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San Francisco Fed Ties to S.V.B. Chief Attracts Scrutiny to Century-Old Setup

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As Greg Becker, the former C.E.O. of Silicon Valley Bank, prepares to testify before Congress, boards that oversee regional Federal Reserve branches are in the spotlight.The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank has drawn attention to the relationship between the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, which was in charge of overseeing safety and soundness at the lender, and the bank’s former chief executive, Greg Becker, who for years sat on the San Francisco Fed’s board of directors.The bank’s collapse on March 10 has prompted criticism of the Fed, whose bank supervisors were slow to spot and stop problems before Silicon Valley Bank experienced a devastating run that necessitated a sweeping government response.Now, Mr. Becker could face lawmaker questions about his board role — and whether it created too close a link between the bank and its regulators — when he testifies on Tuesday before the Senate Banking Committee about Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse.In prepared testimony published before the hearing, Mr. Becker said he was “truly sorry” for the bank’s failure. “I do not believe that any bank could survive a bank run of that velocity and magnitude,” he said.Mr. Becker’s position on the San Francisco Fed board would have given him little formal power, according to current and former Fed employees and officials. The Fed’s 12 reserve banks — semiprivate institutions dotted across the country — each has a nine-person board of directors, three of whom come from the banking industry. Those boards have no say in bank supervision, and serve mainly as advisers for the Fed bank’s leadership.But many acknowledged that the setup created the appearance of coziness between S.V.B. and the Fed. Some outside experts and politicians are beginning to question whether the way the Fed has been organized for more than a century makes sense today.“They’re like a glorified advisory committee,” said Kaleb Nygaard, who researches central banks at the University of Pennsylvania. “It causes massive headaches in the best of times, potentially fatal aneurysms in the worst of times.”The Fed boards date back to 1913.In the days after Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse, headlines about Mr. Becker’s close ties to his bank’s regulator abounded, with many raising questions about a possible conflict of interest.Though regional Fed presidents and other officials play a limited role in bank oversight — which is mostly in Washington’s domain — some critics wondered if supervisors at the San Francisco Fed failed to effectively police Silicon Valley Bank partly because of the reserve bank’s close ties to the bank’s chief executive.And some asked: Why do banks have representatives on the Fed Board at all?The answer is tied to the Fed’s history.When Congress and the White House created the Fed in 1913, they were skeptical about giving either the government or the private sector unilateral power over the nation’s money supply. So they compromised. They created a public Fed Board in Washington, alongside quasi-private reserve banks around the country.Those reserve banks, which ended up numbering 12 in total, would be set up like private companies with banks as their shareholders. And much like other private companies, they would be overseen by boards — ones that included bank representatives. Each of the Fed reserve banks has nine board members, or directors. Three of them come from banks, while the others come from other financial companies, businesses, and labor and community groups.“The setup is the way that it is because of the way the Fed was set up in 1913,” said William Dudley, the former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who said that the directors served mainly as a sort of advisory focus group on banking issues and operational issues, like cybersecurity.The boards may give members benefits.Several former Fed officials said that the bank-related board members provided a valuable function, offering real-time insight into the finance industry. And 10 current and former Fed employees interviewed for this article agreed on one point: These boards have relatively little official power in the modern era.While they vote for changes on a formerly important interest rate at the Fed — called the discount rate — that role has become much less critical over time. Board members select Fed presidents, though since the 2010 Dodd Frank law, the bank-tied directors have not been allowed to participate in those votes.But the law didn’t go so far as to cut bank representatives from the boards altogether because of a lobbying push to keep them intact, said Aaron Klein, who was deputy assistant secretary for economic policy at the Treasury Department at the time and worked closely on the law’s passage.“The Fed didn’t want that, and neither did the bankers,” Mr. Klein said.From a bank’s perspective, directorships offer prestige: Regional Fed board members rub shoulders with other bank and community leaders and with powerful central bankers.They might also offer either an actual or a perceived information advantage about the economy and about monetary policy. Although the discount rate is not as important today, directors at some regional banks are given economic briefings as they make their decisions.Mr. Becker would have seen Mary C. Daly, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, at meetings held roughly once a month, her calendars suggest.Jim Wilson/The New York TimesRegional board discount votes have often been seen as a sort of weather vane for how a regional bank’s leadership is thinking about policy — suggesting that directors might know how their president is going to vote when it comes to the federal funds rate, the important interest rate that the Fed uses to guide the speed of the economy.That is notable in an era in which Wall Street traders hang on Fed officials’ every word when it comes to interest rates.“It’s a very awkward thing,” said Narayana Kocherlakota, a former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. “There’s no gain to having them vote on discount rates.”Renée Adams, a former New York Fed researcher who studies corporate boards and is now at the University of Oxford, has found that when a bank executive becomes a director, the stock price of their firm rises on the news.“The market believes that they have some advantage,” she said.And Board members do get substantial face time with Fed presidents, who meet regularly with their directors. Mr. Becker would have seen Mary C. Daly, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, at meetings held roughly once a month, her calendars suggest.‘Supervisory leniency’ is a risk.Bank-tied directors have no direct role in supervision, nor can they appoint officials or participate in budget decisions related to bank oversight, according to the Fed.But Mr. Klein is skeptical that Mr. Becker’s position on the San Francisco Fed’s board did not matter at all in the case of Silicon Valley Bank.“Who wants to be the person raising problems about the C.E.O. who is on the board of your own C.E.O.?” he said, explaining that even though the organizational structure might have drawn clear lines, those may not have cleanly applied in the “real world.”Ms. Adams’s research found that banks whose executives sat on boards did in fact see fewer enforcement actions — slaps on the wrist from Fed supervisors — during the director’s tenure. “There may be supervisory leniency,” she said.Changing the system might prove difficult.This is not the first time the Fed regional boards have raised ethical issues. In the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, Dick Fuld, the Lehman Brothers chief executive at the time, and Steve Friedman, who was a director at Goldman Sachs, both served on the New York Fed board.Mr. Fuld resigned just before Lehman collapsed in 2008. Mr. Friedman left in 2009, after news broke that he had bought Goldman Sachs stock during the crisis, at a time when the Treasury and the Fed were drawing up plans to bolster big banks.Given that controversy, politicians have at times focused on the Fed boards. The Democratic Party included language in its 2016 platform to bar executives of financial institutions from serving on reserve bank boards. And the issue has recently garnered bipartisan interest. Draft legislation under development by members of the Senate Banking Committee would limit directorships to small banks — those with less than $10 billion in assets, according to a person familiar with the material.The committee has a hearing on Fed accountability planned for May 17. Senators Elizabeth Warren, Democrat from Massachusetts, and Rick Scott, Republican from Florida, plan to introduce the legislation ahead of that, a spokesperson for Ms. Warren said.“It’s dangerous and unethical for executives from the largest banks to serve on Fed boards where these bankers could secure preferential regulatory treatment or exploit privileged information,” Ms. Warren said in a statement.But — as the Dodd Frank legislation illustrated — stripping banks of their power at the Fed has been a heavy lift.“As a political target,” said Ms. Binder, the political scientist, “it’s a little in the weeds.” More

