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Late-Night Negotiating Frenzy Left First Republic in JPMorgan’s Control

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The resolution of First Republic Bank came after a frantic night of deal making by government officials and executives at the country’s biggest bank.Lawmakers and regulators have spent years erecting laws and rules meant to limit the power and size of the largest U.S. banks. But those efforts were cast aside in a frantic late-night effort by government officials to contain a banking crisis by seizing and selling First Republic Bank to the country’s biggest bank, JPMorgan Chase.At about 1 a.m. Monday, hours after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had been expected to announce a buyer for the troubled regional lender, government officials informed JPMorgan executives that they had won the right to take over First Republic and the accounts of its well-heeled customers, most of them in wealthy coastal cities and suburbs.The F.D.I.C.’s decision appears, for now, to have quelled nearly two months of simmering turmoil in the banking sector that followed the sudden collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank in early March. “This part of the crisis is over,” Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan’s chief executive, told analysts on Monday in a conference call to discuss the acquisition.For Mr. Dimon, it was a reprise of his role in the 2008 financial crisis when JPMorgan acquired Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual at the behest of federal regulators.But the resolution of First Republic has also brought to the fore long-running debates about whether some banks have become too big too fail partly because regulators have allowed or even encouraged them to acquire smaller financial institutions, especially during crises.“Regulators view them as adults and business partners,” said Tyler Gellasch, president of Healthy Markets Association, a Washington-based group that advocates greater transparency in the financial system, referring to big banks like JPMorgan. “They are too big to fail and they are afforded the privilege of being so.”He added that JPMorgan was likely to make a lot of money from the acquisition. JPMorgan said on Monday that it expected the deal to raise its profits this year by $500 million.JPMorgan will pay the F.D.I.C. $10.6 billion to acquire First Republic. The government agency expects to cover a loss of about $13 billion on First Republic’s assets.`Normally a bank cannot acquire another bank if doing so would allow it to control more than 10 percent of the nation’s bank deposits — a threshold JPMorgan had already reached before buying First Republic. But the law includes an exception for the acquisition of a failing bank.The F.D.I.C. sounded out banks to see if they would be willing to take First Republic’s uninsured deposits and if their primary regulator would allow them to do so, according to two people familiar with the process. On Friday afternoon, the regulator invited the banks into a virtual data room to look at First Republic’s financials, the two people said. The government agency, which was working with the investment bank Guggenheim Securities, had plenty of time to prepare for the auction. First Republic had been struggling since the failure of Silicon Valley Bank, despite receiving a $30 billion lifeline in March from 11 of the country’s largest banks, an effort led by Mr. Dimon of JPMorgan.By the afternoon of April 24, it had became increasingly clear that First Republic couldn’t stand on its own. That day, the bank revealed in its quarterly earnings report that it had lost $102 billion in customer deposits in the last weeks of March, or more than half what it had at the end of December.Ahead of the earnings release, First Republic’s lawyers and other advisers told the bank’s senior executives not to answer any questions on the company’s conference call, according to a person briefed on the matter, because of the bank’s dire situation.The revelations in the report and the executives’ silence spooked investors, who dumped its already beaten-down stock.When the F.D.I.C. began the process to sell First Republic, several bidders including PNC Financial Services, Fifth Third Bancorp, Citizens Financial Group and JPMorgan expressed an interest. Analysts and executives at those banks began going through First Republic’s data to figure out how much they would be willing to bid and submitted bids by early afternoon Sunday.Regulators and Guggenheim then returned to the four bidders, asking them for their best and final offers by 7 p.m. E.T. Each bank, including JPMorgan Chase, improved its offer, two of the people said.Regulators had indicated that they planned to announce a winner by 8 p.m., before markets in Asia opened. PNC executives had spent much of the weekend at the bank’s Pittsburgh headquarters putting together its bid. Executives at Citizens, which is based in Providence, R.I., gathered in offices in Connecticut and Massachusetts. But 8 p.m. rolled by with no word from the F.D.I.C. Several hours of silence followed.For the three smaller banks, the deal would have been transformative, giving them a much bigger presence in wealthy places like the San Francisco Bay Area and New York City. PNC, which is the sixth-largest U.S. bank, would have bolstered its position to challenge the nation’s four large commercial lenders — JPMorgan, Bank of America, Citigroup and Wells Fargo.Ultimately, JPMorgan not only offered more money than others and agreed to buy the vast majority of the bank, two people familiar with the process said. Regulators also were more inclined to accept the bank’s offer because JPMorgan was likely to have an easier time integrating First Republic’s branches into its business and managing the smaller bank’s loans and mortgages either by holding onto them or selling them, the two people said.As the executives at the smaller banks waited for their phones to ring, the F.D.I.C. and its advisers continued to negotiate with Mr. Dimon and his team, who were seeking assurances that the government would safeguard JPMorgan against losses, according to one of the people.At around 3 a.m., the F.D.I.C. announced that JPMorgan would acquire First Republic.An F.D.I.C. spokesman declined to comment on other bidders. In its statement, the agency said, “The resolution of First Republic Bank involved a highly competitive bidding process and resulted in a transaction consistent with the least-cost requirements of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.” The announcement was widely praised in the financial industry. Robin Vince, the president and chief executive of Bank of New York Mellon, said in an interview that it felt “like a cloud has been lifted.”Some financial analysts cautioned that the celebrations might be overdone.Many banks still have hundreds of billions of dollars in unrealized losses on Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities purchased when interest rates were very low. Some of those bond investments are now worth much less because the Federal Reserve has sharply raised rates to bring down inflation.Christopher Whalen of Whalen Global Advisors said the Fed fueled some of the problems at banks like First Republic with an easy money policy that led them to load up on bonds that are now performing poorly. “This problem will not go away until the Fed drops interest rates,” he