Barr, Michael

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Meet the Man Making Big Banks Tremble

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Michael Barr, whom President Biden appointed as the Federal Reserve’s top bank cop, has drawn blowback for his bank regulation push.Yelling at Michael Barr, the Federal Reserve’s top banking regulator, has never been particularly effective, his friends and co-workers will tell you. That hasn’t stopped America’s biggest banks, their lobbying groups and even his own colleagues, who have reacted to his proposal to tighten and expand oversight of the nation’s large lenders with a mix of incredulity and outrage.“There is no justification for significant increases in capital at the largest U.S. banks,” Kevin Fromer, the president of the Financial Services Forum, said in a statement after regulators released the draft rules spearheaded by Mr. Barr. The proposal would push up the amount of easy-access money that banks need to have at the ready, potentially cutting into their profits.Even before its release, rumors of what the draft contained triggered a lobbying blitz: Bank of America’s lobbyists and those affiliated with banks including BNP Paribas, HSBC and TD Bank descended on Capitol Hill. Lawmakers sent worried letters to the Fed and peppered its officials with questions about what the proposal would contain.The Bank Policy Institute, a trade group, recently rolled out a national ad campaign urging Americans to “demand answers” on the Fed’s new capital rules. On Tuesday, the organization and other trade groups appeared to lay the groundwork to sue over the proposal, arguing that the Fed violated the law by relying on analysis that was not made public.Some of Mr. Barr’s own colleagues have opposed the proposed changes: Two of the Fed’s seven governors, both Trump appointees, voted against them in a stark sign of discord at the consensus-oriented institution.“The costs of this proposal, if implemented in its current form, would be substantial,” Michelle Bowman, a Fed governor and an increasingly frequent critic of Mr. Barr’s, wrote in a statement.The reason for all of the drama is that the proposal — which the Fed released alongside two other banking agencies — would notably tighten the rules for both America’s largest banks and their slightly smaller counterparts.Michelle Bowman, a Fed governor, has become increasingly critical of Mr. Barr. Ann Saphir/ReutersIf adopted, it would mark both the completion of a process toward tighter bank oversight that started in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the beginning of the government’s regulatory response to a series of painful bank blowups this year.For the eight largest banks, the new proposal could raise capital requirements to about 14 percent on average, from about 12 percent now. And for banks with more than $100 billion in assets, it would strengthen oversight in a push that has been galvanized by the implosion of Silicon Valley Bank in March. Lenders of its size faced less oversight because they were not viewed as a huge risk to the banking system if they collapsed. The bank’s implosion required a sweeping government intervention, proving that theory wrong.Mr. Barr does not seem, at first glance, like someone who would be the main character in a regulatory knife fight.The Biden administration nominated him to his role, and Democrats tend to favor tighter financial rules — so he was always expected to be harder on banks than his predecessor, a Trump nominee. But the Fed’s vice chair for supervision, who was confirmed to his job in July 2022, has a knack for coming off as unobtrusive in public: He talks softly and has a habit of smiling as he speaks, even when challenged.If the proposal is adopted, it would mark both the completion of a process toward tighter bank oversight that started in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the beginning of the government’s regulatory response to a series of bank blowups earlier this year.Stephen Crowley/The New York TimesAnd Mr. Barr came into his job with a reputation — correct or not — for being somewhat moderate. As a top Treasury official, he helped design the Obama administration’s regulatory response to the 2008 financial crisis and then negotiated what would become the 2010 Dodd-Frank law.The changes that he and his colleagues won drastically ramped up bank oversight — but the Treasury Department, then led by Secretary Timothy Geithner, was often criticized by progressives for being too easy on Wall Street.That legacy has, at times, dogged Mr. Barr. He was in the running for a seat on the Fed’s Board of Governors in 2014, but progressive groups opposed him. When he was floated as the likely candidate to lead the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in 2021, a similar chorus objected, with powerful Democrats including Senator Sherrod Brown, the chair of the Banking Committee, lining up behind another candidate.Mr. Barr’s chance to break back into Washington policy