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    What to Watch as the Fed Releases Its Look Into Silicon Valley Bank

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    The Federal Reserve is set to release an examination of why its oversight of the bank failed to stem disaster at 11 a.m. on Friday.WASHINGTON — The Federal Reserve is set to release a highly anticipated report on Friday examining what went wrong with its oversight of Silicon Valley Bank, which collapsed in mid-March, in the largest bank failure since the 2008 financial crisis.The post-mortem comes as the aftershocks of Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse continue to shake the American financial system: First Republic, which required a cash infusion from other large banks as nervous customers pulled their deposits and fled, remains imperiled.The Fed’s investigation into what went wrong at Silicon Valley Bank has been overseen by Michael S. Barr, the central bank’s head of supervision and one of the architects of the 2010 Dodd-Frank law, which aimed to prevent a repeat of the 2008 crisis. The review was announced on March 13, just after S.V.B.’s failure and the government’s sweeping announcement on March 12 that it would protect the bank’s large depositors, among other measures to shore up the banking system.That same weekend, the federal government also shuttered a second institution, Signature Bank. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which was the primary supervisor for Signature, will release its own report Friday.Still, most of the attention has focused on S.V.B., in part because significant weaknesses at the bank appear to have started and grown progressively worse in plain sight in the years leading up to its demise. The bank had a large share of deposits above the government’s $250,000 insurance limit. That is a potential risk, given that uninsured depositors are more likely to pull their money at the first sign of trouble to prevent losing their savings.The bank’s leaders also made a big bet on interest rates staying low. That became a problem as the Fed, trying to control rapid inflation, carried out its most aggressive rate increase campaign since the 1980s. The bank held longer-term bonds that dropped in value as interest rates rose, because newer debt issued at the higher rates became more attractive for investors.Supervisors at the Fed were aware of many of the bank’s problems and had flagged and tried to follow up on some of them. Yet the issues were not resolved quickly enough to save the bank.The questions that the review could answer center on what went wrong. Was it a problem at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, which supervised the bank, or did the fault rest with the Federal Reserve Board, which has ultimate responsibility for bank oversight? It is also unclear whether there was an issue with the Fed’s culture around — and approach to — supervision, or whether the existing rules were lacking.“It’s a little bit of a mystery” what the report will hold, said Steven Kelly, a researcher at the Yale Program on Financial Stability, explaining that he had little expectation that the release would point fingers. “In some sense, they really need a head on a pike — and they’re not going to do that in this report.”Jeff Hauser, director of the Revolving Door Project, said he was interested to see how the report would deal with the tone around bank supervision at the Fed, and the reality that Gregory Becker, S.V.B.’s chief executive, sat on the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. That role gave Mr. Becker no official influence over bank oversight, but Mr. Hauser thinks that such positions might offer banks the advantage of more prestige.Mr. Hauser said he also thinks an independent review is needed in addition to the Fed’s internal probe and whatever its inspector general — who is also looking into the matter — eventually releases. Mr. Barr will still have to work with his colleagues in the future, Mr. Hauser pointed out, and the central bank’s inspector general is appointed by the Fed chair.“We need someone with some independence to dig in,” Mr. Hauser said. More

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    How a Trump-Era Rollback Mattered for Silicon Valley Bank’s Demise