said. “Otherwise, we’ll see more banks fail.”But Mr. Whalen’s view is a minority opinion. The growing consensus is that the failures of Silicon Valley, Signature and now First Republic will not lead to a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis that brought down Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual.The assets of the three banks that failed this year are greater than of the 25 banks that failed in 2008 after adjusting for inflation. But 465 banks failed in total from 2008 to 2012.One unresolved issue is how to deal with banks that still have a high percentage of uninsured deposits — money from customers well in excess of the $250,000 federally insured cap on deposits. The F.D.I.C. on Monday recommended that Congress consider expanding its ability to protect deposits.Many investors and depositors are already assuming that the government will step in to protect all deposits at any failing institution by invoking a systemic risk exception — something they did with Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank. But that’s easy to do when it is just a few banks that run into trouble and more difficult if many banks have problems.Another looming concern is that midsize banks will pull back on lending to preserve capital if they are subject to the kind of bank runs that took place at Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic. Depositors might also move their savings to money market funds, which tend to offer higher returns than savings or checking accounts.Midsize banks also need to brace for more exacting oversight from the Fed and the F.D.I.C., which criticized themselves in reports released last week about the bank failures in March.Regional and community banks are the main source of financing for the commercial real estate industry, which encompasses office buildings, apartment complexes and shopping centers. An unwillingness by banks to lend to developers could stymie plans for new construction.Any pullback in lending could lead to a slowdown in economic growth or a recession.Some experts said that despite those challenges and concerns about big banks getting bigger, regulators have done an admirable job in restoring stability to the financial system.“It was an extremely difficult situation, and given how difficult it was, I think it was well done,” said Sheila Bair, who was chair of the F.D.I.C. during the 2008 financial crisis. “It means that big banks becoming bigger when smaller banks begin to fail is inevitable,” she added.Reporting was contributed by More

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    How Far Can Regulators Go to Protect Uninsured Deposits?

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    A decision by federal regulators to ensure that depositors at Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank did not lose money regardless of how much they had in their accounts, has aroused populist anger as well as questions of what government agencies can and cannot do to protect uninsured accounts.Under current law, the government insures bank deposits only up to $250,000. Any increase in that limit would require congressional authorization. But regulators can protect deposits over that amount, like they did at Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, if they determine that the banks’ failures pose a systemic risk.They can also request approval from Congress to temporarily raise the cap or eliminate it altogether, though some lawmakers have already expressed unwillingness to do so.Janet L. Yellen, the Treasury secretary, suggested last week that regulators were ready to make uninsured depositors at other banks whole if necessary and “if smaller institutions suffer deposit runs that pose the risk of contagion.”Amid widespread bank failures in the Great Depression, Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933 to insure deposits under $2,500. It has increased that limit over the years, recently lifting it to $250,000 from $100,000 for IRAs in 2006 and for checking accounts in 2008. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 made the increase permanent.In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the F.D.I.C. evoked the systemic risk exception to create a program that guaranteed new debt issued by banks for three years and insured all deposits if they did not bear interest (typically, accounts used by businesses for payroll).The decision to grant the exception was reached “after three days of intense negotiation,” according to an account of the episode by the F.D.I.C.’s historian, and had to be approved by the Treasury secretary in consultation with the president and two-thirds of the boards of both the F.D.I.C. and the Federal Reserve.But regulators no longer have the ability to create such a program unilaterally, as the Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the F.D.I.C.’s authority to temporarily insure accounts with more assets than the statutory limit. Under that law, the agency can only do so if it is the receiver of a failed bank or if it has approval from Congress.“Congress was so concerned with moral hazard and ‘bailouts’ that it seemed to limit the receipt of F.D.I.C. assistance to the imposition of an F.D.I.C. receivership, unless Congress specifically approved a subsequent F.D.I.C. alternative,” said Jeffrey N. Gordon, a law professor at Columbia University and expert on financial regulation.During the coronavirus pandemic, Congress in 2020 temporarily lifted the deposit limit on noninterest bearing accounts. But in congressional testimony last week, Ms. Yellen said her agency was not seeking to lift the cap altogether and insure all deposits over $250,000. Rather, she said, regulators would seek the systemic risk exception for failed banks through a “case-by-case determination.”Others, though, have pushed for more sweeping coverage. Some lawmakers are considering temporarily increasing the deposit cap while others have proposed eliminating it altogether.The Dodd-Frank Act provides a fast-track process for such requests, allowing the Congress to expedite approval by adopting a joint resolution. Sheila Blair, the former president of the F.D.I.C. during the financial crisis, recently urged Congress to initiate the procedure.“We want people to make payroll. We want people to be able to pay their businesses and others to pay their bills. So I think that is one area where unlimited coverage, at least on a temporary basis, makes a lot of sense,” she said in a Washington Post event last week.News reports have also suggested that regulators are looking at other mechanisms of acting without Congress, specifically by tapping into the Exchange Stabilization Fund. The Treasury secretary has broad authority to use the emergency reserve, which was created in 1934 to stabilize the value of the dollar but has been used over the years for a host of other purposes.Mr. Gordon noted that using the exchange fund alone would not work to protect uninsured deposits, given that it is “paltry compared to the Deposit Insurance Fund and unlike the D.I.F. has no mechanism for replenishment.” But he said it would be possible to use the fund as a backstop in a program operated by the Federal Reserve that lends against bank assets.“What this means is that banks would have an easy way to raise cash to pay off all deposits,” he said. More

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    A Big Question for the Fed: What Went Wrong With Bank Oversight?

