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    Why What We Thought About the Global Economy Is No Longer True

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    While the world’s eyes were on the pandemic, the war in Ukraine and China, the paths to prosperity and shared interests have grown murkier.When the world’s business and political leaders gathered in 2018 at the annual economic forum in Davos, the mood was jubilant. Growth in every major country was on an upswing. The global economy, declared Christine Lagarde, then the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, “is in a very sweet spot.”Five years later, the outlook has decidedly soured.“Nearly all the economic forces that powered progress and prosperity over the last three decades are fading,” the World Bank warned in a recent analysis. “The result could be a lost decade in the making — not just for some countries or regions as has occurred in the past — but for the whole world.”A lot has happened between then and now: A global pandemic hit; war erupted in Europe; tensions between the United States and China boiled. And inflation, thought to be safely stored away with disco album collections, returned with a vengeance.But as the dust has settled, it has suddenly seemed as if almost everything we thought we knew about the world economy was wrong.The economic conventions that policymakers had relied on since the Berlin Wall fell more than 30 years ago — the unfailing superiority of open markets, liberalized trade and maximum efficiency — look to be running off the rails.During the Covid-19 pandemic, the ceaseless drive to integrate the global economy and reduce costs left health care workers without face masks and medical gloves, carmakers without semiconductors, sawmills without lumber and sneaker buyers without Nikes.Calverton National Cemetery in New York in early 2021, where daily burials more than doubled at the height of the pandemic.Johnny Milano for The New York TimesCaring for Covid patients in Bergamo, Italy, in 2020. Cost-cutting and economic integration around the globe left health care workers scrambling for masks and other supplies when the coronavirus hit.Fabio Bucciarelli for The New York TimesThe idea that trade and shared economic interests would prevent military conflicts was trampled last year under the boots of Russian soldiers in Ukraine.And increasing bouts of extreme weather that destroyed crops, forced migrations and halted power plants has illustrated that the market’s invisible hand was not protecting the planet.Now, as the second year of war in Ukraine grinds on and countries struggle with limp growth and persistent inflation, questions about the emerging economic playing field have taken center stage.Globalization, seen in recent decades as unstoppable a force as gravity, is clearly evolving in unpredictable ways. The move away from an integrated world economy is accelerating. And the best way to respond is a subject of fierce debate.Of course, challenges to the reigning economic consensus had been growing for a while.“We saw before the pandemic began that the wealthiest countries were getting frustrated by international trade, believing — whether correctly or not — that somehow this was hurting them, their jobs and standards of living,” said Betsey Stevenson, a member of the Council of Economic Advisers during the Obama administration.The financial meltdown in 2008 came close to tanking the global financial system. Britain pulled out of the European Union in 2016. President Donald Trump slapped tariffs on China in 2017, spurring a mini trade war.But starting with Covid-19, the rat-a-tat series of crises exposed with startling clarity vulnerabilities that demanded attention.As the consulting firm EY concluded in its 2023 Geostrategic Outlook, the trends behind the shift away from ever-increasing globalization “were accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic — and then they have been supercharged by the war in Ukraine.”A view of the destruction in Bakhmut, Ukraine, in May.Tyler Hicks/The New York TimesUkrainians lined up to receive humanitarian aid in Kherson last year. Trade and shared economic interests weren’t enough to prevent wars, as once thought.Lynsey Addario for The New York TimesIt was the ‘end of history.’Today’s sense of unease is a stark contrast with the heady triumphalism that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. It was a period when a theorist could declare that the fall of communism marked “the end of history” — that liberal democratic ideas not only vanquished rivals, but represented “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution.”Associated economic theories about the ineluctable rise of worldwide free market capitalism took on a similar sheen of invincibility and inevitability. Open markets, hands-off government and the relentless pursuit of efficiency would offer the best route to prosperity.It was believed that a new world where goods, money and information crisscrossed the globe would essentially sweep away the old order of Cold War conflicts and undemocratic regimes.There was reason for optimism. During the 1990s, inflation was low while employment, wages and productivity were up. Global trade nearly doubled. Investments in developing countries surged. The stock market rose.The World Trade Organization was established in 1995 to enforce the rules. China’s entry six years later was seen as transformative. And linking a huge market with 142 countries would irresistibly draw the Asian giant toward democracy.China, along with South Korea, Malaysia and others, turned struggling farmers into productive urban factory workers. The furniture, toys and electronics they sold around the world generated tremendous growth.China joined the World Trade Organization at a signing ceremony in 2001. ReutersThe favored economic road map helped produce fabulous wealth, lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and spur wondrous technological advances.But there were stunning failures as well. Globalization hastened climate change and deepened inequalities.In the United States and other advanced economies, many industrial jobs were exported to lower-wage countries, removing a springboard to the middle class.Policymakers always knew there would be winners and losers. Still, the market was left to decide how to deploy labor, technology and capital in the belief that efficiency and growth would automatically follow. Only afterward, the thinking went, should politicians step in to redistribute gains or help those left without jobs or prospects.Companies embarked on a worldwide scavenger hunt for low-wage workers, regardless of worker protections, environmental impact or democratic rights. They found many of them in places like Mexico, Vietnam and China.Television, T-shirts and tacos were cheaper than ever, but many essentials like health care, housing and higher education were increasingly out of reach.The job exodus pushed down wages at home and undercut workers’ bargaining power, spurring anti-immigrant sentiments and strengthening hard-right populist leaders like Donald Trump in the United States, Viktor Orban in Hungary and Marine Le Pen in France.In advanced industrial giants like the United States, Britain and several European countries, political