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    An under-the-radar change to the way regional banks are supervised may have helped the bank’s rapidly growing risks to go unresolved.WASHINGTON — Silicon Valley Bank was growing steadily in 2018 and 2019 — and supervisors at its primary overseer, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, were preparing it for a stricter oversight group, one in which specialists from around the Fed system would vet its risks and point out weak spots.But a decision from officials in Washington halted that move.The Federal Reserve Board — which sets the Fed’s standards for banking regulation — was in the process of putting into effect a bipartisan 2018 law that aimed to make regulation less onerous for small and midsize banks. As the board did that, Randal K. Quarles, the Trump-appointed vice chair for supervision, and his colleagues also chose to recalibrate how banks were supervised in line with the new requirements.As a result, Silicon Valley Bank’s move to the more rigorous oversight group would be delayed. The bank would previously have advanced to the Large and Foreign Bank Organization group after its assets had averaged more than $50 billion for a year; now, that shift would not come until it consistently averaged more than $100 billion in assets.The change proved fateful. Silicon Valley Bank did not fully move to the stronger oversight group until late 2021. Its assets had nearly doubled over the course of that year, to about $200 billion, by the time it came under more intense supervision.By that point, many of the issues that would cause its demise had already begun festering. Those included a customer base heavily dependent on the success of the technology industry, an unusually large share of deposits above the $250,000 limit that the government insures in the event of a bank collapse and an executive team that paid little attention to risk management.Those weak spots appear to have gone unresolved when Silicon Valley Bank was being overseen the way that small and regional banks are: by a small team of supervisors who were in some cases generalists.When the bank finally entered more sophisticated supervision for big banks in late 2021, putting it under the purview of a bigger team of specialist bank overseers with input from around the Fed system, it was immediately issued six citations. Those flagged various problems, including how it was managing its ability to raise cash quickly in times of trouble. By the next summer, its management was rated deficient, and by early 2023, intense scrutiny of the bank had stretched to the Fed’s highest reaches.Big questions remain about why supervisors didn’t do more to ensure that shortcomings were addressed once they became alarmed enough to begin issuing citations. The Fed is conducting an internal investigation of what happened, with results expected on May 1.Michael Barr, the Fed’s vice chair for supervision, told lawmakers this week that by the time Silicon Valley Bank came under intense oversight and problems were fully recognized, “in a sense, it was already very late in the process.”Shuran Huang for The New York TimesBut the picture that is emerging is one in which a slow reaction in 2022 was not the sole problem: Silicon Valley Bank’s difficulties also appear to have come to the fore too late to fix them easily, in part because of the Trump-era rollbacks. By deciding to move banks into large-bank oversight much later, Mr. Quarles and his colleagues had created a system that treated even sizable and rapidly ballooning banks with a light touch when it came to how aggressively they were monitored.That has caught the attention of officials from the Fed and the White House as they sort through the fallout left by Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse on March 10 and ask what lessons should be learned.“The way the Federal Reserve’s regulation set up the structure for approach to supervision treated firms in the $50 to $100 billion range with lower levels of requirements,” Michael Barr, the Fed’s vice chair for supervision, told lawmakers this week. By the time Silicon Valley Bank’s problems were fully recognized, he said, “in a sense, it was already very late in the process.”About five people were supervising Silicon Valley Bank in the years before its move up to big-bank oversight, according to a person familiar with the matter. The bank was subject to quarterly reviews, and its overseers could choose to put it through horizontal reviews — thorough check-ins that test for a particular weakness by comparing a bank with firms of similar size. But those would not have been a standard part of its oversight, based on the way the Fed runs supervision for small and regional banks.As the bank grew and moved up to large-bank oversight, the size of the supervisory team dedicated to it swelled. By the time it failed, about 20 people were working on Silicon Valley Bank’s supervision, Mr. Barr said this week. It had been put through horizontal reviews, which had flagged serious risks.But such warnings often take time to translate into action. Although the bank’s overseers started pointing out big issues in late 2021, banks typically get leeway to fix problems before they are penalized.“One of the defining features of supervision is that it is an iterative process,” said Kathryn Judge, a financial regulation expert at Columbia Law School.The Fed’s response to the problems at Silicon Valley Bank seemed to be halting even after it recognized risks. Surprisingly, the firm was given a satisfactory liquidity rating in early 2022, after regulators had begun flagging problems, Mr. Barr acknowledged this week. Several people familiar with how supervising operates found that unusual.“We’re trying to understand how that is consistent with the other material,” Mr. Barr said this week. “The question is, why wasn’t that escalated and why wasn’t further action taken?”Yet the high liquidity rating could also tie back to the bank’s delayed move to the large bank supervision group. Bank supervisors sometimes treat a bank more gently during its first year of tougher oversight, one person said, as it adjusts to more onerous regulator attention.There was also turmoil in the San Francisco Fed’s supervisory ranks around the time that Silicon Valley Bank’s risks were growing.Aaron Wojack for The New York TimesThere was also turmoil in the San Francisco Fed’s supervisory ranks around the time that Silicon Valley Bank’s risks were growing. Mary Daly, the president of the reserve bank, had called a meeting in 2019 with a number of the bank supervisory group’s leaders to insist that they work on improving employee satisfaction scores, according to people with knowledge of the event. The meeting was previously reported by Bloomberg.Of all the San Francisco Fed employees, bank supervisors had the lowest satisfaction ratings, with employees reporting that they might face retribution if they spoke out or had different opinions, according to one person.Several supervision officials departed in the following years, retiring or leaving for other reasons. As a result, relatively new managers were at the wheel as Silicon Valley Bank’s risks grew and became clearer.It’s hard to assess whether supervisors in San Francisco — and staff members at the Fed board, who would have been involved in rating Silicon Valley Bank — were unusually slow to respond to the bank’s problems given the secrecy surrounding bank oversight, Ms. Judge said.“We don’t have a baseline,” she said.Even as the Fed tries to understand why problems were not addressed more promptly, the fact that Silicon Valley Bank remained under less rigorous oversight that may not have tested for its specific weaknesses until relatively late in the game is increasingly in focus.“The Federal Reserve system of supervision and regulation is based on a tailored approach,” Mr. Barr said this week. “That framework, which really focuses on asset size, is not sensitive to the kinds of problems we saw here with respect to rapid growth and a concentrated business model.”Plus, the 2018 law and the Fed’s implementation of it probably affected Silicon Valley Bank’s oversight in other ways. The Fed would probably have begun administering full stress tests on the bank earlier without the changes, and the bank might have had to shore up its ability to raise money in a pinch to comply with the “liquidity coverage ratio,” some research has suggested.The White House called on Thursday for regulators to consider reinstating stronger rules for banks with assets of $100 billion to $250 billion. And the Fed is both re-examining the size cutoffs for stricter bank oversight and working on ways to test for “novel” risks that may not tie back cleanly to size, Mr. Barr said this week.But Mr. Quarles, who carried out the tailoring of the 2018 bank rule, has insisted that the bank’s collapse was not the result of changes that the law required or that he chose to make. Even the simplest rung of supervision should have caught the obvious problems that killed Silicon Valley Bank, he said, including a lack of protection against rising interest rates.“It was the simplest risk imaginable,” he said in interview. More