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    As the Federal Reserve reviews the failure of Silicon Valley Bank, and Congress prepares for hearings, bank oversight is getting a closer look.WASHINGTON — Jerome H. Powell is likely to face more than the typical questions about the Federal Reserve’s latest interest rate decision on Wednesday. The central bank chair will almost certainly be grilled about how and why his institution failed to stop problems at Silicon Valley Bank before it was too late.The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, the largest bank failure since 2008, has prompted intense scrutiny of the Fed’s oversight as many wonder why the bank’s vulnerabilities were not promptly fixed.Many of the bank’s weaknesses seem, in hindsight, as if they should have been obvious to its regulators at the Fed. An outsize share of its deposits were over the $250,000 insurance limit, making depositors more likely to flee at the first sign of trouble and leaving the bank susceptible to runs.The bank had also grown rapidly, and its depositors were heavily concentrated in the volatile technology industry. It held a lot of long-term bonds, which lose market value when the Fed raises interest rates, as it has over the past year. Still, the bank had done little to protect itself against an increase in borrowing costs.Governors at the Fed Board in Washington allowed the bank to merge with a small bank in June 2021, after the first warning signs had surfaced and just months before Fed supervisors in San Francisco began to issue a volley of warnings about the company’s poor risk management. In 2022, the Fed repeatedly flagged problems to executives and barred the firm from growing through acquisition.But the Fed did not react decisively enough to prevent the bank’s problems from leading to its demise, a failure that has sent destabilizing jitters through the rest of the American financial system.Mr. Powell is likely to face several questions: What went wrong? Did examiners at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco fail to flag risks aggressively enough? Did the Fed’s board fail to follow up on noted weaknesses? Or was the lapse indicative of a broader problem — that is, did existing rules and oversight make it difficult to quickly address important flaws?Some Democrats have blamed regulatory rollbacks put into effect by the Fed in 2019 for weakening the system, and have pointed a finger at Mr. Powell.Julia Nikhinson for The New York TimesThe Fed has already announced a review of the bank’s collapse, with the inquiry set to conclude by May 1.“The events surrounding Silicon Valley Bank demand a thorough, transparent and swift review by the Federal Reserve,” Mr. Powell said in a statement last week.Congress is also planning to dig into what went awry, with committees in both the Senate and House planning hearings next week on the recent bank collapses.Investors and experts in financial regulation have been racing to figure out what went wrong even before the conclusion of those inquiries. Silicon Valley Bank had a business model that made it unusually vulnerable to a wave of rapid withdrawals. Even so, if its demise is evidence of a blind spot in how banks are overseen, then weaknesses could be more broadly spread throughout the banking system.“The SVB failure has not only gotten people asking the question, ‘Gee, are other banks in similar enough circumstances that they could be in danger?’” said Daniel Tarullo, a former Fed governor who oversaw post-2008 regulation and who is now a professor at Harvard. “It’s also been a wake-up call to look at banks generally.”Politicians have already begun assigning blame. Some Democrats have blasted regulatory rollbacks passed in 2018, and put into effect by the Fed in 2019, for weakening the system, and they have pointed a finger at Mr. Powell for failing to stop them.At the same time, a few Republicans have tried to lay the blame firmly with the San Francisco Fed, arguing that the blowup shouldn’t necessarily lead to more onerous regulation.“There’s a lot, obviously, that we don’t know yet,” said Lev Menand, who studies money and banking at Columbia Law School.Understanding what happened at Silicon Valley Bank requires understanding how bank oversight works — and particularly how it has evolved since the late 2010s.Different American regulators oversee different banks, but the Federal Reserve has jurisdiction over large bank holding companies, state member banks, foreign banks operating in the United States and some regional banks.The Fed’s Board of Governors, which is made up of seven politically appointed officials, is responsible for shaping regulations and setting out the basic rules that govern bank supervision. But day-to-day monitoring of banks is carried out by supervisors at the Fed’s 12 regional banks.President Barack Obama with, to his left, Sen. Christopher Dodd and Representative Barney Frank in 2010, after signing the Dodd-Frank financial reform act.Doug Mills/The New York TimesBefore the 2008 financial crisis, those quasi-private regional branches had a lot of discretion when it came to bank oversight. But in the wake of that meltdown, the supervision came to be run more centrally out of Washington. The Dodd-Frank law carved out a new role for one of the Fed’s governors — vice chair for bank supervision — giving the central bank’s examiners around the country a more clear-cut and formal boss.The idea was to make bank oversight both stricter and more fail-safe. Dodd-Frank also ramped up capital and liquidity requirements, forcing many banks to police their risk and keep easy-to-tap money on hand, and it instituted regular stress tests that served as health checkups for the biggest banks.But by the time the Fed’s first official vice chair for supervision was confirmed in 2017, the regulatory pendulum had swung back in the opposite direction. Randal K. Quarles, a pick by President Donald J. Trump, came into office pledging to pare back bank rules that many Republicans, in particular, deemed too onerous.“After the first wave of reform, and with the benefit of experience and reflection, some refinements will undoubtedly be in order,” Mr. Quarles said at his confirmation hearing.Some of those refinements came straight from Congress. In 2018, Republicans and many Democrats passed a law that lightened regulations on small banks. But the law did more than just relieve community banks. It also lifted the floor at which many strict bank rules kicked in, to $250 billion in assets.Mr. Quarles pushed the relief even further. For instance, banks with between $250 billion and $700 billion in assets were allowed to opt out of counting unrealized losses — the change in the market value of older bonds — from their capital calculations. While that would not have mattered in SVB’s case, given that the bank was beneath the $250 billion threshold, some Fed officials at the time warned that it and other changes could leave the banking system more vulnerable.Lael Brainard, who was then a Fed governor and now directs the National Economic Council, warned in a dissent that “distress of even noncomplex large banking organizations generally manifests first in liquidity stress and quickly transmits contagion through the financial system.”Randal K. Quarles, who was picked by President Donald J. Trump and started at the Fed in 2017, came into office pledging to pare back bank rules that were by then deemed too onerous.Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call, via Associated PressOther Fed officials, including Mr. Powell, voted for the changes.It is unclear how much any of the adjustments mattered in the case of Silicon Valley Bank. The bank most likely would have faced a stress test earlier had those changes not gone into place. Still, those annual assessments have rarely tested for the interest rate risks that undid the firm.Some have cited another of Mr. Quarles’s changes as potentially more consequential: He tried to make everyday bank supervision more predictable, leaving less of it up to individual examiners.While Mr. Quarles has said he failed to change supervision much, people both within and outside the Fed system have suggested that his mere shift in emphasis may have mattered.“That ethos might have been why supervisors felt like they couldn’t do more here,” said Peter Conti-Brown, an expert in financial regulation and a Fed historian at the University of Pennsylvania.Mr. Quarles, who stepped down from his position in October 2021, pushed back on the contention that he had made changes to supervision that allowed weaknesses to grow at Silicon Valley Bank.“I gave up the reins as vice chair for supervision a year and a half ago,” he said.Fed supervisors began to flag Silicon Valley Bank’s problems in earnest in the fall of 2021, after the bank had grown and faced a more extensive review. That process resulted in six citations, often called “matters requiring attention,” which are meant to spur executives to act. Additional deficiencies were identified in early 2023, shortly before the failure.A critical question, said Mr. Menand, is “were the supervisors content to spot problems and wait for them to be remediated?”But he noted that when it came to “bringing out the big guns” — backing up stern warnings with legal enforcement — supervisors must, in many ways, rely on the Fed Board in Washington. If bank leadership thought the Board was unlikely to react to their deficiencies, it might have made them less keen to fix the problems.Banks often have issues flagged by their supervisors, and those concerns are not always immediately resolved. In a rating system that tests for capital planning, liquidity risk management and governance and controls, consistently only about half of large banking institutions score as “satisfactory” across all three.But in the wake of Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse, how bank oversight is performed at the Fed could be in for some changes. Michael Barr, who President Biden appointed as the Fed’s vice chair for supervision, was carrying out a “holistic review” of bank oversight even before the failures. Either that or the review of what happened at SVB is now more likely to end in tighter controls, particularly at large regional banks.“There’s a lot of buck-passing,” said Mr. Conti-Brown. “I think it was likely a joint failure, and that’s part of the design of the system.” More

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    After SVB Collapse, Fed and Lawmakers Eye Bank Rules

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    The stunning demise of Silicon Valley Bank has spurred soul-searching about how large and regional banks are overseen.The Federal Reserve is facing criticism over Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse, with lawmakers and financial regulation experts asking why the regulator failed to catch and stop seemingly obvious risks. That concern is galvanizing a review of how the central bank oversees financial institutions — one that could end in stricter rules for a range of banks.In particular, the episode could result in meaningful regulatory and supervisory changes for institutions — like Silicon Valley Bank — that are large but not large enough to be considered globally systemic and thus subject to tougher oversight and rules. Smaller banks face lighter regulations than the largest ones, which go through regular and extensive tests of their financial health and have to more closely police how much easy-to-tap cash they have to serve as a buffer in times of crisis.Regulators and lawmakers are focused both on whether a deregulatory push in 2018, during the Trump administration, went too far, and on whether existing rules are sufficient in a changing world.While it is too early to predict the outcome, the shock waves that Silicon Valley Bank’s demise sent through the financial system, and the sweeping response the government staged to prevent it from inciting a nationwide bank run, are clearly intensifying the pressure for stronger oversight.“There are a lot of signs of a supervisory failure,” said Kathryn Judge, a financial regulation expert at Columbia Law School, who also noted that it was too early to draw firm conclusions. “We do need more rigorous regulations for large regional banks that more accurately reflect the risks these banks can pose to the financial system,” she said.The call for tougher bank rules echoes the aftermath of 2008, when risky bets by big financial firms helped to plunge the United States into a deep recession and exposed blind spots in bank oversight. The crisis ultimately led to the Dodd-Frank law in 2010, a reform that ushered in a series of more stringent requirements, including wide-ranging “stress tests” that probe a bank’s ability to weather severe economic situations.But some of those rules were lightened — or “tailored” — under Republicans. Randal K. Quarles, who was the Fed’s vice chair for supervision from 2017 to 2021, put a bipartisan law into effect that relaxed some regulations for small and medium-size banks and pushed to make day-to-day Fed supervision simpler and more predictable.Critics have said such changes could have helped pave the way for the problems now plaguing the banking system.“Clearly, there’s a problem with supervision,” said Daniel Tarullo, a former Fed governor who helped shape and enact many post-2008 bank regulations and who is now a professor at Harvard. “The lighter touch on supervision is something that has been a concern for several years now.”Jerome H. Powell, right, the chair of the Federal Reserve, and Randal K. Quarles, then the vice chair for supervision, at the Fed, in 2018. “The events surrounding Silicon Valley Bank demand a thorough, transparent and swift review,” Mr. Powell said in a statement this week.Aaron P. Bernstein/ReutersThe Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco was in charge of overseeing Silicon Valley Bank, and experts across the ideological spectrum are questioning why growing risks at the bank were not halted. The firm grew rapidly and took on a large number of depositors from one vulnerable industry: technology. A large share of the bank’s deposits were uninsured, making customers more likely to run for the exit in a moment of trouble, and the bank had not taken care to protect itself against the financial risks posed by rising interest rates.Worsening the optics of the situation, Greg Becker, the chief executive of Silicon Valley Bank, was until Friday on the board of directors at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. The Fed has said reserve bank directors are not involved in matters related to banking supervision.Questions about bank oversight ultimately come back to roost at the Fed’s board in Washington — which, since the 2008 crisis, has played a heavier role in guiding how banks are overseen day to day.The board has indicated that it will take the concerns seriously, putting its new vice chair of supervision, Michael Barr, in charge of the inquiry into what happened at Silicon Valley Bank, the Fed announced this week.