Becker, Gregory W

Latest story

150 Shares169 Views

San Francisco Fed Ties to S.V.B. Chief Attracts Scrutiny to Century-Old Setup

by

As Greg Becker, the former C.E.O. of Silicon Valley Bank, prepares to testify before Congress, boards that oversee regional Federal Reserve branches are in the spotlight.The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank has drawn attention to the relationship between the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, which was in charge of overseeing safety and soundness at the lender, and the bank’s former chief executive, Greg Becker, who for years sat on the San Francisco Fed’s board of directors.The bank’s collapse on March 10 has prompted criticism of the Fed, whose bank supervisors were slow to spot and stop problems before Silicon Valley Bank experienced a devastating run that necessitated a sweeping government response.Now, Mr. Becker could face lawmaker questions about his board role — and whether it created too close a link between the bank and its regulators — when he testifies on Tuesday before the Senate Banking Committee about Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse.In prepared testimony published before the hearing, Mr. Becker said he was “truly sorry” for the bank’s failure. “I do not believe that any bank could survive a bank run of that velocity and magnitude,” he said.Mr. Becker’s position on the San Francisco Fed board would have given him little formal power, according to current and former Fed employees and officials. The Fed’s 12 reserve banks — semiprivate institutions dotted across the country — each has a nine-person board of directors, three of whom come from the banking industry. Those boards have no say in bank supervision, and serve mainly as advisers for the Fed bank’s leadership.But many acknowledged that the setup created the appearance of coziness between S.V.B. and the Fed. Some outside experts and politicians are beginning to question whether the way the Fed has been organized for more than a century makes sense today.“They’re like a glorified advisory committee,” said Kaleb Nygaard, who researches central banks at the University of Pennsylvania. “It causes massive headaches in the best of times, potentially fatal aneurysms in the worst of times.”The Fed boards date back to 1913.In the days after Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse, headlines about Mr. Becker’s close ties to his bank’s regulator abounded, with many raising questions about a possible conflict of interest.Though regional Fed presidents and other officials play a limited role in bank oversight — which is mostly in Washington’s domain — some critics wondered if supervisors at the San Francisco Fed failed to effectively police Silicon Valley Bank partly because of the reserve bank’s close ties to the bank’s chief executive.And some asked: Why do banks have representatives on the Fed Board at all?The answer is tied to the Fed’s history.When Congress and the White House created the Fed in 1913, they were skeptical about giving either the government or the private sector unilateral power over the nation’s money supply. So they compromised. They created a public Fed Board in Washington, alongside quasi-private reserve banks around the country.Those reserve banks, which ended up numbering 12 in total, would be set up like private companies with banks as their shareholders. And much like other private companies, they would be overseen by boards — ones that included bank representatives. Each of the Fed reserve banks has nine board members, or directors. Three of them come from banks, while the others come from other financial companies, businesses, and labor and community groups.“The setup is the way that it is because of the way the Fed was set up in 1913,” said William Dudley, the former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who said that the directors served mainly as a sort of advisory focus group on banking issues and operational issues, like cybersecurity.The boards may give members benefits.Several former Fed officials said that the bank-related board members provided a valuable function, offering real-time insight into the finance industry. And 10 current and former Fed employees interviewed for this article agreed on one point: These boards have relatively little official power in the modern era.While they vote for changes on a formerly important interest rate at the Fed — called the discount rate — that role has become much less critical over time. Board members select Fed presidents, though since the 2010 Dodd Frank law, the bank-tied directors have not been allowed to participate in those votes.But the law didn’t go so far as to cut bank representatives from the boards altogether because of a lobbying push to keep them intact, said Aaron Klein, who was deputy assistant secretary for economic policy at the Treasury Department at the time and worked closely on the law’s passage.