leaders turned out to be unable or unwilling to more broadly reapportion rewards and burdens.Nor were they able to prevent damaging environmental fallout. Transporting goods around the globe increased greenhouse gas emissions. Producing for a world of consumers strained natural resources, encouraging overfishing in Southeast Asia and illegal deforestation in Brazil. And cheap production facilities polluted countries without adequate environmental standards.It turned out that markets on their own weren’t able to automatically distribute gains fairly or spur developing countries to grow or establish democratic institutions.Jake Sullivan, the U.S. national security adviser, said in a recent speech that a central fallacy in American economic policy had been to assume “that markets always allocate capital productively and efficiently — no matter what our competitors did, no matter how big our shared challenges grew, and no matter how many guardrails we took down.”The proliferation of economic exchanges between nations also failed to usher in a promised democratic renaissance.Communist-led China turned out to be the global economic system’s biggest beneficiary — and perhaps master gamesman — without embracing democratic values.“Capitalist tools in socialist hands,” the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said in 1992, when his country was developing into the world’s factory floor. China’s astonishing growth transformed it into the world’s second largest economy and a major engine of global growth. All along, though, Beijing maintained a tight grip on its raw materials, land, capital, energy, credit and labor, as well as the movements and speech of its people.Globalization has had enormous effects on the environment — including deforestation in Roraima State, in the Brazilian Amazon.Victor Moriyama for The New York TimesDistributing food in Johannesburg in 2020, where the pandemic caused a significant spike in the need for assistance.Joao Silva/The New York TimesMoney flowed in, and poor countries paid the price.In developing countries, the results could be dire.The economic havoc wreaked by the pandemic combined with soaring food and fuel prices caused by the war in Ukraine have created a spate of debt crises. Rising interest rates have made those crises worse. Debts, like energy and food, are often priced in dollars on the world market, so when U.S. rates go up, debt payments get more expensive.The cycle of loans and bailouts, though, has deeper roots.Poorer nations were pressured to lift all restrictions on capital moving in and out of the country. The argument was that money, like goods, should flow freely among nations. Allowing governments, businesses and individuals to borrow from foreign lenders would finance industrial development and key infrastructure.“Financial globalization was supposed to usher in an era of robust growth and fiscal stability in the developing world,” said Jayati Ghosh, an economist at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. But “it ended up doing the opposite.”Some loans — whether from private lenders or institutions like the World Bank — didn’t produce enough returns to pay off the debt. Others were poured into speculative schemes, half-baked proposals, vanity projects or corrupt officials’ bank accounts. And debtors remained at the mercy of rising interest rates that swelled the size of debt payments in a heartbeat.Over the years, reckless lending, asset bubbles, currency fluctuations and official mismanagement led to boom-and-bust cycles in Asia, Russia, Latin America and elsewhere. In Sri Lanka, extravagant projects undertaken by the government, from ports to cricket stadiums, helped drive the country into bankruptcy last year as citizens scavenged for food and the central bank, in a barter arrangement, paid for Iranian oil with tea leaves.It’s a “Ponzi scheme,” Ms. Ghosh said.Private lenders who got spooked that they would not be repaid abruptly cut off the flow of money, leaving countries in the lurch.And the mandated austerity that accompanied bailouts from the International Monetary Fund, which compelled overextended governments to slash spending, often brought widespread misery by cutting public assistance, pensions, education and health care.Even I.M.F. economists acknowledged in 2016 that instead of delivering growth, such policies “increased inequality, in turn jeopardizing durable expansion.”Disenchantment with the West’s style of lending gave China the opportunity to become an aggressive creditor in countries like Argentina, Mongolia, Egypt and Suriname.A market in Buenos Aires. China has become an aggressive creditor to countries like Argentina. Sarah Pabst for The New York TimesSelf-reliance replaces cheap imports.While the collapse of the Soviet Union cleared the way for the domination of free-market orthodoxy, the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation has now decisively unmoored it.The story of the international economy today, said Henry Farrell, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, is about “how geopolitics is gobbling up hyperglobalization.”Old-world style great power politics accomplished what the threat of catastrophic climate collapse, seething social unrest and widening inequality could not: It upended assumptions about the global economic order.Josep Borrell, the European Union’s head of foreign affairs and security policy, put it bluntly in a speech 10 months after the invasion of Ukraine: “We have decoupled the sources of our prosperity from the sources of our security.” Europe got cheap energy from Russia and cheap manufactured goods from China. “This is a world that is no longer there,” he said.Supply-chain chokeholds stemming from the pandemic and subsequent recovery had already underscored the fragility of a globally sourced economy. As political tensions over the war grew, policymakers quickly added self-reliance and strength to the goals of growth and efficiency.“Our supply chains are not secure, and they’re not resilient,” Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen said last spring. Trade relationships should be built around “trusted partners,” she said, even if it means “a somewhat higher level of cost, a somewhat less efficient system.”“It was naïve to think that markets are just about efficiency and that they’re not also about power,” said Abraham Newman, a co-author with Mr. Farrell of “Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy.”Economic networks, by their very nature, create power imbalances and pressure points because countries have varying capabilities, resources and vulnerabilities.Russia, which had supplied 40 percent of the European Union’s natural gas, tried to use that dependency to pressure the bloc to withdraw its support of Ukraine.The United States and its allies used their domination of the global financial system to remove major Russian banks from the international payments system.The Port of Chornomorsk near Odesa, last year. In 2021, Ukraine was the largest wheat exporter in the world.Laetitia Vancon for The New York TimesHarvesting grapes at a vineyard in South Australia. China blocked Australian exports of wine and other goods after the country expressed support for Taiwan.Adam Ferguson for The New York TimesChina has retaliated against trading partners by restricting access to its enormous market.The extreme concentrations of critical suppliers and information technology networks has generated additional choke points.China manufactures 80 percent of the world’s solar panels. Taiwan produces 92 percent of tiny advanced semiconductors. Much of the world’s trade and transactions are figured in U.S. dollars.The new reality is reflected in American policy. The United States — the central architect of the liberalized economic order and the World Trade Organization — has turned away from more comprehensive free trade agreements and repeatedly refused to abide by W.T.O. decisions.Security concerns have led the Biden administration to block Chinese investment in American businesses and limit China’s access to private data on citizens and to new technologies.And it has embraced Chinese-style industrial policy, offering gargantuan subsidies for electric vehicles, batteries, wind farms, solar plants and more to secure supply chains and speed the transition to renewable energy.