“The events surrounding Silicon Valley Bank demand a thorough, transparent and swift review by the Federal Reserve,” Jerome H. Powell, the Fed chair, said in a statement.It is unclear how much any one of the 2018 rollbacks would have mattered in the case of Silicon Valley Bank. Under the original postcrisis rules, the bank, which had less than $250 billion in assets, most likely would have faced a full Fed stress test earlier, probably by this year. But the rules for stress tests are complex enough that even that is difficult to pinpoint with certainty.“Nobody can say that without the 2018 rollbacks none of this would have happened,” Ms. Judge said. But “those rules suggested that banks in this size range did not pose a threat to financial stability.”But the government’s dramatic response to Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse, which included saving uninsured depositors and rolling out a Fed rescue program, underlined that even the 16th-largest bank in the country could require major public action.Given that, the Fed will be paying renewed attention to how those banks are treated when it comes to both capital (their financial cushion against losses) and liquidity (their ability to quickly convert assets into cash to pay back depositors).There could be a push, for instance, to lower the threshold at which the more onerous regulations begin to apply. As a result of the 2018 law, some of the stricter rules now kick in when banks have $250 billion in assets.Another major focal point will be the content of stress tests. While banks used to be run through an “adverse” scenario that included creative and unexpected shocks to the system — including, occasionally, a jump in interest rates like the one that bedeviled Silicon Valley Bank — that scenario ended with the deregulatory push.An interest rate shock will be included in this year’s stress test scenarios, but the larger question of what risks are reflected in those exercises and whether they are sufficient is likely to get another look. Many economists had assumed that inflation and interest rates would stay low for a long time — but the pandemic upended that. It now seems clear that bank oversight made the same flawed assumption.The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank could precipitate changes for financial institutions that are not large enough to be considered globally systemic and thus subject to tougher oversight and rules.Jason Henry for The New York TimesMany people were wrong about the staying power of low rates, and “that includes regulators and supervisors, who are supposed to think about: What are the possibilities, and what are the scenarios?” said Jonathan Parker, the head of the finance department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Sloan School of Management.And there is a bigger challenge laid bare by the current episode: Several financial experts said the run on Silicon Valley Bank was so severe that more capital would not have saved the institution. Its problem, in part, was its huge share of uninsured deposits. Those depositors ran rapidly amid signs of weakness.That could spur greater attention in Congress and among regulators regarding whether deposit insurance needs to be extended more broadly, or whether banks need to be limited in how many uninsured deposits they can hold. And it could prompt a closer look at how uninsured deposits are treated in bank oversight — those deposits have long been looked at as unlikely to run quickly.In an interview, Mr. Quarles pushed back on the idea that the changes made under his watch helped to precipitate Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse. But he acknowledged that they had created new regulatory questions — including how to deal with a world in which technology enables very rapid bank runs.“Certainly, none of this resulted from anything that we changed,” Mr. Quarles said. “You had this perfect flow of imperfect information that really increased the speed and intensity of this run.”In the days after the collapse, some Republicans focused on supervisory failures at the Fed, while many Democrats focused on the aftershocks of deregulation and possible wrongdoing by the bank’s executives.“All the regulators had to do was read the reports that Silicon Valley Bank was submitting, and they would have seen the problem,” Senator John Kennedy, Republican of Louisiana and a member of the Banking Committee, said on the Senate floor.By contrast, two Senate Democrats — Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts and Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut — sent a letter to the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission on Wednesday urging the agencies to investigate whether senior executives involved in the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank had fallen short of their regulatory responsibilities or violated laws.Ms. Warren also unveiled legislation this week, co-sponsored by roughly 50 Democrats in the House and Senate, that would reimpose some of the Dodd-Frank requirements that were rolled back in 2018, including regular stress testing.Senator Sherrod Brown, Democrat of Ohio and chairman of the Banking Committee, told reporters that he intended to hold a hearing examining what happened “as soon as we can.”Mr. Barr, who started at the Fed last summer, was already reviewing a number of the Fed’s regulations to try to determine whether they were appropriately stern — a reality that had spurred intense lobbying as financial institutions resisted tougher oversight.But the episode could make those counterefforts more challenging.Late on Monday, the Bank Policy Institute, which represents 40 large banks and financial services companies, emailed journalists a list of its positions, including claims that the failures of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank were caused by “primarily a failure of management and supervision rather than regulation” and that the panic surrounding the collapses proved how resilient big banks were to stress, since they were largely unaffected by it.The trade group also emailed those talking points to congressional Democrats, but other trade groups, including the American Bankers Association, have stayed silent, according to a person familiar with the matter.“We share President Biden’s confidence in the nation’s banking system,” a spokesman with the American Bankers Association said. “Every American should know that their accounts are safe and their deposits are protected. Our industry will work with the administration, regulators and Congress to further bolster that trust.”The fallout could also kill big banks’ attempts to roll back regulations that they say are inefficient. The largest banks had wanted the Fed to stop forcing them to hold cash equivalents to what they say are safe securities like U.S. government debt. But Silicon Valley Bank’s failure was caused in part by its decision to keep a large portion of depositors’ cash in longer-dated U.S. Treasury bonds, which lost value as interest rates rose.“This definitely underscores why it is important that there be some capital requirement against government-backed securities,” said Sheila Bair, a former chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.Catie Edmondson More