circles came when Sarah Bloom Raskin, a law professor nominated for vice chair for supervision at the Fed, was forced to drop out. In need of a new candidate, the Biden administration tapped Mr. Barr.Suddenly, the fact that he had just been accused of being too centrist to lead the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency was a boon. He needed a simple majority in the 100-seat Senate to pass, and received 66 votes.By then, the idea that he would have a mild touch had taken hold. Analysts predicted “targeted tweaks” to regulation on his watch. But banks and some lawmakers have found plenty of reasons to complain about him in the 14 months since.Wall Street knew that Mr. Barr would need to carry out the U.S. version of global rules developed by an international group called the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Banks initially expected the American version to look similar to, perhaps even gentler than, the international standard.But by early this year, rumors were swirling that Mr. Barr’s approach might be tougher. Then came the collapse this spring of Silicon Valley Bank and other regional lenders — whose rules had been loosened under the Trump administration. That seemed destined to result in even tighter rules.In one of his first acts as vice chair, Mr. Barr wrote a scathing internal review of what had happened, concluding that “regulatory standards for SVB were too low” and bluntly criticizing the Fed’s own oversight of the institution and its peers.Mr. Barr’s conclusions drew some pushback: Ms. Bowman said his review relied “on a limited number of unattributed source interviews” and “was the product of one board member, and was not reviewed by the other members of the board prior to its publication.”But that did little to stop the momentum toward more intense regulation.When Jerome H. Powell, the Fed chair, gave his regular testimony on the economy before Congress in June, at least six Republicans brought up the potential for tighter regulation, with several warning against going too far.After Silicon Valley Bank and other regional lenders collapsed this spring, Mr. Barr wrote a scathing internal review concluding that “regulatory standards for SVB were too low.” Jim Wilson/The New York TimesAnd when the proposal was finally released in July, it was clear why banks and their allies had worried. The details were meaningful. One tweak would make it harder for banks to game their assessments of their own operational risks — which include things like lawsuits. Both that and other measures would prod banks to hold more capital.The plan would also force large banks to treat some — mostly larger — residential mortgages as a riskier asset. That raised concerns not just from the banks but from progressive Democrats and fair housing groups, who worried that it could discourage lending to low-income areas. News of the measure came late in the process — surprising even some in the White House, according to people familiar with the matter.Representative Andy Barr, a Kentucky Republican, said that aspects of the proposal went beyond the international standard, which “caught a lot of people off guard,” and that the Fed had not provided a clear cost-benefit analysis.“Vice Chair Barr is using some of the bank failures as a pretext,” he said.The banks “feel like he’s being obstinate,” said Ian Katz, an analyst at Capital Alpha Partners, a research firm in Washington. “They feel like he’s the guy making the decisions, and there are not a lot of workarounds.”Andrew Cecere, the chief executive of U.S. Bancorp, said of Mr. Barr, “We may not agree on everything, but he tries to understand.”Andrew Harnik/Associated PressBut he does have fans. Andrew Cecere, the chief executive of U.S. Bancorp and a member of a Fed advisory council, said Mr. Barr was “quite collaborative” and “a good listener.”“We may not agree on everything, but he tries to understand,” Mr. Cecere said.The Fed did not provide a comment for this article.The question now is whether the proposal will change before it is final: Bankers have until Nov. 30 to offer suggestions for how to adjust it. Colleagues who worked with Mr. Barr the last time he was reshaping America’s bank regulations — in the wake of the 2008 financial collapse — suggested that he could be willing to negotiate but not when he viewed something as essential.Amias Gerety, a Treasury official during the Obama administration, joined him and other government policymakers for those discussions over consumer protection and big bank oversight. He watched Mr. Barr leave some ideas on the cutting-room floor (such as an online marketplace that would allow consumers to compare credit card terms), while fighting aggressively for others (such as a powerful structure for the then-nascent Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).When people disagreed with Mr. Barr, even loudly, he would politely listen — often before forging ahead with the plan he thought was best.“Sometimes to his detriment, Michael is who he is,” Mr. Gerety said. “He is very willing to sacrifice small-p interpersonal politics to achieve policy goals that he thinks are good for people.”Some tweaks to the current proposal are expected: The residential mortgage suggestion is getting a closer look, for instance. But several analysts said they expected the final rule to remain toothy.In the meantime, Mr. Barr appears to have shaken his reputation for mildness. Dean Baker, an economist at a progressive think tank who, in 2014, was quoted in a news article saying Mr. Barr could not “really be trusted to go after the industry,” said his view had shifted.“I definitely have had a better impression of him over the years,” Mr. Baker said. More