“The Fed didn’t want that, and neither did the bankers,” Mr. Klein said.From a bank’s perspective, directorships offer prestige: Regional Fed board members rub shoulders with other bank and community leaders and with powerful central bankers.They might also offer either an actual or a perceived information advantage about the economy and about monetary policy. Although the discount rate is not as important today, directors at some regional banks are given economic briefings as they make their decisions.Mr. Becker would have seen Mary C. Daly, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, at meetings held roughly once a month, her calendars suggest.Jim Wilson/The New York TimesRegional board discount votes have often been seen as a sort of weather vane for how a regional bank’s leadership is thinking about policy — suggesting that directors might know how their president is going to vote when it comes to the federal funds rate, the important interest rate that the Fed uses to guide the speed of the economy.That is notable in an era in which Wall Street traders hang on Fed officials’ every word when it comes to interest rates.“It’s a very awkward thing,” said Narayana Kocherlakota, a former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. “There’s no gain to having them vote on discount rates.”Renée Adams, a former New York Fed researcher who studies corporate boards and is now at the University of Oxford, has found that when a bank executive becomes a director, the stock price of their firm rises on the news.“The market believes that they have some advantage,” she said.And Board members do get substantial face time with Fed presidents, who meet regularly with their directors. Mr. Becker would have seen Mary C. Daly, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, at meetings held roughly once a month, her calendars suggest.‘Supervisory leniency’ is a risk.Bank-tied directors have no direct role in supervision, nor can they appoint officials or participate in budget decisions related to bank oversight, according to the Fed.But Mr. Klein is skeptical that Mr. Becker’s position on the San Francisco Fed’s board did not matter at all in the case of Silicon Valley Bank.“Who wants to be the person raising problems about the C.E.O. who is on the board of your own C.E.O.?” he said, explaining that even though the organizational structure might have drawn clear lines, those may not have cleanly applied in the “real world.”Ms. Adams’s research found that banks whose executives sat on boards did in fact see fewer enforcement actions — slaps on the wrist from Fed supervisors — during the director’s tenure. “There may be supervisory leniency,” she said.Changing the system might prove difficult.This is not the first time the Fed regional boards have raised ethical issues. In the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, Dick Fuld, the Lehman Brothers chief executive at the time, and Steve Friedman, who was a director at Goldman Sachs, both served on the New York Fed board.Mr. Fuld resigned just before Lehman collapsed in 2008. Mr. Friedman left in 2009, after news broke that he had bought Goldman Sachs stock during the crisis, at a time when the Treasury and the Fed were drawing up plans to bolster big banks.Given that controversy, politicians have at times focused on the Fed boards. The Democratic Party included language in its 2016 platform to bar executives of financial institutions from serving on reserve bank boards. And the issue has recently garnered bipartisan interest. Draft legislation under development by members of the Senate Banking Committee would limit directorships to small banks — those with less than $10 billion in assets, according to a person familiar with the material.The committee has a hearing on Fed accountability planned for May 17. Senators Elizabeth Warren, Democrat from Massachusetts, and Rick Scott, Republican from Florida, plan to introduce the legislation ahead of that, a spokesperson for Ms. Warren said.“It’s dangerous and unethical for executives from the largest banks to serve on Fed boards where these bankers could secure preferential regulatory treatment or exploit privileged information,” Ms. Warren said in a statement.But — as the Dodd Frank legislation illustrated — stripping banks of their power at the Fed has been a heavy lift.“As a political target,” said Ms. Binder, the political scientist, “it’s a little in the weeds.” More