“Ignoring the economic dependencies that had built up over the decades of liberalization had become really perilous,” Mr. Sullivan, the U.S. national security adviser, said. Adherence to “oversimplified market efficiency,” he added, proved to be a mistake.While the previous economic orthodoxy has been partly abandoned, it is not clear what will replace it. Improvisation is the order of the day. Perhaps the only assumption that can be confidently relied on now is that the path to prosperity and policy trade-offs will become murkier.A solar farm in Yanqing district, in China. The country makes 80 percent of the world’s solar panels.Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times More

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    World Bank Projects Weak Global Growth Amid Rising Interest Rates

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    A new report projects that economic growth will slow this year and remain weak in 2024.The World Bank said on Tuesday that the global economy remained in a “precarious state” and warned of sluggish growth this year and next as rising interest rates slow consumer spending and business investment, and threaten the stability of the financial system.The bank’s tepid forecasts in its latest Global Economic Prospects report highlight the predicament that global policymakers face as they try to corral stubborn inflation by raising interest rates while grappling with the aftermath of the pandemic and continuing supply chain disruptions stemming from the war in Ukraine.The World Bank projected that global growth would slow to 2.1 percent this year from 3.1 percent in 2022. That is slightly stronger than its forecast of 1.7 percent in January, but in 2024 output is now expected to rise to 2.4 percent, weaker than the bank’s previous prediction of 2.7 percent.“Rays of sunshine in the global economy we saw earlier in the year have been fading, and gray days likely lie ahead,” said Ayhan Kose, deputy chief economist at the World Bank Group.Mr. Kose said that the world economy was experiencing a “sharp, synchronized global slowdown” and that 65 percent of countries would experience slower growth this year than last. A decade of poor fiscal management in low-income countries that relied on borrowed money is compounding the problem. According to the World Bank, 14 of 28 low-income countries are in debt distress or at a high risk of debt distress.Optimism about an economic rebound this year has been dampened by recent stress in the banking sectors in the United States and Europe, which resulted in the biggest bank failures since the 2008 financial crisis. Concerns about the health of the banking industry have prompted many lenders to pull back on providing credit to businesses and individuals, a phenomenon that the World Bank said was likely to further weigh down growth.The bank also warned that rising borrowing costs in rich countries — including the United States, where overnight interest rates have topped 5 percent for the first time in 15 years — posed an additional headwind for the world’s poorest economies.The most vulnerable economies, the report warned, are facing greater risk of financial crises as a result of rising rates. Higher interest rates make it more expensive for developing countries to service their loan payments and, if their currencies depreciate, to import food.In addition to the risks posed by rising interest rates, the pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine have combined to reverse decades of progress in global poverty reduction. The World Bank estimated on Tuesday that in 2024, incomes in the poorest countries would be 6 percent lower than in 2019.“Emerging market and developing economies today are struggling just to cope — deprived of the wherewithal to create jobs and deliver essential services to their most vulnerable citizens,” the report said.The World Bank sees widespread slowdowns in advanced economies, too. In the United States, it projects 1.1 percent growth this year and 0.8 percent in 2024.China is a notable exception to that trend, and the reopening of its economy after years of strict Covid-19 lockdowns is propping up global growth. The bank projects that the Chinese economy will grow 5.6 percent this year and 4.6 percent next year.Inflation is expected to continue to moderate this year, but the World Bank expects that prices will remain above central bank targets in many countries throughout 2024. More

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    G7 Countries Borrow China’s Economic Strategy

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    Wealthy democracies rev up an effort to spend trillions on a new climate-friendly energy economy, while stealing away some of China’s manufacturing power.Midway through his face-to-face meeting with President Biden in Indonesia last fall, the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, offered an unsolicited warning.Mr. Biden had in the preceding months signed a series of laws aimed at supercharging America’s industrial capacity and imposed new limits on the export of technology to China, in hopes of dominating the race for advanced energy technologies that could help fight climate change. For months, he and his aides had worked to recruit allied countries to impose their own restrictions on sending technology to China.The effort echoed the sort of industrial policy that China had employed to become the world’s manufacturing leader. In Bali, Mr. Xi urged Mr. Biden to abandon it.The president was not persuaded. Mr. Xi’s protests only further convinced Mr. Biden that America’s new industrial approach was the right one, according to a person familiar with the exchange.As Mr. Biden and fellow leaders of the Group of 7 nations meet this weekend in Hiroshima, Japan, a centerpiece of their discussions will be how to rapidly accelerate what has become an internationally coordinated round of vast public investment. For these wealthy democracies, the goal is both to reduce their reliance on Chinese manufacturing and to help their own companies compete in a new energy economy.Mr. Biden’s legislative agenda, including bills focused on semiconductors, infrastructure and low-emission energy sources, has begun to spur what could be trillions of dollars in government and private investment in American industrial capacity. That includes subsidies for electric vehicles, batteries, wind farms, solar plants and much more.The spending — the United States’ most significant intervention in industrial policy in decades — has galvanized many of America’s top allies in Europe and Asia, including key leaders of the Group of 7. European nations, South Korea, Japan, Canada and others are pushing for increased access to America’s clean-energy subsidies, while launching companion efforts of their own.