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    How a Trump-Era Rollback Mattered for Silicon Valley Bank’s Demise

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    An under-the-radar change to the way regional banks are supervised may have helped the bank’s rapidly growing risks to go unresolved.WASHINGTON — Silicon Valley Bank was growing steadily in 2018 and 2019 — and supervisors at its primary overseer, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, were preparing it for a stricter oversight group, one in which specialists from around the Fed system would vet its risks and point out weak spots.But a decision from officials in Washington halted that move.The Federal Reserve Board — which sets the Fed’s standards for banking regulation — was in the process of putting into effect a bipartisan 2018 law that aimed to make regulation less onerous for small and midsize banks. As the board did that, Randal K. Quarles, the Trump-appointed vice chair for supervision, and his colleagues also chose to recalibrate how banks were supervised in line with the new requirements.As a result, Silicon Valley Bank’s move to the more rigorous oversight group would be delayed. The bank would previously have advanced to the Large and Foreign Bank Organization group after its assets had averaged more than $50 billion for a year; now, that shift would not come until it consistently averaged more than $100 billion in assets.The change proved fateful. Silicon Valley Bank did not fully move to the stronger oversight group until late 2021. Its assets had nearly doubled over the course of that year, to about $200 billion, by the time it came under more intense supervision.By that point, many of the issues that would cause its demise had already begun festering. Those included a customer base heavily dependent on the success of the technology industry, an unusually large share of deposits above the $250,000 limit that the government insures in the event of a bank collapse and an executive team that paid little attention to risk management.Those weak spots appear to have gone unresolved when Silicon Valley Bank was being overseen the way that small and regional banks are: by a small team of supervisors who were in some cases generalists.When the bank finally entered more sophisticated supervision for big banks in late 2021, putting it under the purview of a bigger team of specialist bank overseers with input from around the Fed system, it was immediately issued six citations. Those flagged various problems, including how it was managing its ability to raise cash quickly in times of trouble. By the next summer, its management was rated deficient, and by early 2023, intense scrutiny of the bank had stretched to the Fed’s highest reaches.Big questions remain about why supervisors didn’t do more to ensure that shortcomings were addressed once they became alarmed enough to begin issuing citations. The Fed is conducting an internal investigation of what happened, with results expected on May 1.Michael Barr, the Fed’s vice chair for supervision, told lawmakers this week that by the time Silicon Valley Bank came under intense oversight and problems were fully recognized, “in a sense, it was already very late in the process.”Shuran Huang for The New York TimesBut the picture that is emerging is one in which a slow reaction in 2022 was not the sole problem: Silicon Valley Bank’s difficulties also appear to have come to the fore too late to fix them easily, in part because of the Trump-era rollbacks. By deciding to move banks into large-bank oversight much later, Mr. Quarles and his colleagues had created a system that treated even sizable and rapidly ballooning banks with a light touch when it came to how aggressively they were monitored.That has caught the attention of officials from the Fed and the White House as they sort through the fallout left by Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse on March 10 and ask what lessons should be learned.