More stories

  • 138 Shares199 Views

    in Economy

    Before Collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, the Fed Spotted Big Problems

    by

    The bank was using an incorrect model as it assessed its own risks amid rising interest rates, and spent much of 2022 under a supervisory review.WASHINGTON — Silicon Valley Bank’s risky practices were on the Federal Reserve’s radar for more than a year — an awareness that proved insufficient to stop the bank’s demise.The Fed repeatedly warned the bank that it had problems, according to a person familiar with the matter.In 2021, a Fed review of the growing bank found serious weaknesses in how it was handling key risks. Supervisors at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, which oversaw Silicon Valley Bank, issued six citations. Those warnings, known as “matters requiring attention” and “matters requiring immediate attention,” flagged that the firm was doing a bad job of ensuring that it would have enough easy-to-tap cash on hand in the event of trouble.But the bank did not fix its vulnerabilities. By July 2022, Silicon Valley Bank was in a full supervisory review — getting a more careful look — and was ultimately rated deficient for governance and controls. It was placed under a set of restrictions that prevented it from growing through acquisitions. Last autumn, staff members from the San Francisco Fed met with senior leaders at the firm to talk about their ability to gain access to enough cash in a crisis and possible exposure to losses as interest rates rose.It became clear to the Fed that the firm was using bad models to determine how its business would fare as the central bank raised rates: Its leaders were assuming that higher interest revenue would substantially help their financial situation as rates went up, but that was out of step with reality.By early 2023, Silicon Valley Bank was in what the Fed calls a “horizontal review,” an assessment meant to gauge the strength of risk management. That checkup identified additional deficiencies — but at that point, the bank’s days were numbered. In early March, it faced a run and failed, sending shock-waves across the broader American banking system that ultimately led to a sweeping government intervention meant to prevent panic from spreading. On Sunday, Credit Suisse, which was caught up in the panic that followed Silicon Valley Bank’s demise, was taken over by UBS in a hastily arranged deal put together by the Swiss government.Major questions have been raised about why regulators failed to spot problems and take action early enough to prevent Silicon Valley Bank’s March 10 downfall. Many of the issues that contributed to its collapse seem obvious in hindsight: Measuring by value, about 97 percent of its deposits were uninsured by the federal government, which made customers more likely to run at the first sign of trouble. Many of the bank’s depositors were in the technology sector, which has recently hit tough times as higher interest rates have weighed on business.And Silicon Valley Bank also held a lot of long-term debt that had declined in market value as the Fed raised interest rates to fight inflation. As a result, it faced huge losses when it had to sell those securities to raise cash to meet a wave of withdrawals from customers.The Fed has initiated an investigation into what went wrong with the bank’s oversight, headed by Michael S. Barr, the Fed’s vice chair for supervision. The inquiry’s results are expected to be publicly released by May 1. Lawmakers are also digging into what went awry. The House Financial Services Committee has scheduled a hearing on recent bank collapses for March 29.Michael S. Barr’s review of the Silicon Valley Bank problems will focus on a few key questions.Manuel Balce Ceneta/Associated PressThe picture that is emerging is one of a bank whose leaders failed to plan for a realistic future and neglected looming financial and operational problems, even as they were raised by Fed supervisors. For instance, according to a person familiar with the matter, executives at the firm were told of cybersecurity problems both by internal employees and by the Fed — but ignored the concerns.The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which has taken control of the firm, did not comment on its behalf.Still, the extent of known issues at the bank raises questions about whether Fed bank examiners or the Fed’s Board of Governors in Washington could have done more to force the institution to address weaknesses. Whatever intervention was staged was too little to save the bank, but why remains to be seen.