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    Don’t Call It a Bailout: Washington Is Haunted by the 2008 Financial Crisis

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    The colossal bailouts after the 2008 collapse arguably saved the global economy, but they also provoked a ferocious popular backlash.WASHINGTON — On that summer day in 2010 when he signed new legislation regulating the banks after the worst financial crash in generations, President Barack Obama declared, “There will be no more tax-funded bailouts. Period.” Standing over his right shoulder just inches away and clapping was his vice president, Joseph R. Biden Jr.Nearly 13 years later, Mr. Biden, now himself a president facing a banking crisis, appeared before television cameras on Monday to make clear that he remembered that moment even as he guaranteed depositors at failing institutions. “This is an important point: No losses will be borne by the taxpayers,” he vowed. “Let me repeat that: No losses will be borne by the taxpayers.”He could not even bring himself to utter the word “bailout.”Washington remains haunted by the specter of government intervention after the banking sector collapse that triggered the Great Recession, leaving leaders of both parties determined to avoid any repeat of that painful period. The colossal bailouts initiated under President George W. Bush and continued under Mr. Obama arguably saved the global economy but also provoked such a ferocious popular backlash that they transformed American politics to this day.The notion that “fat-cat bankers,” as Mr. Obama once called them, should be rescued by the government even as everyday Americans lost their jobs, their homes and their life savings so rankled the public that it gave birth to the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street movements and undermined the establishment across the political spectrum. In some ways, that popular revolt empowered populists like Donald J. Trump and Bernie Sanders, ultimately helping Mr. Trump to win the presidency.“Today’s populism is firmly rooted in 2008,” said Brendan Buck, a top adviser to two Republican House speakers, John A. Boehner and Paul D. Ryan, who were both eventually targeted by Tea Party rebels within their own party. “The bailouts not only fostered distrust of corporations, but cemented the notion that elites always do well while regular people pay the price. Bailouts were also followed by a large expansion of government, and while it all may have prevented much worse calamity, the recovery was slow.”Mr. Biden, of course, knows all that intimately. He saw it up close, watching the public uprising from his office in the West Wing while counseling Mr. Obama on how to respond. Even the separate economic stimulus package that Mr. Obama assigned Mr. Biden to manage came to be tainted because many Americans confused it with the bank bailouts.And so now, as he endeavors to head off a crisis of confidence after the failure of three financial institutions in recent days, Mr. Biden wants to avoid not just a run on the banks but a run on his credibility.“The term and the idea of bailouts are still highly toxic,” said Robert Gibbs, Mr. Obama’s first White House press secretary. He said Mr. Biden rightly focused on accountability for those responsible and sparing taxpayers the cost. “Those are two important lessons learned from 15 years ago. Emphasizing that the ones being helped are instead innocent bystanders who just had money in the bank is why a backlash on this action is less likely.”But Republicans were quick to pin both the crisis and potential resolution on Mr. Biden, accusing him of fostering economic troubles by stoking inflation with big spending and labeling government efforts to head off escalation of the crisis the Biden bailout.“Politically, if you ask me what’s the impact of bailing out rich techies in California — which is exactly how this will be played — then the answer is Donald Trump’s likelihood of re-election just went up three to four points,” said Mick Mulvaney, who came to Congress as a Tea Party champion and later served as Mr. Trump’s acting White House chief of staff.In repeating that taxpayers will not bear the cost of bailing out depositors at the failed banks, Mr. Biden noted that the cost will be financed by fees paid by other banks into the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or F.D.I.C. What he did not mention was that a separate loan program that the Federal Reserve has opened to help keep money flowing through the banking system will be backed by taxpayer money. In a statement on Sunday, the Fed said it “does not anticipate that it will be necessary to draw on these backstop funds.”.css-1v2n82w{max-width:600px;width:calc(100% – 40px);margin-top:20px;margin-bottom:25px;height:auto;margin-left:auto;margin-right:auto;font-family:nyt-franklin;color:var(–color-content-secondary,#363636);}@media only screen and (max-width:480px){.css-1v2n82w{margin-left:20px;margin-right:20px;}}@media only screen and (min-width:1024px){.css-1v2n82w{width:600px;}}.css-161d8zr{width:40px;margin-bottom:18px;text-align:left;margin-left:0;color:var(–color-content-primary,#121212);border:1px solid var(–color-content-primary,#121212);}@media only screen and (max-width:480px){.css-161d8zr{width:30px;margin-bottom:15px;}}.css-tjtq43{line-height:25px;}@media only screen and (max-width:480px){.css-tjtq43{line-height:24px;}}.css-x1k33h{font-family:nyt-cheltenham;font-size:19px;font-weight:700;line-height:25px;}.css-1hvpcve{font-size:17px;font-weight:300;line-height:25px;}.css-1hvpcve em{font-style:italic;}.css-1hvpcve strong{font-weight:bold;}.css-1hvpcve a{font-weight:500;color:var(–color-content-secondary,#363636);}.css-1c013uz{margin-top:18px;margin-bottom:22px;}@media only screen and (max-width:480px){.css-1c013uz{font-size:14px;margin-top:15px;margin-bottom:20px;}}.css-1c013uz a{color:var(–color-signal-editorial,#326891);-webkit-text-decoration:underline;text-decoration:underline;font-weight:500;font-size:16px;}@media only screen and (max-width:480px){.css-1c013uz a{font-size:13px;}}.css-1c013uz a:hover{-webkit-text-decoration:none;text-decoration:none;}How Times reporters cover politics. We rely on our journalists to be independent observers. So while Times staff members may vote, they are not allowed to endorse or campaign for candidates or political causes. This includes participating in marches or rallies in support of a movement or giving money to, or raising money for, any political candidate or election cause.Learn more about our process.The nuances did not matter to Mr. Biden’s critics. “Joe Biden is pretending this isn’t a bailout. It is,” Nikki Haley, the former ambassador to the United Nations now running for the Republican presidential nomination, said in a statement. “Now depositors at healthy banks are forced to subsidize Silicon Valley Bank’s mismanagement. When the Deposit Insurance Fund runs dry, all bank customers are on the hook. That’s a public bailout.”Other conservatives argued that a government rescue, however it is formulated, warps private markets and eliminates disincentives for financial institutions taking reckless risks because they can assume they too will eventually be saved, a concept called “moral hazard.”