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    Before Collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, the Fed Spotted Big Problems

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    The bank was using an incorrect model as it assessed its own risks amid rising interest rates, and spent much of 2022 under a supervisory review.WASHINGTON — Silicon Valley Bank’s risky practices were on the Federal Reserve’s radar for more than a year — an awareness that proved insufficient to stop the bank’s demise.The Fed repeatedly warned the bank that it had problems, according to a person familiar with the matter.In 2021, a Fed review of the growing bank found serious weaknesses in how it was handling key risks. Supervisors at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, which oversaw Silicon Valley Bank, issued six citations. Those warnings, known as “matters requiring attention” and “matters requiring immediate attention,” flagged that the firm was doing a bad job of ensuring that it would have enough easy-to-tap cash on hand in the event of trouble.But the bank did not fix its vulnerabilities. By July 2022, Silicon Valley Bank was in a full supervisory review — getting a more careful look — and was ultimately rated deficient for governance and controls. It was placed under a set of restrictions that prevented it from growing through acquisitions. Last autumn, staff members from the San Francisco Fed met with senior leaders at the firm to talk about their ability to gain access to enough cash in a crisis and possible exposure to losses as interest rates rose.It became clear to the Fed that the firm was using bad models to determine how its business would fare as the central bank raised rates: Its leaders were assuming that higher interest revenue would substantially help their financial situation as rates went up, but that was out of step with reality.By early 2023, Silicon Valley Bank was in what the Fed calls a “horizontal review,” an assessment meant to gauge the strength of risk management. That checkup identified additional deficiencies — but at that point, the bank’s days were numbered. In early March, it faced a run and failed, sending shock-waves across the broader American banking system that ultimately led to a sweeping government intervention meant to prevent panic from spreading. On Sunday, Credit Suisse, which was caught up in the panic that followed Silicon Valley Bank’s demise, was taken over by UBS in a hastily arranged deal put together by the Swiss government.Major questions have been raised about why regulators failed to spot problems and take action early enough to prevent Silicon Valley Bank’s March 10 downfall. Many of the issues that contributed to its collapse seem obvious in hindsight: Measuring by value, about 97 percent of its deposits were uninsured by the federal government, which made customers more likely to run at the first sign of trouble. Many of the bank’s depositors were in the technology sector, which has recently hit tough times as higher interest rates have weighed on business.And Silicon Valley Bank also held a lot of long-term debt that had declined in market value as the Fed raised interest rates to fight inflation. As a result, it faced huge losses when it had to sell those securities to raise cash to meet a wave of withdrawals from customers.The Fed has initiated an investigation into what went wrong with the bank’s oversight, headed by Michael S. Barr, the Fed’s vice chair for supervision. The inquiry’s results are expected to be publicly released by May 1. Lawmakers are also digging into what went awry. The House Financial Services Committee has scheduled a hearing on recent bank collapses for March 29.Michael S. Barr’s review of the Silicon Valley Bank problems will focus on a few key questions.Manuel Balce Ceneta/Associated PressThe picture that is emerging is one of a bank whose leaders failed to plan for a realistic future and neglected looming financial and operational problems, even as they were raised by Fed supervisors. For instance, according to a person familiar with the matter, executives at the firm were told of cybersecurity problems both by internal employees and by the Fed — but ignored the concerns.The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which has taken control of the firm, did not comment on its behalf.Still, the extent of known issues at the bank raises questions about whether Fed bank examiners or the Fed’s Board of Governors in Washington could have done more to force the institution to address weaknesses. Whatever intervention was staged was too little to save the bank, but why remains to be seen.“It’s a failure of supervision,” said Peter Conti-Brown, an expert in financial regulation and a Fed historian at the University of Pennsylvania. “The thing we don’t know is if it was a failure of supervisors.”Mr. Barr’s review of the Silicon Valley Bank collapse will focus on a few key questions, including why the problems identified by the Fed did not stop after the central bank issued its first set of matters requiring attention. The existence of those initial warnings was reported earlier by Bloomberg. It will also look at whether supervisors believed they had authority to escalate the issue, and if they raised the problems to the level of the Federal Reserve Board.The Fed’s report is expected to disclose information about Silicon Valley Bank that is usually kept private as part of the confidential bank oversight process. It will also include any recommendations for regulatory and supervisory fixes.The bank’s downfall and the chain reaction it set off is also likely to result in a broader push for stricter bank oversight. Mr. Barr was already performing a “holistic review” of Fed regulation, and the fact that a bank that was large but not enormous could create so many problems in the financial system is likely to inform the results.Typically, banks with fewer than $250 billion in assets are excluded from the most onerous parts of bank oversight — and that has been even more true since a “tailoring” law that passed in 2018 during the Trump administration and was put in place by the Fed in 2019. Those changes left smaller banks with less stringent rules.Silicon Valley Bank was still below that threshold, and its collapse underlined that even banks that are not large enough to be deemed globally systemic can cause sweeping problems in the American banking system.As a result, Fed officials could consider tighter rules for those big, but not huge, banks. Among them: Officials could ask whether banks with $100 billion to $250 billion in assets should have to hold more capital when the market price of their bond holdings drops — an “unrealized loss.” Such a tweak would most likely require a phase-in period, since it would be a substantial change.But as the Fed works to complete its review of what went wrong at Silicon Valley Bank and come up with next steps, it is facing intense political blowback for failing to arrest the problems.Supervisors at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, which oversaw Silicon Valley Bank, issued six citations in 2021.Aaron Wojack for The New York TimesSome of the concerns center on the fact that the bank’s chief executive, Greg Becker, sat on the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s board of directors until March 10. While board members do not play a role in bank supervision, the optics of the situation are bad.“One of the most absurd aspects of the Silicon Valley bank failure is that its CEO was a director of the same body in charge of regulating it,” Senator Bernie Sanders, a Vermont independent, wrote on Twitter on Saturday, announcing that he would be “introducing a bill to end this conflict of interest by banning big bank CEOs from serving on Fed boards.”Other worries center on whether Jerome H. Powell, the Fed chair, allowed too much deregulation during the Trump administration. Randal K. Quarles, who was the Fed’s vice chair for supervision from 2017 to 2021, carried out a 2018 regulatory rollback law in an expansive way that some onlookers at the time warned would weaken the banking system.Mr. Powell typically defers to the Fed’s supervisory vice chair on regulatory matters, and he did not vote against those changes. Lael Brainard, then a Fed governor and now a top White House economic adviser, did vote against some of the tweaks — and flagged them as potentially dangerous in dissenting statements.“The crisis demonstrated clearly that the distress of even noncomplex large banking organizations generally manifests first in liquidity stress and quickly transmits contagion through the financial system,” she warned.Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, has asked for an independent review of what happened at Silicon Valley Bank and has urged that Mr. Powell not be involved in that effort.  He “bears direct responsibility for — and has a long record of failure involving” bank regulation, she wrote in a letter on Sunday.Maureen Farrell More