“It’s a failure of supervision,” said Peter Conti-Brown, an expert in financial regulation and a Fed historian at the University of Pennsylvania. “The thing we don’t know is if it was a failure of supervisors.”Mr. Barr’s review of the Silicon Valley Bank collapse will focus on a few key questions, including why the problems identified by the Fed did not stop after the central bank issued its first set of matters requiring attention. The existence of those initial warnings was reported earlier by Bloomberg. It will also look at whether supervisors believed they had authority to escalate the issue, and if they raised the problems to the level of the Federal Reserve Board.The Fed’s report is expected to disclose information about Silicon Valley Bank that is usually kept private as part of the confidential bank oversight process. It will also include any recommendations for regulatory and supervisory fixes.The bank’s downfall and the chain reaction it set off is also likely to result in a broader push for stricter bank oversight. Mr. Barr was already performing a “holistic review” of Fed regulation, and the fact that a bank that was large but not enormous could create so many problems in the financial system is likely to inform the results.Typically, banks with fewer than $250 billion in assets are excluded from the most onerous parts of bank oversight — and that has been even more true since a “tailoring” law that passed in 2018 during the Trump administration and was put in place by the Fed in 2019. Those changes left smaller banks with less stringent rules.Silicon Valley Bank was still below that threshold, and its collapse underlined that even banks that are not large enough to be deemed globally systemic can cause sweeping problems in the American banking system.As a result, Fed officials could consider tighter rules for those big, but not huge, banks. Among them: Officials could ask whether banks with $100 billion to $250 billion in assets should have to hold more capital when the market price of their bond holdings drops — an “unrealized loss.” Such a tweak would most likely require a phase-in period, since it would be a substantial change.But as the Fed works to complete its review of what went wrong at Silicon Valley Bank and come up with next steps, it is facing intense political blowback for failing to arrest the problems.Supervisors at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, which oversaw Silicon Valley Bank, issued six citations in 2021.Aaron Wojack for The New York TimesSome of the concerns center on the fact that the bank’s chief executive, Greg Becker, sat on the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s board of directors until March 10. While board members do not play a role in bank supervision, the optics of the situation are bad.“One of the most absurd aspects of the Silicon Valley bank failure is that its CEO was a director of the same body in charge of regulating it,” Senator Bernie Sanders, a Vermont independent, wrote on Twitter on Saturday, announcing that he would be “introducing a bill to end this conflict of interest by banning big bank CEOs from serving on Fed boards.”Other worries center on whether Jerome H. Powell, the Fed chair, allowed too much deregulation during the Trump administration. Randal K. Quarles, who was the Fed’s vice chair for supervision from 2017 to 2021, carried out a 2018 regulatory rollback law in an expansive way that some onlookers at the time warned would weaken the banking system.Mr. Powell typically defers to the Fed’s supervisory vice chair on regulatory matters, and he did not vote against those changes. Lael Brainard, then a Fed governor and now a top White House economic adviser, did vote against some of the tweaks — and flagged them as potentially dangerous in dissenting statements.“The crisis demonstrated clearly that the distress of even noncomplex large banking organizations generally manifests first in liquidity stress and quickly transmits contagion through the financial system,” she warned.Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, has asked for an independent review of what happened at Silicon Valley Bank and has urged that Mr. Powell not be involved in that effort.  He “bears direct responsibility for — and has a long record of failure involving” bank regulation, she wrote in a letter on Sunday.Maureen Farrell More