“Organizations that can’t manage risk should be allowed to fail, and taxpayers should not be forced to bailout the well-connected and wealthy because a bank prioritized woke causes above smart investing,” David M. McIntosh, a former Republican congressman from Indiana and president of the Club for Growth, a conservative advocacy organization, wrote on Twitter.But the White House adamantly rejected the comparison to the bailouts of the past, noting that the government is protecting depositors, not investors, while firing bank managers responsible for the trouble. “This is very different than what we saw in 2008,” Karine Jean-Pierre, the White House press secretary, told reporters.Michael Kikukawa, another White House spokesman, later said in a statement: “The president’s direction from the outset has been to respond in a way that protects hardworking Americans and small businesses, keeps our banking system strong and resilient, and ensures those responsible are held accountable. That’s exactly what his administration’s actions have done.”Mr. Biden, for his part, blamed Mr. Trump for the current crisis, saying “the last administration rolled back some of these requirements” in the Dodd-Frank law that Mr. Obama signed in 2010. Mr. Trump signed legislation passed by lawmakers in both parties in 2018 freeing thousands of small and medium-sized banks from some of the strict rules in the earlier law.The bailouts back then came in response to a banking crisis that seemed far more dangerous than what is currently evident. Some of the country’s most storied investment houses were collapsing in 2008 under the weight of risky mortgage-based securities, starting with Bear Stearns and later Lehman Brothers.Mr. Bush was warned that a cascade of failures could propel the country into another Great Depression. “If we’re really looking at another Great Depression,” he told aides, “you can be damn sure I’m going to be Roosevelt, not Hoover.”Casting aside his longstanding free-market philosophy, Mr. Bush asked Congress to authorize $700 billion for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, to prop up the banks. Aghast at the request just weeks before an election, the House rejected the plan, led by Mr. Bush’s fellow Republicans, sending the Dow Jones industrial average down 777 points, the largest single-day point drop in history to that point. Alarmed by the reaction, the House soon reversed course and approved a barely revised version of the plan.Mr. Obama and his running mate, Mr. Biden, both voted for the program and went on to win the election. Taking office in January 2009, they then inherited the bailout. In the end, about $443 billion of the $700 billion authorized was actually used to bolster banks, automakers and a giant insurance firm. As unpopular as it was, the injection of funds helped stabilize the economy.The ultimate cost of the bailouts of that period remains in dispute. Mr. Obama and others who were involved often say that they were all ultimately paid back by the companies that benefited from the funds. ProPublica, the nonprofit investigative news organization, calculated in 2019 that after repayments the federal government actually made a profit of $109 billion.But it depends on how you count the costs. Deborah J. Lucas, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, calculated that same year that the TARP program cost $90 billion in the end, a far cry from the original $700 billion. But other bailouts, most notably to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the federally backed home mortgage companies, brought the total cost of various bailouts to $498 billion in her estimation.Either way, critics on the left and right felt aggrieved. As recently as 2020, Mr. Sanders cited the issue in running against Mr. Biden for the Democratic nomination. “Joe bailed out the crooks on Wall Street that nearly destroyed our economy 12 years ago,” he said at a town hall.Mr. Biden stood by the decisions, maintaining they worked. “Had those banks all gone under, all those people Bernie says he cares about would be in deep trouble,” he said during a debate, adding, “This was about saving an economy, and it did save the economy.”The issue was not enough to cost Mr. Biden the nomination, but that did not mean voters remember the bailouts of the past fondly. “To many, it didn’t feel like it ‘worked,’ and that made it very easy to demagogue,” said Mr. Buck. “A long period of economic malaise also leads to people looking for something or someone to blame, which is the basis for populism. I firmly believe we don’t get Trump without the devastation of 2008.” More

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    Was This a Bailout? Skeptics Descend on Silicon Valley Bank Response.

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    The government took drastic action to shore up the banking system and make depositors of two failed banks whole. It quickly drew blowback.WASHINGTON — A sweeping package aimed at containing damage to the financial system in the wake of high-profile failures has prompted questions about whether the federal government is again bailing out Wall Street.And while many economists and analysts agreed that the government’s response should not be considered a “bailout” in key ways — investors in the banks’ stock will lose their money, and the banks have been closed — many said it should lead to scrutiny of how the banking system is regulated and supervised.The reckoning came after the Federal Reserve, Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation announced Sunday that they would make sure that all depositors in two large failed banks, Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, were repaid in full. The Fed also announced that it would offer banks loans against their Treasuries and many other asset holdings, treating the securities as though they were worth their original value — even though higher interest rates have eroded the market price of such bonds.The actions were meant to send a message to America: There is no reason to pull your money out of the banking system, because your deposits are safe and funding is plentiful. The point was to avert a bank run that could tank the financial system and broader economy.It was unclear on Monday whether the plan would succeed. Regional bank stocks tumbled, and nervous investors snapped up safe assets. But even before the verdict was in, lawmakers, policy researchers and academics had begun debating whether the government had made the correct move, whether it would encourage future risk-taking in the financial system and why it was necessary in the first place.“The Fed has basically just written insurance on interest-rate risk for the whole banking system,” said Steven Kelly, senior research associate at Yale’s program on financial stability. And that, he said, could stoke future risk-taking by implying that the Fed will step in if things go awry.“I’ll call it a bailout of the system,” Mr. Kelly said. “It lowers the threshold for the expectation of where emergency steps kick in.”While the definition of “bailout” is ill defined, it is typically applied when an institution or investor is saved by government intervention from the consequences of reckless risk-taking. The term became a swear word in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, after the government engineered a rescue of big banks and other financial firms using taxpayer money, with little to no consequences for the executives who made bad bets that brought the financial system close to the abyss.President Biden, speaking from the White House on Monday, tried to make clear that he did not consider what the government was doing to be a bailout in the traditional sense, given that investors would lose their money and taxpayers would not be on the hook for any losses.