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    Was This a Bailout? Skeptics Descend on Silicon Valley Bank Response.

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    The government took drastic action to shore up the banking system and make depositors of two failed banks whole. It quickly drew blowback.WASHINGTON — A sweeping package aimed at containing damage to the financial system in the wake of high-profile failures has prompted questions about whether the federal government is again bailing out Wall Street.And while many economists and analysts agreed that the government’s response should not be considered a “bailout” in key ways — investors in the banks’ stock will lose their money, and the banks have been closed — many said it should lead to scrutiny of how the banking system is regulated and supervised.The reckoning came after the Federal Reserve, Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation announced Sunday that they would make sure that all depositors in two large failed banks, Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, were repaid in full. The Fed also announced that it would offer banks loans against their Treasuries and many other asset holdings, treating the securities as though they were worth their original value — even though higher interest rates have eroded the market price of such bonds.The actions were meant to send a message to America: There is no reason to pull your money out of the banking system, because your deposits are safe and funding is plentiful. The point was to avert a bank run that could tank the financial system and broader economy.It was unclear on Monday whether the plan would succeed. Regional bank stocks tumbled, and nervous investors snapped up safe assets. But even before the verdict was in, lawmakers, policy researchers and academics had begun debating whether the government had made the correct move, whether it would encourage future risk-taking in the financial system and why it was necessary in the first place.“The Fed has basically just written insurance on interest-rate risk for the whole banking system,” said Steven Kelly, senior research associate at Yale’s program on financial stability. And that, he said, could stoke future risk-taking by implying that the Fed will step in if things go awry.“I’ll call it a bailout of the system,” Mr. Kelly said. “It lowers the threshold for the expectation of where emergency steps kick in.”While the definition of “bailout” is ill defined, it is typically applied when an institution or investor is saved by government intervention from the consequences of reckless risk-taking. The term became a swear word in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, after the government engineered a rescue of big banks and other financial firms using taxpayer money, with little to no consequences for the executives who made bad bets that brought the financial system close to the abyss.President Biden, speaking from the White House on Monday, tried to make clear that he did not consider what the government was doing to be a bailout in the traditional sense, given that investors would lose their money and taxpayers would not be on the hook for any losses.“Investors in the banks will not be protected,” Mr. Biden said. “They knowingly took a risk, and when the risk didn’t pay off, investors lose their money. That’s how capitalism works.”The Downfall of Silicon Valley BankOne of the most prominent lenders in the world of technology start-ups collapsed on March 10, forcing the U.S. government to step in.A Rapid Fall: The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, the biggest U.S. bank failure since the 2008 financial crisis, was caused by a run on the bank. But will the turmoil prove to be fleeting — or turn into a true crisis?The Fallout: The bank’s implosion rattled a start-up industry already on edge, and some of the worst casualties of the collapse were companies developing solutions for the climate crisis.Signature Bank: The New York financial institution closed its doors abruptly after regulators said it could threaten the entire financial system. To some extent, it is a victim of the panic around Silicon Valley Bank.The Fed’s Next Move: The Federal Reserve has been rapidly raising interest rates to fight inflation, but making big moves could be trickier after Silicon Valley Bank’s blowup.He added, “No losses will be borne by the taxpayers. Let me repeat that: No losses will be borne by the taxpayers.”But some Republican lawmakers were unconvinced.Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri said on Monday that he was introducing legislation to protect customers and community banks from new “special assessment fees” that the Fed said would be imposed to cover any losses to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Deposit Insurance Fund, which is being used to protect depositors from losses.“What’s basically happened with these ‘special assessments’ to cover SVB is the Biden administration has found a way to make taxpayers pay for a bailout without taking a vote,” Mr. Hawley said in a statement.President Biden said Monday that he would ask Congress and banking regulators to consider rule changes “to make it less likely that this kind of bank failure would happen again.”Doug Mills/The New York TimesMonday’s action by the government was a clear rescue of a range of financial players. Banks that took on interest-rate risk, and potentially their big depositors, were being protected against losses — which some observers said constituted a bailout.“It’s hard to say that isn’t a bailout,” said Dennis Kelleher, a co-founder of Better Markets, a prominent financial reform advocacy group. “Merely because taxpayers aren’t on the hook so far doesn’t mean something isn’t a bailout.”But many academics agreed that the plan was more about preventing a broad and destabilizing bank run than saving any one business or group of depositors.