  • 113 Shares129 Views

    in Economy

    After SVB Collapse, Fed and Lawmakers Eye Bank Rules

    by

    The stunning demise of Silicon Valley Bank has spurred soul-searching about how large and regional banks are overseen.The Federal Reserve is facing criticism over Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse, with lawmakers and financial regulation experts asking why the regulator failed to catch and stop seemingly obvious risks. That concern is galvanizing a review of how the central bank oversees financial institutions — one that could end in stricter rules for a range of banks.In particular, the episode could result in meaningful regulatory and supervisory changes for institutions — like Silicon Valley Bank — that are large but not large enough to be considered globally systemic and thus subject to tougher oversight and rules. Smaller banks face lighter regulations than the largest ones, which go through regular and extensive tests of their financial health and have to more closely police how much easy-to-tap cash they have to serve as a buffer in times of crisis.Regulators and lawmakers are focused both on whether a deregulatory push in 2018, during the Trump administration, went too far, and on whether existing rules are sufficient in a changing world.While it is too early to predict the outcome, the shock waves that Silicon Valley Bank’s demise sent through the financial system, and the sweeping response the government staged to prevent it from inciting a nationwide bank run, are clearly intensifying the pressure for stronger oversight.“There are a lot of signs of a supervisory failure,” said Kathryn Judge, a financial regulation expert at Columbia Law School, who also noted that it was too early to draw firm conclusions. “We do need more rigorous regulations for large regional banks that more accurately reflect the risks these banks can pose to the financial system,” she said.The call for tougher bank rules echoes the aftermath of 2008, when risky bets by big financial firms helped to plunge the United States into a deep recession and exposed blind spots in bank oversight. The crisis ultimately led to the Dodd-Frank law in 2010, a reform that ushered in a series of more stringent requirements, including wide-ranging “stress tests” that probe a bank’s ability to weather severe economic situations.But some of those rules were lightened — or “tailored” — under Republicans. Randal K. Quarles, who was the Fed’s vice chair for supervision from 2017 to 2021, put a bipartisan law into effect that relaxed some regulations for small and medium-size banks and pushed to make day-to-day Fed supervision simpler and more predictable.Critics have said such changes could have helped pave the way for the problems now plaguing the banking system.“Clearly, there’s a problem with supervision,” said Daniel Tarullo, a former Fed governor who helped shape and enact many post-2008 bank regulations and who is now a professor at Harvard. “The lighter touch on supervision is something that has been a concern for several years now.”Jerome H. Powell, right, the chair of the Federal Reserve, and Randal K. Quarles, then the vice chair for supervision, at the Fed, in 2018. “The events surrounding Silicon Valley Bank demand a thorough, transparent and swift review,” Mr. Powell said in a statement this week.Aaron P. Bernstein/ReutersThe Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco was in charge of overseeing Silicon Valley Bank, and experts across the ideological spectrum are questioning why growing risks at the bank were not halted. The firm grew rapidly and took on a large number of depositors from one vulnerable industry: technology. A large share of the bank’s deposits were uninsured, making customers more likely to run for the exit in a moment of trouble, and the bank had not taken care to protect itself against the financial risks posed by rising interest rates.Worsening the optics of the situation, Greg Becker, the chief executive of Silicon Valley Bank, was until Friday on the board of directors at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. The Fed has said reserve bank directors are not involved in matters related to banking supervision.Questions about bank oversight ultimately come back to roost at the Fed’s board in Washington — which, since the 2008 crisis, has played a heavier role in guiding how banks are overseen day to day.The board has indicated that it will take the concerns seriously, putting its new vice chair of supervision, Michael Barr, in charge of the inquiry into what happened at Silicon Valley Bank, the Fed announced this week.“The events surrounding Silicon Valley Bank demand a thorough, transparent and swift review by the Federal Reserve,” Jerome H. Powell, the Fed chair, said in a statement.It is unclear how much any one of the 2018 rollbacks would have mattered in the case of Silicon Valley Bank. Under the original postcrisis rules, the bank, which had less than $250 billion in assets, most likely would have faced a full Fed stress test earlier, probably by this year. But the rules for stress tests are complex enough that even that is difficult to pinpoint with certainty.