“This clean-tech race is an opportunity to go faster and further, together,” Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, said after an economy-themed meeting at the Group of 7 summit on Friday.“Now that the G7 are in this race together, our competition should create additional manufacturing capacity and not come at each other’s expense,” she said.Mr. Biden touring a semiconductor manufacturer in Durham, N.C., in March.Al Drago for The New York TimesMr. Biden and his Group of 7 counterparts have embarked on a project with two ambitious goals: to accelerate demand, even by decades, for the technologies needed to reduce emissions and fight climate change, and to give workers in the United States and in allied countries an advantage over Chinese workers in meeting that demand.Much of that project has roared to life since the G7 leaders met last year in the German Alps. The wave of recent Group of 7 actions on supply chains, semiconductors and other measures to counter China is based on “economic security, national security and energy security,” Rahm Emanuel, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, told reporters this week in Tokyo.He added: “This is an inflection point for a new and more relevant G7.”Mr. Emanuel said the effort reflected a growing impatience among Group of 7 leaders with what they call Beijing’s use of economic measures to punish and deter behavior by foreign governments and companies that China’s officials do not like.But more than anything, the shift has been fueled by urgency over climate action and by two laws Mr. Biden signed last summer: a bipartisan bill to shower the semiconductor industry with tens of billions of dollars in government subsidies, and the climate provisions of the so-called Inflation Reduction Act, which companies have jumped to cash in on.Those bills have spurred a wave of newly announced battery plants, solar panel factories and other projects. They have also set off an international subsidy race, which has evolved after being deeply contentious in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the climate law.The lucrative U.S. supports for clean energy and semiconductors — along with stricter requirements for companies and government agencies to buy U.S.-made steel, vehicles and equipment — have put unwelcome pressure on competing industries in allied countries.Workers at a solar energy parts and batteries factory in Suqian, China, in February.Alex Plavevski/EPA, via ShutterstockSome of those concerns have been quelled in recent months. The United States signed a deal with Japan in March that will allow battery materials made in Japan to qualify for the benefits of the Inflation Reduction Act. The European Union is pursuing a similar agreement, and has proposed its own $270 billion program to subsidize green industries. Canada has passed its own version of the Biden climate law, and Britain, Indonesia and other countries are angling for their own critical mineral deals.Administration officials say once-rankled allies have bought into the potential benefits of a concerted wealthy-democracy industrial strategy.At the Group of 7 meeting, “you will see a degree of convergence on this that, from our perspective, can continue the conversion of the Inflation Reduction Act from a source of friction into a source of cooperation and strength between the United States and our G7 partners,” Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, told reporters on Air Force One as Mr. Biden flew to Japan.Some Group of 7 officials say the alliance has much more work to do to ensure that fast-growing economies like India benefit from the increased investments in a new energy economy. “It is important that the acceleration that is going to be created by this doesn’t disincentivize investment around the world,” Kirsten Hillman, the Canadian ambassador to the United States, said in an interview.One country they don’t want to see benefit is China. The United States has issued sweeping restrictions on China’s ability to access American technology, namely advanced chips and the machinery used to make them. And it has leaned on its allies as it tries to enforce global restrictions on sharing technology with Russia, as well as China. All of those efforts are meant to hinder China’s continued development in advanced manufacturing.Biden officials have urged allied countries not to step in to supply China with chips and other products it can no longer get from the United States. The United States is also weighing further restrictions on certain kinds of Chinese chip technology, including a likely ban on venture capital investments that U.S. officials are expected to discuss with their counterparts in Hiroshima.Although many of the Group of 7 governments agree that China poses an increasing economic and security threat, there is little consensus about what to do about it.Mr. Biden with Xi Jinping, China’s leader, in Bali, Indonesia, in November.Doug Mills/The New York TimesJapanese officials have been relatively eager to discuss coordinated responses to economic coercion from China, following Beijing’s move to cut Japan off from a supply of rare earth minerals during a clash more than a decade ago.European officials, by contrast, have been more divided on whether to risk close and lucrative business ties with China. Some, like the French president, Emmanuel Macron, have pushed back on U.S. plans to decouple supply chains with China.Ms. von der Leyen, the European Commission president, has been pushing for a “de-risking” of relations with China that involves recognizing China’s growing economic and security ambitions while reducing, in targeted ways, European dependence on China for its industrial and defense base. European officials said in Hiroshima that they had been pleased to see American leaders moving more toward their approach, at least rhetorically.Still, the allies’ industrial policy push threatens to complicate already difficult relations with China. Consulting and advisory firms with foreign ties have been subject to raids, detainments and arrests in China in recent months. Chinese officials have made clear that they see export controls as a threat. Adopting the phase American officials use to criticize Beijing, the Chinese Embassy in Washington warned the Group of 7 this week against what it called “economic coercion.”Mr. Xi issued a similar rebuke to Mr. Biden in Bali last fall. He pointed to the late 1950s, when the Soviet Union withdrew support for the Chinese nuclear program.China’s nuclear research continued, Mr. Xi said, and four years later, it detonated its first atomic bomb. More

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    The ‘Peace Dividend’ Is Over in Europe. Now Come the Hard Tradeoffs.