“Big picture, this was the right thing to do,” said Christina Parajon Skinner, an expert on central banking and financial regulation at the University of Pennsylvania. But she added that it could still encourage financial betting by reinforcing the idea that the government would step in to clean up the mess if the financial system faced trouble.“There are questions about moral hazard,” she said.One of the signals the rescue sent was to depositors: If you hold a large bank account, the moves suggested that the government would step in to protect you in a crisis. That might be desirable — several experts on Monday said it might be smart to revise deposit insurance to cover accounts bigger than $250,000.But it could give big depositors less incentive to pull their money out if their banks take big risks, which could in turn give the financial institutions a green light to be less careful.That could merit new safeguards to guard against future danger, said William English, a former director of the monetary affairs division at the Fed who is now at Yale. He thinks that bank runs in 2008 and recent days have illustrated that a system of partial deposit insurance doesn’t really work, he said.An official with the F.D.I.C., center, explained to clients of Silicon Valley Bank in Santa Clara, Calif., the procedure for entering the bank and making transactions.Jim Wilson/The New York Times“Market discipline doesn’t really happen until it’s too late, and then it’s too sharp,” he said. “But if you don’t have that, what is limiting the risk-tanking of banks?”It wasn’t just the side effects of the rescue stoking concern on Monday: Many onlookers suggested that the failure of the banks, and particularly of Silicon Valley Bank, indicated that bank supervisors might not have been monitoring vulnerabilities closely enough. The bank had grown very quickly. It had a lot of clients in one volatile industry — technology — and did not appear to have managed its exposure to rising interest rates carefully.“The Silicon Valley Bank situation is a massive failure of regulation and supervision,” said Simon Johnson, an economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.The Fed responded to that concern on Monday, announcing that it would conduct a review of Silicon Valley Bank’s oversight. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco was responsible for supervising the failed bank. The results will be released publicly on May 1, the central bank said.“The events surrounding Silicon Valley Bank demand a thorough, transparent and swift review,” Jerome H. Powell, the Fed chair, said in a statement.Mr. Kelleher said the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission should be looking into potential wrongdoing by Silicon Valley Bank’s executives.“Crises don’t just happen — they’re not like the Immaculate Conception,” Mr. Kelleher said. “People take actions that range from stupid to reckless to illegal to criminal that cause banks to fail and cause financial crises, and they should be held accountable whether they are bank executives, board directors, venture capitalists or anyone else.”One big looming question is whether the federal government will prevent bank executives from getting big compensation packages, often known as “golden parachutes,” which tend to be written into contracts.Treasury and the F.D.I.C. had no comment on whether those payouts would be restricted.Uninsured depositors at Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, who had accounts exceeding $250,000, will be paid back.David Dee Delgado/ReutersMany experts said the reality that problems at Silicon Valley Bank could imperil the financial system — and require such a big response — suggested a need for more stringent regulation.While the regional banks that are now struggling are not large enough to face the most intense level of regulatory scrutiny, they were deemed important enough to the financial system to warrant an aggressive government intervention.“At the end of the day, what has been shown is that the explicit guarantee extended to the globally systemic banks is now extended to everyone,” said Renita Marcellin, legislative and advocacy director at Americans for Financial Reform. “We have this implicit guarantee for everyone, but not the rules and regulations that should be paired with these guarantees.”Daniel Tarullo, a former Fed governor who was instrumental in setting up and carrying out financial regulation after the 2008 crisis, said the situation meant that “concerns about moral hazard, and concerns about who the system is protecting, are front and center again.” More

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    A Fed Pivot? Not Yet, Policymakers Suggest, as Rapid Inflation Lingers.

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    Federal Reserve officials on Tuesday made clear that they expected to continue raising rates to try to choke off the most rapid inflation in decades, putting them at odds with investors who had become more sanguine about the outlook for interest rate moves.Stocks prices rose following the Fed’s meeting last week, as investors celebrated what some interpreted as a pivot: Jerome H. Powell, the Fed chair, said the central bank would begin making rate decisions on a meeting-by-meeting basis, which Wall Street took as a signal that its rate moves might soon slow down.But a chorus of Fed officials has since made clear that a lurch away from rate increases is not yet in the cards.Mary C. Daly, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, said in an interview on LinkedIn on Tuesday that the Fed was “nowhere near” done raising interest rates. Charles L. Evans, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, told reporters that he would favor a half- or even a three-quarter-point rate increase in September.Neel Kashkari, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, said in an interview late last week that he did not understand why markets were dialing back their expectations for Fed rate increases.8 Signs That the Economy Is Losing SteamCard 1 of 9Worrying outlook. More

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    January Fed Minutes Show Concern About Inflation's Spread