“The way the Federal Reserve’s regulation set up the structure for approach to supervision treated firms in the $50 to $100 billion range with lower levels of requirements,” Michael Barr, the Fed’s vice chair for supervision, told lawmakers this week. By the time Silicon Valley Bank’s problems were fully recognized, he said, “in a sense, it was already very late in the process.”About five people were supervising Silicon Valley Bank in the years before its move up to big-bank oversight, according to a person familiar with the matter. The bank was subject to quarterly reviews, and its overseers could choose to put it through horizontal reviews — thorough check-ins that test for a particular weakness by comparing a bank with firms of similar size. But those would not have been a standard part of its oversight, based on the way the Fed runs supervision for small and regional banks.As the bank grew and moved up to large-bank oversight, the size of the supervisory team dedicated to it swelled. By the time it failed, about 20 people were working on Silicon Valley Bank’s supervision, Mr. Barr said this week. It had been put through horizontal reviews, which had flagged serious risks.But such warnings often take time to translate into action. Although the bank’s overseers started pointing out big issues in late 2021, banks typically get leeway to fix problems before they are penalized.“One of the defining features of supervision is that it is an iterative process,” said Kathryn Judge, a financial regulation expert at Columbia Law School.The Fed’s response to the problems at Silicon Valley Bank seemed to be halting even after it recognized risks. Surprisingly, the firm was given a satisfactory liquidity rating in early 2022, after regulators had begun flagging problems, Mr. Barr acknowledged this week. Several people familiar with how supervising operates found that unusual.“We’re trying to understand how that is consistent with the other material,” Mr. Barr said this week. “The question is, why wasn’t that escalated and why wasn’t further action taken?”Yet the high liquidity rating could also tie back to the bank’s delayed move to the large bank supervision group. Bank supervisors sometimes treat a bank more gently during its first year of tougher oversight, one person said, as it adjusts to more onerous regulator attention.There was also turmoil in the San Francisco Fed’s supervisory ranks around the time that Silicon Valley Bank’s risks were growing.Aaron Wojack for The New York TimesThere was also turmoil in the San Francisco Fed’s supervisory ranks around the time that Silicon Valley Bank’s risks were growing. Mary Daly, the president of the reserve bank, had called a meeting in 2019 with a number of the bank supervisory group’s leaders to insist that they work on improving employee satisfaction scores, according to people with knowledge of the event. The meeting was previously reported by Bloomberg.Of all the San Francisco Fed employees, bank supervisors had the lowest satisfaction ratings, with employees reporting that they might face retribution if they spoke out or had different opinions, according to one person.Several supervision officials departed in the following years, retiring or leaving for other reasons. As a result, relatively new managers were at the wheel as Silicon Valley Bank’s risks grew and became clearer.It’s hard to assess whether supervisors in San Francisco — and staff members at the Fed board, who would have been involved in rating Silicon Valley Bank — were unusually slow to respond to the bank’s problems given the secrecy surrounding bank oversight, Ms. Judge said.“We don’t have a baseline,” she said.Even as the Fed tries to understand why problems were not addressed more promptly, the fact that Silicon Valley Bank remained under less rigorous oversight that may not have tested for its specific weaknesses until relatively late in the game is increasingly in focus.“The Federal Reserve system of supervision and regulation is based on a tailored approach,” Mr. Barr said this week. “That framework, which really focuses on asset size, is not sensitive to the kinds of problems we saw here with respect to rapid growth and a concentrated business model.”Plus, the 2018 law and the Fed’s implementation of it probably affected Silicon Valley Bank’s oversight in other ways. The Fed would probably have begun administering full stress tests on the bank earlier without the changes, and the bank might have had to shore up its ability to raise money in a pinch to comply with the “liquidity coverage ratio,” some research has suggested.The White House called on Thursday for regulators to consider reinstating stronger rules for banks with assets of $100 billion to $250 billion. And the Fed is both re-examining the size cutoffs for stricter bank oversight and working on ways to test for “novel” risks that may not tie back cleanly to size, Mr. Barr said this week.But Mr. Quarles, who carried out the tailoring of the 2018 bank rule, has insisted that the bank’s collapse was not the result of changes that the law required or that he chose to make. Even the simplest rung of supervision should have caught the obvious problems that killed Silicon Valley Bank, he said, including a lack of protection against rising interest rates.“It was the simplest risk imaginable,” he said in interview. More