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    Defending against an unpredictable Russia in years to come will mean bumping up against a strained social safety net and ambitious climate transition plans.In the 30 years since the Iron Curtain came crashing down, trillions of dollars that had been dedicated to Cold War armies and weapons systems were gradually diverted to health care, housing and schools.That era — when security took a back seat to trade and economic growth — abruptly ended with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year.“The peace dividend is gone,” Kristalina Georgieva, the head of the International Monetary Fund, recently declared, referring to the mountains of cash that were freed up when military budgets shrank. “Defense expenditures have to go up.”The urgent need to combat a brutal and unpredictable Russia has forced European leaders to make excruciating budgetary decisions that will enormously affect peoples’ everyday lives. Do they spend more on howitzers or hospitals, tanks or teachers, rockets or roadways? And how to pay for it: raise taxes or borrow more? Or both?The sudden security demands, which will last well beyond an end to the war in Ukraine, come at a moment when colossal outlays are also needed to care for rapidly aging populations, as well as to avoid potentially disastrous climate change. The European Union’s ambitious goal to be carbon neutral by 2050 alone is estimated to cost between $175 billion and $250 billion each year for the next 27 years.“The spending pressures on Europe will be huge, and that’s not even taking into account the green transition,” said Kenneth Rogoff, an economics professor at Harvard. “The whole European social safety net is very vulnerable to these big needs.” After the Berlin Wall fell, social spending shot up. Denmark doubled the money it funneled to health care between 1994 and 2022, according to the latest figures compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, while Britain increased its spending by more than 90 percent. Over the same period, Poland more than doubled funding for culture and recreation programs. Germany ramped up investments in the economy. The Czech Republic increased its education budget.President Biden with NATO allies in Warsaw in February. Military budgets started to rise after Russia annexed Crimea. Doug Mills/The New York TimesMilitary spending by European members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Canada reached a low point in 2014 as the demand for battle tanks, fighter jets and submarines plummeted. After Russia annexed Crimea that year, budgets started to rise again, but most countries still fell well below NATO’s target of 2 percent of national output.“The end of the peace dividend is a big rupture,” said Daniel Daianu, chairman of the Fiscal Council in Romania and a former finance minister.Before war broke out in Ukraine, military spending by the European members of NATO was expected to reach nearly $1.8 trillion by 2026, a 14 percent increase over five years, according to research by McKinsey & Company. Now, spending is estimated to rise between 53 and 65 percent.That means hundreds of billions of dollars that otherwise could have been used to, say, invest in bridge and highway repairs, child care, cancer research, refugee resettlement or public orchestras is expected to be redirected to the military.Last week, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that military spending in Europe last year had its biggest annual rise in three decades. And the spendathon is just beginning.The demand for military spending will be on display Wednesday when the European Union’s trade commissioner, Thierry Breton, is expected to discuss his fact-finding tour to determine whether European nations and weapons manufacturers can produce one million rounds of 155-millimeter shells for Ukraine this year, and how production can be increased. Poland has pledged to spend 4 percent of its national output on defense. The German defense minister has asked for an additional $11 billion next year, a 20 percent increase in military spending. President Emmanuel Macron of France has promised to lift military spending by more than a third through 2030 and to “transform” France’s nuclear-armed military.Some analysts argue that at times cuts in military budgets were so deep that they compromised basic readiness. And surveys have shown that there is public support for increased military spending, pointedly illustrated by Finland and Sweden’s about-face in wanting to join NATO.Polish military units train Ukrainian soldiers on the German-made Leopard tanks at a military base, in Poland in February.Maciek Nabrdalik for The New York TimesBut in most of Europe, the painful budgetary trade-offs or tax increases that will be required have not yet trickled down to daily life. Much of the belt-tightening last year that squeezed households was the result of skyrocketing energy prices and stinging inflation.Going forward, the game board has changed. “France has entered into a war economy that I believe we will be in for a long time,” Mr. Macron said in a speech shortly after announcing his spending blueprint.But the crucial question of how to pay for the momentous shift in national priorities remains. In France, for instance, government spending as a percentage of the economy, at 1.4 trillion euros ($1.54 trillion), is the highest in Europe. Of that, nearly half was spent on the nation’s generous social safety net, which includes unemployment benefits and pensions. Debt has also spiraled in the wake of the pandemic. Yet Mr. Macron has vowed not to increase what is already one of the highest tax levels in Europe for fear of scaring off investors.Debates over competing priorities are playing out in other capitals across the region — even if the trade-offs are not explicitly mentioned.In Britain, on the same day in March that the government unveiled a budget that included a $6.25 billion bump in military spending, teachers, doctors and transport workers joined strikes over pay and working conditions. It was just one in a series of walkouts by public workers who complained that underfunding, double-digit inflation and the pandemic’s aftermath have crippled essential services like health care, transportation and education. The budget included a $4.1 billion increase for the National Health Service over the same two-year period.Romania, which has been running up its public debt over the years, has pledged to lift military spending this year by 0.5 percent of national output. And this month it agreed to buy an undisclosed number of F-35 fighter jets, which have a list price of $80 million a piece. While the increase will enable the country to hit NATO’s budget target, it will undercut efforts to meet the debt limits set by the European Union.Romania has pledged to lift military spending this year by 0.5 percent of national output.Andreea Campeanu for The New York TimesThe shift in government spending is perhaps most striking in Germany, where defense outlays plunged after the reunification of the former East and West German nations in 1990.“Defense was always the place to save, because it was not very popular,” said Hubertus Bardt, the managing director of the Institute of the German Economy.Germany, the largest and most powerful economy in Europe, has consistently devoted less money to the military as a percentage of gross domestic output than either France or Britain.It’s a “historic turning point,” the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, said when he announced a special $112 billion defense fund last year. Yet that pot of money did not include any spending for ammunition. And when the fund is depleted, Germany will need to find an additional $38 billion to level up with its NATO partners.Mr. Rogoff, the Harvard economist, said that most Europeans have not yet absorbed how big the long-term effects of a fading peace dividend will be. This is a new reality, he said, “and governments are going to have to figure out how to rebalance things.”Melissa Eddy More