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    Officials at the Federal Reserve expressed concern about inflation at their meeting in January, in particular that it had spread beyond pandemic-affected sectors into other areas, and agreed it would be warranted to begin scaling back their support for the economy faster than they previously had anticipated, minutes of the meeting released Wednesday showed.Fed officials noted that the labor market remained strong, though the Omicron wave of the coronavirus had worsened supply chain bottlenecks and labor shortages, and that inflation continued to significantly exceed the levels the central bank targets.Most officials still expect inflation to moderate over the year as pandemic-related supply bottlenecks ease and the Fed removes some of its support for the economy. But some participants warned that inflation could continue to accelerate, pointing to factors like rising wages and rents. If inflation does not move down as they expect, most Fed officials agreed that they might need to pare back their support for the economy even more quickly, though that could carry some risk.The outlook for inflation could be worsened by China’s zero-tolerance policy toward Covid, which has led to expansive lockdowns that have shuttered factories; a clash in Ukraine that could push up global energy prices; or the spread of another variant, they said.The central bank emphasized that the pace of interest rate increases would hinge on how the economy developed. But most officials agreed that the Fed should take a faster approach to cooling the economy than it did in 2015, when it began raising rates at a slow and plodding pace in the wake of the Great Recession.“Most participants suggested that a faster pace of increases in the target range for the federal funds rate than in the post-2015 period would likely be warranted, should the economy evolve generally in line with the committee’s expectation,” the minutes read.Fed officials also agreed that it was appropriate to proceed with plans to trim the nearly $9 trillion in securities that the central bank holds. Most officials preferred to keep to a schedule announced in December, which would end such purchases starting next month, though some viewed an earlier end to the program as warranted and a way to signal that they were taking a stronger stance to fight inflation.Policymakers said the labor market had made “remarkable progress in recovering from the recession associated with the pandemic and, by most measures, was now very strong.”The January meeting solidified what markets had been anticipating: that the Fed was on track to raise interest rates in March. The question now is how quickly, and by how much. Many investors have speculated that the Fed could raise its interest rate by half a percentage point in March, instead of its usual quarter-point increase.In a statement after their two-day policy meeting in January, Fed officials laid the groundwork for higher borrowing costs “soon.” Jerome H. Powell, the Fed chair, said at a news conference after the meeting that “I would say that the committee is of a mind to raise the federal funds rate at the March meeting, assuming that the conditions are appropriate for doing so.”Inflation has continued to run hot since the Fed’s last meeting, and wage growth remains elevated. A key inflation measure released last week showed that prices were climbing at the fastest pace in 40 years and broadening beyond pandemic-affected goods and services, a sign that rapid gains could prove longer lasting and harder to shake off.January’s Consumer Price Index showed prices jumping 7.5 percent over the year and 0.6 percent from the prior month, exceeding forecasts. A separate inflation gauge that the Fed prefers also showed that prices remained elevated at the end of 2021. Overall, prices have been climbing at the fastest pace since 1982.Wall Street is now anticipating that interest rates could rise to more than 1.75 percent by the end of the year, up from near zero now. Markets began to bet on a double-size rate increase after January’s inflation data came in surprisingly strong. But some Fed officials have been tempering those expectations, saying they need to take a steady approach.Mary C. Daly, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, said on Sunday that the Fed needed to get moving but that its approach ought to be “measured.”“I see that it is obvious that we need to pull some of the accommodation out of the economy,” Ms. Daly said on “Face the Nation.” “But history tells us with Fed policy that abrupt and aggressive action can actually have a destabilizing effect on the very growth and price stability we’re trying to achieve.” More

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    Lingering Virus, Lasting Inflation: A Fed Official Explains Her Pivot

