with TikTok, a video app—see article). Tencent shares tumbled, dragging Prosus down with it.
    Potential investors may also be put off by Prosus’s corporate structure. Naspers still owns 73% of the shares, and the two firms are essentially run as one. Even if the parent sold down its stake, its shares would carry 1,000 times more voting power than anyone else’s. Naspers itself has similar super-voting shareholders, who are seen as close to management. They call the shots.
    Naspers’s dual voting structure was put in place to protect editorial independence and carried over to Prosus, though it owns no media assets. Tech founders often use dual shares to protect their legacy. But Prosus is a subsidiary of a century-old firm. Whatever the rationale, the effect is to shield executives from being held to account. A strong board might rein them in. But its chairman, the former Naspers chief executive who pulled off the Tencent deal, is no counterweight. When two-thirds of ordinary shareholders in 2017 voted against the pay deals of Mr van Dijk and others, their gripes were mostly ignored.
    Other firms have grappled with the curse of success. Yahoo struck gold with Alibaba, another Chinese tech titan—only to be undone by it when activist shareholders pushed the American search pioneer to spin off other operations in 2017, leaving mainly the Alibaba stake, which was sold off in 2019. SoftBank, a Japanese group which also made a bundle off Alibaba, took a different route. Its boss, Son Masayoshi, parlayed his windfall into a complex empire of telecoms, property and venture capital. Whether that has been a wise use of Alibaba’s riches is an open question; Mr Son has had some big blow-ups. Investors have recently nudged him to sell some assets to cut back debt.
    Mr van Dijk need not worry about debt or activist investors, who would no doubt campaign to offload the Tencent stake. Yet not cashing in has borne handsome rewards. By trimming the lucrative stake bit by bit—it sold about 2% of the firm in 2018, raising $10bn—Prosus can indulge its bosses’ empire-building instincts while giving shareholders access to Tencent’s growth. Listing in Amsterdam was meant to give global investors a chance to buy into Mr van Dijk’s broader vision, boosting Prosus’s value and crushing the conglomerate discount. So far this has not happened. Unless shareholders have a real say in what Prosus is for, it may never do. ■
    This article appeared in the Business section of the print edition under the headline “Winner’s curse” More