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    Why Russia Has Such a Strong Grip on Europe’s Nuclear Power

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    New energy sources to replace oil and natural gas have been easier to find than kicking the dependency on Rosatom, the state-owned nuclear superstore.The pinched cylinders of Russian-built nuclear power plants that dot Europe’s landscape are visible reminders of the crucial role that Russia still plays in the continent’s energy supply.Europe moved with startling speed to wean itself off Russian oil and natural gas in the wake of war in Ukraine. But breaking the longstanding dependency on Russia’s vast nuclear industry is a much more complicated undertaking.Russia, through its mammoth state-owned nuclear power company, Rosatom, dominates the global nuclear supply chain. It was Europe’s third-largest supplier of uranium in 2021, accounting for 20 percent of the total. With few ready alternatives, there has been scant support for sanctions against Rosatom — despite urging from the Ukrainian government in Kyiv.For countries with Russian-made reactors, reliance runs deep. In five European Union countries, every reactor — 18 in total — were built by Russia. In addition, two more are scheduled to start operating soon in Slovakia, and two are under construction in Hungary, cementing partnerships with Rosatom far into the future.For years, the operators of these nuclear power plants had little choice. Rosatom, through its subsidiary TVEL, was virtually the only producer of the fabricated fuel assemblies — the last step in the process of turning uranium into the nuclear fuel rods — that power the reactors.Even so, since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, some European countries have started to step away from Russia’s nuclear energy superstore.The Czech Republic’s energy company, CEZ, has signed contracts with Pennsylvania-based Westinghouse Electric Company and the French company Framatome to supply fuel assemblies for its plant in Temelin.Finland canceled a troubled project with Rosatom to build a nuclear reactor and hired Westinghouse to design, license and supply a new fuel type for its plant in Loviisa after its current contracts expire.“The purpose is to diversify the supply chain,” said Simon-Erik Ollus, an executive vice president at Fortum, a Finnish energy company.The Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant near St. Petersburg, Russia. Rosatom, a Russian company, dominates the global nuclear supply chain.Sezgin Pancar/Anadolu Agency via Getty ImagesBulgaria signed a new 10-year agreement with Westinghouse to provide fuel for its existing reactors. And last week, it moved ahead with plans for the American company to build new nuclear reactor units. Poland is about to construct its first nuclear power plant, which will feature three Westinghouse reactors.The State of the WarRussian Strikes: Moscow fired an array of weapons, including its newest hypersonic missiles, in its biggest aerial attack on Ukraine in weeks, knocking out power in multiple regions.Bakhmut: Even as Ukrainian and Russian leaders predicted that the fall of the city could open the way for a broader Russian offensive, the U.S. intelligence chief said that the Kremlin’s forces were too depleted to wage such a campaign.Nord Stream Pipelines: The sabotage in September of the pipelines has become one of the central mysteries of the war. A Times investigation offers new insight into who might have been behind it.Slovakia and even Hungary, Russia’s closest ally in the European Union, have also reached out to alternative fuel suppliers.“We see a lot of genuine movement,” said Tarik Choho, president of nuclear fuel unit at Westinghouse, adding that the Ukraine war accelerated Europe’s search for new suppliers. “Even Hungary wants to diversify.”William Freebairn, senior managing editor for nuclear energy at S&P Commodity Insights, said Russia’s march into Ukraine last year in some ways marked “a sea change.”“Within days of the invasion,” he said, “just about every country that operated a Russian reactor started looking for alternate supply.”In Ukraine, serious efforts to chip away at Russian nuclear dominance began in 2014 after President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia sent troops to occupy territory in Crimea and the eastern Donbas region. Ukraine, whose 15 Soviet-era reactors provided half the country’s electricity, signed a deal with Westinghouse to expand its fuel contract.It took roughly five years between the start of the design process and the final delivery of the first fuel assembly, according to the International Energy Agency.Ukraine “blazed a commercial trail,” Mr. Freebairn said. In June, Ukraine signed another contract with Westinghouse to eventually provide all its nuclear fuel. The company will also build nine power plants and establish an engineering center in the country.Technicians in a nuclear plant in Mochovce, Slovakia, last year. Slovakia is among the European countries seeking nuclear fuel suppliers other than Russia.Radovan Stoklasa/ReutersStill, a worldwide turn away from Russia’s nuclear industry would be a slog: The nuclear supply chain is exceptionally complex. Establishing a new one would be expensive and take years.At the same time, Rosatom has proved uniquely successful as both a business enterprise and a vehicle for Russian political influence. Much of its ascendancy is due to what experts have labeled a “one-stop nuclear shop” that can provide countries with an all-inclusive package: materials, training, support, maintenance, disposal of nuclear waste, decommissioning and, perhaps most important, financing on favorable terms.And with a life span of 20 to 40 years, deals to build nuclear reactors compel a long-term marriage.Russia’s tightest grip is on the market for nuclear fuel. It controls 38 percent of the world’s uranium conversion and 46 percent of the uranium enrichment capacity — essential steps in producing usable fuel.“That’s equal to all of OPEC put together in terms of market share and power,” said Paul Dabbar, a visiting fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, referring to the oil dominance of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.As with oil and natural gas, the cost of nuclear fuel supplies has risen over the past year, putting more than $1 billion from exports into Russia’s treasury, according to a report from the Royal United Services Institute, a security research organization in London.The American nuclear power industry gets up to 20 percent of its enriched uranium from Russia, the maximum allowed by a recent nonproliferation treaty, according to the International Energy Association. France imports 15 percent. Framatome, which is owned by state-backed nuclear power operator, Électricité de France, or EDF, signed a cooperation agreement with Rosatom in December 2021, two months before Russia’s invasion, that is still in effect. Framatome declined to comment.The control room of a nuclear power plant in Paks, Hungary, in 2019. Two Rosatom nuclear plants are under construction in Hungary.Tamas Soki/EPA, via ShutterstockAnd even with the slate of new fuel agreements in Europe with non-Russian sources, deliveries won’t begin for at least a year, and in some cases several years.Around a quarter of the European Union’s electricity supply comes from nuclear power. With pending climate disaster prompting a worldwide push to decrease the overall use of fossil fuels, nuclear energy’s role in the future fuel mix is expected to increase.Still, analysts argue that even without formal sanctions, Russia’s position as a nuclear supplier has been permanently compromised.At the height of the debate in Germany last year over whether to keep its two remaining nuclear power plants online because of the war, their reliance on uranium enriched by Russia for the fuel rods emerged as one of the arguments against extending their lives. The last two reactors are to be shut down next month.And when Poland’s Council of