“Nobody can say that without the 2018 rollbacks none of this would have happened,” Ms. Judge said. But “those rules suggested that banks in this size range did not pose a threat to financial stability.”But the government’s dramatic response to Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse, which included saving uninsured depositors and rolling out a Fed rescue program, underlined that even the 16th-largest bank in the country could require major public action.Given that, the Fed will be paying renewed attention to how those banks are treated when it comes to both capital (their financial cushion against losses) and liquidity (their ability to quickly convert assets into cash to pay back depositors).There could be a push, for instance, to lower the threshold at which the more onerous regulations begin to apply. As a result of the 2018 law, some of the stricter rules now kick in when banks have $250 billion in assets.Another major focal point will be the content of stress tests. While banks used to be run through an “adverse” scenario that included creative and unexpected shocks to the system — including, occasionally, a jump in interest rates like the one that bedeviled Silicon Valley Bank — that scenario ended with the deregulatory push.An interest rate shock will be included in this year’s stress test scenarios, but the larger question of what risks are reflected in those exercises and whether they are sufficient is likely to get another look. Many economists had assumed that inflation and interest rates would stay low for a long time — but the pandemic upended that. It now seems clear that bank oversight made the same flawed assumption.The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank could precipitate changes for financial institutions that are not large enough to be considered globally systemic and thus subject to tougher oversight and rules.Jason Henry for The New York TimesMany people were wrong about the staying power of low rates, and “that includes regulators and supervisors, who are supposed to think about: What are the possibilities, and what are the scenarios?” said Jonathan Parker, the head of the finance department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Sloan School of Management.And there is a bigger challenge laid bare by the current episode: Several financial experts said the run on Silicon Valley Bank was so severe that more capital would not have saved the institution. Its problem, in part, was its huge share of uninsured deposits. Those depositors ran rapidly amid signs of weakness.That could spur greater attention in Congress and among regulators regarding whether deposit insurance needs to be extended more broadly, or whether banks need to be limited in how many uninsured deposits they can hold. And it could prompt a closer look at how uninsured deposits are treated in bank oversight — those deposits have long been looked at as unlikely to run quickly.In an interview, Mr. Quarles pushed back on the idea that the changes made under his watch helped to precipitate Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse. But he acknowledged that they had created new regulatory questions — including how to deal with a world in which technology enables very rapid bank runs.“Certainly, none of this resulted from anything that we changed,” Mr. Quarles said. “You had this perfect flow of imperfect information that really increased the speed and intensity of this run.”In the days after the collapse, some Republicans focused on supervisory failures at the Fed, while many Democrats focused on the aftershocks of deregulation and possible wrongdoing by the bank’s executives.“All the regulators had to do was read the reports that Silicon Valley Bank was submitting, and they would have seen the problem,” Senator John Kennedy, Republican of Louisiana and a member of the Banking Committee, said on the Senate floor.By contrast, two Senate Democrats — Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts and Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut — sent a letter to the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission on Wednesday urging the agencies to investigate whether senior executives involved in the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank had fallen short of their regulatory responsibilities or violated laws.Ms. Warren also unveiled legislation this week, co-sponsored by roughly 50 Democrats in the House and Senate, that would reimpose some of the Dodd-Frank requirements that were rolled back in 2018, including regular stress testing.Senator Sherrod Brown, Democrat of Ohio and chairman of the Banking Committee, told reporters that he intended to hold a hearing examining what happened “as soon as we can.”Mr. Barr, who started at the Fed last summer, was already reviewing a number of the Fed’s regulations to try to determine whether they were appropriately stern — a reality that had spurred intense lobbying as financial institutions resisted tougher oversight.But the episode could make those counterefforts more challenging.Late on Monday, the Bank Policy Institute, which represents 40 large banks and financial services companies, emailed journalists a list of its positions, including claims that the failures of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank were caused by “primarily a failure of management and supervision rather than regulation” and that the panic surrounding the collapses proved how resilient big banks were to stress, since they were largely unaffected by it.The trade group also emailed those talking points to congressional Democrats, but other trade groups, including the American Bankers Association, have stayed silent, according to a person familiar with the matter.“We share President Biden’s confidence in the nation’s banking system,” a spokesman with the American Bankers Association said. “Every American should know that their accounts are safe and their deposits are protected. Our industry will work with the administration, regulators and Congress to further bolster that trust.”The fallout could also kill big banks’ attempts to roll back regulations that they say are inefficient. The largest banks had wanted the Fed to stop forcing them to hold cash equivalents to what they say are safe securities like U.S. government debt. But Silicon Valley Bank’s failure was caused in part by its decision to keep a large portion of depositors’ cash in longer-dated U.S. Treasury bonds, which lost value as interest rates rose.“This definitely underscores why it is important that there be some capital requirement against government-backed securities,” said Sheila Bair, a former chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.Catie Edmondson More