“Investors in the banks will not be protected,” Mr. Biden said. “They knowingly took a risk, and when the risk didn’t pay off, investors lose their money. That’s how capitalism works.”The Downfall of Silicon Valley BankOne of the most prominent lenders in the world of technology start-ups collapsed on March 10, forcing the U.S. government to step in.A Rapid Fall: The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, the biggest U.S. bank failure since the 2008 financial crisis, was caused by a run on the bank. But will the turmoil prove to be fleeting — or turn into a true crisis?The Fallout: The bank’s implosion rattled a start-up industry already on edge, and some of the worst casualties of the collapse were companies developing solutions for the climate crisis.Signature Bank: The New York financial institution closed its doors abruptly after regulators said it could threaten the entire financial system. To some extent, it is a victim of the panic around Silicon Valley Bank.The Fed’s Next Move: The Federal Reserve has been rapidly raising interest rates to fight inflation, but making big moves could be trickier after Silicon Valley Bank’s blowup.He added, “No losses will be borne by the taxpayers. Let me repeat that: No losses will be borne by the taxpayers.”But some Republican lawmakers were unconvinced.Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri said on Monday that he was introducing legislation to protect customers and community banks from new “special assessment fees” that the Fed said would be imposed to cover any losses to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Deposit Insurance Fund, which is being used to protect depositors from losses.“What’s basically happened with these ‘special assessments’ to cover SVB is the Biden administration has found a way to make taxpayers pay for a bailout without taking a vote,” Mr. Hawley said in a statement.President Biden said Monday that he would ask Congress and banking regulators to consider rule changes “to make it less likely that this kind of bank failure would happen again.”Doug Mills/The New York TimesMonday’s action by the government was a clear rescue of a range of financial players. Banks that took on interest-rate risk, and potentially their big depositors, were being protected against losses — which some observers said constituted a bailout.“It’s hard to say that isn’t a bailout,” said Dennis Kelleher, a co-founder of Better Markets, a prominent financial reform advocacy group. “Merely because taxpayers aren’t on the hook so far doesn’t mean something isn’t a bailout.”But many academics agreed that the plan was more about preventing a broad and destabilizing bank run than saving any one business or group of depositors.“Big picture, this was the right thing to do,” said Christina Parajon Skinner, an expert on central banking and financial regulation at the University of Pennsylvania. But she added that it could still encourage financial betting by reinforcing the idea that the government would step in to clean up the mess if the financial system faced trouble.“There are questions about moral hazard,” she said.One of the signals the rescue sent was to depositors: If you hold a large bank account, the moves suggested that the government would step in to protect you in a crisis. That might be desirable — several experts on Monday said it might be smart to revise deposit insurance to cover accounts bigger than $250,000.But it could give big depositors less incentive to pull their money out if their banks take big risks, which could in turn give the financial institutions a green light to be less careful.That could merit new safeguards to guard against future danger, said William English, a former director of the monetary affairs division at the Fed who is now at Yale. He thinks that bank runs in 2008 and recent days have illustrated that a system of partial deposit insurance doesn’t really work, he said.An official with the F.D.I.C., center, explained to clients of Silicon Valley Bank in Santa Clara, Calif., the procedure for entering the bank and making transactions.Jim Wilson/The New York Times“Market discipline doesn’t really happen until it’s too late, and then it’s too sharp,” he said. “But if you don’t have that, what is limiting the risk-tanking of banks?”It wasn’t just the side effects of the rescue stoking concern on Monday: Many onlookers suggested that the failure of the banks, and particularly of Silicon Valley Bank, indicated that bank supervisors might not have been monitoring vulnerabilities closely enough. The bank had grown very quickly. It had a lot of clients in one volatile industry — technology — and did not appear to have managed its exposure to rising interest rates carefully.“The Silicon Valley Bank situation is a massive failure of regulation and supervision,” said Simon Johnson, an economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.The Fed responded to that concern on Monday, announcing that it would conduct a review of Silicon Valley Bank’s oversight. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco was responsible for supervising the failed bank. The results will be released publicly on May 1, the central bank said.“The events surrounding Silicon Valley Bank demand a thorough, transparent and swift review,” Jerome H. Powell, the Fed chair, said in a statement.Mr. Kelleher said the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission should be looking into potential wrongdoing by Silicon Valley Bank’s executives.“Crises don’t just happen — they’re not like the Immaculate Conception,” Mr. Kelleher said. “People take actions that range from stupid to reckless to illegal to criminal that cause banks to fail and cause financial crises, and they should be held accountable whether they are bank executives, board directors, venture capitalists or anyone else.”One big looming question is whether the federal government will prevent bank executives from getting big compensation packages, often known as “golden parachutes,” which tend to be written into contracts.Treasury and the F.D.I.C. had no comment on whether those payouts would be restricted.Uninsured depositors at Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, who had accounts exceeding $250,000, will be paid back.David Dee Delgado/ReutersMany experts said the reality that problems at Silicon Valley Bank could imperil the financial system — and require such a big response — suggested a need for more stringent regulation.While the regional banks that are now struggling are not large enough to face the most intense level of regulatory scrutiny, they were deemed important enough to the financial system to warrant an aggressive government intervention.“At the end of the day, what has been shown is that the explicit guarantee extended to the globally systemic banks is now extended to everyone,” said Renita Marcellin, legislative and advocacy director at Americans for Financial Reform. “We have this implicit guarantee for everyone, but not the rules and regulations that should be paired with these guarantees.”Daniel Tarullo, a former Fed governor who was instrumental in setting up and carrying out financial regulation after the 2008 crisis, said the situation meant that “concerns about moral hazard, and concerns about who the system is protecting, are front and center again.” More