Ministers approved the agreement in November for Westinghouse to build the country’s first nuclear power plant, the resolution cited “the need for permanent independence from energy supplies and energy carriers from Russia.”Mr. Choho at Westinghouse was confident about the company’s ability to compete with Rosatom in Europe, estimating that it eventually could capture 50 to 75 percent of that nuclear market. Westinghouse has also signed an agreement with the Spanish energy company Enusa to cooperate on fabricating fuel for Russian-made reactors.A nuclear power plant in Wattenbacherau, Germany, last year. The country’s last two reactors are to be shut down next month.Laetitia Vancon for The New York TimesBut outside the European Union and United States, in countries where support for Russia’s government has held up, Rosatom’s one-stop shopping and financing remain enticing. Russian-built reactors can be found in China, India and Iran as well as Armenia and Belarus. Construction has begun on Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, and Rosatom has a memorandum of understanding with 13 countries, according to the International Energy Association.As a new report in the journal Nature Energy concluded, while the war “will undermine Rosatom’s position in Europe and damage its reputation as a reliable supplier,” its global standing “may remain strong.”Melissa Eddy More

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    ‘The World’s Largest Construction Site’: The Race Is On to Rebuild Ukraine

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    Latvian roofing companies and South Korean trade specialists. Fuel cell manufacturers from Denmark and timber producers from Austria. Private equity titans from New York and concrete plant operators from Germany. Thousands of businesses around the globe are positioning themselves for a possible multibillion-dollar gold rush: the reconstruction of Ukraine once the war is over.Russia is stepping up its offensive heading into the second year of the war, but already the staggering rebuilding task is evident. Hundreds of thousands of homes, schools, hospitals and factories have been obliterated along with critical energy facilities and miles of roads, rail tracks and seaports.The profound human tragedy is unavoidably also a huge economic opportunity that Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has likened to the Marshall Plan, the U.S. program that provided aid to Western Europe after World War II. Early cost estimates of rebuilding the physical infrastructure range from $138 billion to $750 billion.The prospect of that trove is inspiring altruistic impulses and entrepreneurial vision, savvy business strategizing and rank opportunism for what the Ukrainian chamber of commerce is trumpeting as “the world’s largest construction site!”Mr. Zelensky and his allies want to use the rebuilding to stitch Ukraine’s infrastructure seamlessly into the rest of Europe.Yet whether all the gold in the much-anticipated gold rush will materialize is far from certain. Ukraine, whose economy shrank 30 percent last year, desperately needs funds just to keep going and to make emergency repairs. Long-term reconstruction aid will depend not only on the outcome of the war, but on how much money the European Union, the United States and other allies put up.And though private investors are being courted, few are willing to risk committing money now, as the conflict is entrenched.Ukraine and several European nations are pushing hard to confiscate frozen Russian assets held abroad, but several skeptics, including officials in the Biden administration, have questioned the legality of such a move.Ukraine desperately needs funds just to keep going and to make emergency repairs.Maciek Nabrdalik for The New York TimesThe war, a profound human tragedy, is unavoidably also a big economic opportunity that Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has likened to the Marshall Plan.Maciek Nabrdalik for The New York TimesNonetheless, “a lot of companies are starting to position themselves to be ready and have some track record for this time when the reconstruction funding will be coming in,” said Tymofiy Mylovanov, a former economy minister who is president of the Kyiv School of Economics. “There will be a lot of funding from all over the world,” he said, and business are saying that “we want to be a part of it.”The State of the WarVuhledar: A disastrous Russian assault on the Ukrainian city, viewed as an opening move in an expected spring offensive, has renewed doubts about Moscow’s ability to sustain a large-scale ground assault.Bakhmut: With Russian forces closing in, Ukraine is barring aid workers and civilians from entering the besieged city, in what could be a prelude to a Ukrainian withdrawal.Arms Supply: Ukraine and its Western allies are trying to solve a fundamental weakness in its war effort: Kyiv’s forces are firing artillery shells much faster than they are being produced.Prisoners of War: Poorly trained Russian soldiers captured by Ukraine describe being used as cannon fodder by commanders throwing waves of bodies into an assault.More than 300 companies from 22 countries signed up for a Rebuild Ukraine trade exhibition and conference this week in Warsaw. The gathering is just the latest in a dizzying series of in-person and virtual meetings. Last month, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, a standing-room-only crowd packed Ukraine House to discuss investment opportunities.More than 700 French companies swarmed to a conference organized in December by President Emmanuel Macron. And on Wednesday, the Finnish Confederation of Industries sponsored an all-day webinar with Ukrainian officials so companies could show off their wastewater treatment plants, transformers, threshers and prefabricated housing.“There’s so many initiatives, it’s hard to know who’s doing what,” said Sergiy Tsivkach, the executive director of UkraineInvest, the government office dedicated to attracting foreign investment.Mr. Tsivkach sipped a beer a couple of blocks from Lviv’s central square. He is glad for the interest but emphasized a crucial point.“They all say, ‘We want to help in rebuilding Ukraine,’” he said. “But do you want to invest your own money, or do you want to sell services or goods? These are two different things.”Most are interested in selling something, he said.Long-term reconstruction aid will depend on how much money the European Union, the United States and other allies put up.Maciek Nabrdalik for The New York Times“There’s so many initiatives, it’s hard to know who’s doing what,” said Sergiy Tsivkach, the executive director of UkraineInvest, the government office dedicated to attracting foreign investment. Maciek Nabrdalik for The New York TimesFor businesses, a crucial issue is who will control the money. This is a question that Europe, the United States and global institutions like the World Bank — the biggest donors and lenders — are vigorously debating.“Who will pay for what?” Domenico Campogrande, director general of the European Construction Industry Federation, said while moderating a panel at the Warsaw conference.Representatives from both Ukrainian and foreign companies were more pointed: Who will decide on the contracts, and how do they apply?“Hundreds of companies have been asking me this,” said Tomas Kopecny, the Czech government’s envoy for Ukraine.Ukraine has made clear there will be rewards for early investors when it comes to postwar reconstruction. But that opportunity carries risk.Danfoss, a Danish industrial company that sells heat-efficiency devices and hydraulic power units for apartment and other buildings, has been doing business in Ukraine since 1997. When the war started last February, Russian shelling destroyed its Kyiv warehouse.Danfoss has since focused on helping with immediate needs in war-torn regions and in western Ukraine, where millions of people displaced from their homes have been forced to settle in temporary shelters.