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    Mary Daly, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, wanted to withdraw economic help slowly. Now, she might support a rate increase as soon as March.SAN FRANCISCO — Mary C. Daly was in line behind a woman in her neighborhood Walgreens in Oakland, Calif., this fall when she witnessed an upsetting consequence of inflation. The shopper, who was older, was shuffling uncomfortably as the clerk rang up her items.“She starts ruffling in her pockets, and in her purse,” Ms. Daly said in an interview. “And she says: This is a lot more expensive than it usually is. I buy these things — these are my monthly purchases.”The woman had to put something back — she chose potato chips — because she couldn’t afford everything in her basket.It would have been sobering to watch for anyone, but the moment hit especially hard for Ms. Daly, who is president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. As one of the Fed’s 18 top officials, she is one of the people who sets economic policy to help to ensure a strong job market and to keep prices for goods and services stable.Like many of her colleagues, Ms. Daly initially expected inflation to fade relatively quickly in 2021 as the economy reopened and got back to normal. But continued waves of virus that have interrupted and complicated the recovery and increasingly broad price increases have made central bankers nervous that rapid inflation and pandemic-caused labor shortages might linger.Those risks have prompted the Fed to speed up its plans to pull back policies meant to stimulate the economy. Officials had previously suggested that they would keep interest rates low for a long time to allow more people who lost or quit their jobs during the pandemic to return to the job market. But in recent weeks, they announced a plan to more rapidly scale back their other main policy to boost the economy — large-scale bond purchases that have kept long-term borrowing costs low and kept money flowing around the financial system. Concluding that program promptly could put them in position to raise interest rates as soon as March.Ms. Daly, who spoke to The New York Times in two interviews in November and December, has shifted her tone particularly dramatically in recent weeks. How she came to change her mind highlights how policymakers have been caught off guard by the persistence of high inflation and are now struggling to strike the right balance between addressing it while not harming the labor market.As recently as mid-November, she had argued that the Fed should be patient in removing its support, avoiding an overreaction to inflation that might prove temporary and risk unnecessarily slowing the recovery of the labor market. But incoming data have confirmed that employers are still struggling to hire even as consumer prices are rising at the fastest clip in nearly 40 years. Rising rents and tangled supply chains could continue to push up inflation. And she’s running into more people like that woman in Walgreens.“My community members are telling me they’re worried about inflation,” Ms. Daly said last week. “What influenced me quite a lot was recognizing that the very communities we’re trying to serve when we talk about people sidelined” from the labor market “are the very communities that are paying the largest toll of rising food prices, transportation prices and housing prices.”Ms. Daly said she supported ending bond buying quickly so that officials were in a position to begin raising interest rates. A higher Fed policy rate would percolate through the economy, lifting the costs of mortgages, car loans and even credit cards and cooling off consumer and business demand. That would eventually tamp down inflation, while also likely slowing job growth.Ms. Daly said it was too early to know when the first rate increase would be warranted, but suggested she could be open to having the Fed begin raising rates as soon as March.“I’m comfortable with saying that I expect us to need to raise rates next year,” Ms. Daly said last week. “But exactly how many will it be — two or three — and when will that be — March, June, or in the fall? For me it’s just too early to know, and I don’t see the advantage of a declaration.”Many investors and economists now expect the Fed to lift rates from their current near-zero level in March, and Christopher Waller, a Fed governor, suggested last week that he could support a move then.That higher rates could be coming so soon is a big change from what officials were signaling — and what people who watch the Fed closely were expecting — until very recently.Fed officials have long said they want the economy to return to full employment before they lift interest rates. Early in the pandemic, many policymakers suggested that they would like to see the number of people with jobs rebound to levels approaching those that prevailed in early 2020, suggesting a long period of low rates would be needed.But increasingly, officials have argued that the economy is close to achieving their employment target by focusing on the overall unemployment rate and the rates for different racial groups.The jobless rate has fallen to 4.2 percent, and Fed officials expect it to drop to 3.5 percent next year. That would match the rate that prevailed before the pandemic, and would be a marked improvement from a pandemic high of 14.8 percent in April 2020. Black unemployment is dropping swiftly, too.“The economy has been making rapid progress toward maximum employment,” Jerome H. Powell, the Fed chair, said during a news conference this month.Yet that unemployment rate tells just part of the story, because it counts only people who are actively applying for jobs. The share of people in their prime employment ages, between 25 and 54, who are either working or looking for work has dropped notably, and is only starting to recover. Ms. Daly said she was thinking about the Fed’s full employment target in terms of what is achievable in the short term, as the coronavirus keeps many workers at home, and in the longer term, when more employees may be able to return because the virus is more under control.“There’s the labor market we can get eventually, after Covid,” she said. “And there’s the labor market that we have to deal with today.”For now, job openings far exceed the number of people applying for positions, and wages are climbing briskly, two signs that suggest that workers are — at least temporarily — scarce.It may be the case that “in the short run, this is all the workers we have,” Ms. Daly said. “But in the long run, we expect more workers to come.”Retailers in her area are cutting hours on busy shopping days because they can’t hire enough staff. Production lines are shuttered. And with virus infections rising again and the new Omicron variant spreading rapidly, there is no immediate end in sight.“If we get past Covid, inflation comes down, the labor supply recovers — then definitely we want more patience, because we want time for that to work itself through,” she said. “But we have Covid, and it won’t go away.” More

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    Biden's Stimulus Is Stoking Inflation, Fed Analysis Suggests

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    Inflation is likely getting a temporary boost from the $1.9 trillion coronavirus relief package that the Biden administration ushered in early this year, new Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco research released on Monday suggested.The analysis may add fuel to a hot debate in Washington over whether the administration’s policies are contributing to a spike in prices. Critics of the government spending package that was signed into law in March, including former Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers, have said it was poorly targeted and risked overheating the economy. Supporters of the relief program have said it provided critical aid to workers and businesses still struggling through the pandemic.The new paper comes down somewhere in the middle, finding that the spending had some effect on inflation but suggesting that it is most likely to be temporary. The economists estimated that it would add 0.3 percentage points to the core Personal Consumption Expenditures inflation index in 2021 and “a bit more” than 0.2 percentage points in 2022. Core inflation strips out volatile items like food and fuel.While those numbers are significant, they are not what most people would consider “overheating” — the Fed aims for 2 percent inflation on average over time, and a few tenths of a percent here or there are not a reason for much alarm.But the result is only a rough estimate, one the researchers came up with to help inform an continuing political and economic debate.Both the Trump and Biden administrations signed trillions of dollars in virus relief spending into law. The packages included two bipartisan bills in 2020 that pumped more than $3 trillion into the economy, including direct checks to individuals and generous unemployment benefits. Another $1.9 trillion — called the American Rescue Plan — was passed this year by Democrats after they took control of both Congress and the White House.“The later timing and large size of the A.R.P. stirred debate about whether it is causing an overheating of the economy and fueling a sustained increase in inflation,” the San Francisco Fed researchers noted.The economists tried to answer that question by looking at how much spare capacity is in the economy using a labor market measure — the ratio of job openings to unemployment. The logic is that inflation tends to pick up when there is very little labor market slack, because businesses raise wages to attract workers and then raise prices to cover their climbing labor costs.Government stimulus can push up the number of job openings in the economy as it fuels demand while constraining the number of available workers because it gives would-be employees a financial cushion, allowing them to take their time as they search for a new job.Based on the package’s size and using historical evidence on how fiscal spending affects the labor market, the researchers found that the American Rescue Plan might raise the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio close to its historical peak in 1968, fueling some inflation — but that the price impact would be small and short-lived.U.S. Inflation & Supply Chain ProblemsCard 1 of 6Covid’s impact on supply continues. More