“For now, all efforts are going toward maintaining a survival mode,” said Andriy Berestyan, the company’s managing director in Ukraine. “Right now, nobody is really looking for major reconstruction.”Things had been going better for the company since last summer as Ukraine pushed back Russian advances. By October, new orders for Danfoss’s products were rolling in, and Mr. Berestyan restored Danfoss’s distribution center in Kyiv. Then Russia started dropping bombs en masse. Power and water were widely cut off, forcing Ukraine — and businesses — to swing back to dealing with emergencies.Even so, he said, Danfoss is keeping its eye on the long term. “Definitely there will be rebuilding opportunities,” he said, “and we see a huge, huge opportunity for ourselves and for similar companies.”Andriy Berestyan, the managing director of Danfoss in Ukraine. The Danish company sells heat-efficiency devices and hydraulic power units for buildings. Its Kyiv warehouse was destroyed last year.Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York TimesThe question of who will control the money invested in Ukraine is one that Europe, the United States and global institutions like the World Bank are debating.Maciek Nabrdalik for The New York TimesThat groundwork is being laid in places like Mykolaiv, one of the hardest-hit regions, where numerous Danish companies have been working. Drones operated by Danish companies have mapped every bombed-out structure, with an eye toward using the data to help decide what reconstruction contracts should be issued.The information would help companies like Danfoss evaluate the potential for business, and eventually bid on contracts.Other governments that are expected to contribute to Ukraine’s reconstruction are also offering financial support for domestic firms.Germany announced the creation of a fund to guarantee investments. The plan will be overseen by the global auditing giant PwC and would compensate investors for potential financial losses if businesses were expropriated or projects were disrupted.France will also offer state guarantees to companies doing future work in Ukraine. Bruno Le Maire, the finance minister, said contracts worth a total of 100 million euros, or $107 million, had been awarded to three French companies for projects in Ukraine: Matière will build 30 floating bridges, and Mas Seeds and Lidea are providing seeds for farmers.Private equity firms, too, have an eye on business opportunities. President Zelensky sealed a deal late last year with Laurence D. Fink, the chief executive of BlackRock, to “coordinate investment efforts to rebuild the war-torn nation.” BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, will advise Kyiv on “how to structure the country’s reconstruction funds.” The work will be done on a pro bono basis, but promises to give BlackRock insights into investors’ interests.Mr. Fink was brought into the effort by Andrew Forrest, a gregarious Australian mining magnate who is the chief executive of Fortescue Metals Group. Mr. Forrest announced a $500 million initial investment in November, from his own private equity fund, into a new pot of money created for rebuilding projects in Ukraine. The fund would be run with BlackRock and aims to raise at least $25 billion from sovereign wealth funds controlled by national governments and private investors from around the world for clean energy investments in war-torn areas.Andrew Forrest, the chief executive of Fortescue Metals Group, in 2021. Mr. Forrest announced a $500 million initial investment in a pot of money for rebuilding projects in Ukraine. David Dare Parker for The New York TimesMr. Zelensky and his allies want to use the rebuilding to stitch Ukraine’s infrastructure seamlessly into the rest of Europe.Maciek Nabrdalik for The New York TimesMr. Forrest has courted Mr. Zelensky, wearing a Ukrainian flag pin in his lapel and presenting the Ukraine president with an Australian bullwhip during a visit to Kyiv last year. But in a sign of how cautious investors remain, Mr. Forrest said capital would be made available “the instant that the Russian forces have been removed from the homelands of Ukraine” — but not before.Eshe Nelson More

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    Eurozone Inflation Eases on Lower Energy Prices

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    The rate of price increases in countries using the euro slowed to 9.2 percent in December, down from 10.1 percent a month earlier.Lower energy prices helped to push inflation in Europe lower last month, the European Commission reported on Friday, but many prices are still rising at a brisk pace and policymakers have given little indication that they plan to halt planned interest rate increases.Consumer prices in the countries that use the euro as their currency rose at an annual rate of 9.2 percent in December, down from the double-digit levels of 10.1 percent in November and 10.6 percent in October.Declines in inflation reported this week in France, Germany and Spain sparked hopes that the relentless rise across the continent may have finally peaked. But several influential voices urged caution, noting that while the so-called headline rate of inflation has eased, core inflation, which strips out volatile food and energy prices, has not shown the same drop. In fact, for December, the eurozone’s core rate of inflation rose to 5.2 percent, from 5 percent the month before.Europe has benefited from a streak of mild weather, which has lowered the demand for energy, particularly the natural gas used to power much of the continent’s heating infrastructure. Several governments have also offered subsidies to blunt the painfully high energy prices that consumers pay. The drop in Germany’s inflation rate, to 9.6 percent in December from 11.3 percent the month before, was partly due to one-time assistance to help households pay their energy bills, according to the government’s statistics office.The data showed that energy prices in the eurozone rose at an annual rate of 25.7 percent in December, down from as high as 41.5 percent in October. “Europe is very lucky at the moment with the weather,” said Claus Vistesen, chief eurozone economist at Pantheon Macroeconomics. He added that government energy relief had inserted a “wedge between reality and the data.”“It’s a price control,” he said, and “once you take out that, it’s not as clear that inflation is that benign.”Nearly all eurozone countries marked a decline in their main inflation rate in December, including France (6.7 percent, from 7.1 percent in November), Italy (12.3 percent, from 12.6 percent), Spain (5.6 percent, from 6.7 percent) and the Netherlands (11 percent, from 11.3 percent). The numbers bolstered the argument that the eurozone’s record-setting pace of inflation in the past year will slowly lose steam in 2023. “We are likely past the peak,” said Riccardo Marcelli Fabiani, an economist at Oxford Economics, in a note on Friday. But he added, “we expect inflation to cool only gradually, remaining high in the short term.”The European Central Bank, which has a target of 2 percent annual inflation, has already indicated that it is likely to raise interest rates half a point in February. Christine Lagarde, the bank’s president, said last month that she expected interest rates to rise “significantly further, because inflation remains far too high and is projected to stay above our target for too long.”The December data, showing easing overall inflation but persistent underlying price pressure, will probably stoke “tense negotiations among policymakers in the next few months” noted Mr. Vistesen after the numbers were released. The Federal Reserve, the U.S. central bank, is also expected to continue raising rates.This week, Gita Gopinath, first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund, told the Financial Times that the Fed should “stay the course” with its planned increases.“I think it’s clear that we haven’t turned the corner yet on inflation,” she said. At the same time, the fund has also projected that a third of the world economy will face recession this year. More